Abstract

Em 2005, o governo de Álvaro Uribe aprovou a Lei de Justiça e Paz (no 975/2005) e 40 leis adicionais para desmobilizar grupos armados fora da lei atuando na Colômbia, mas apenas as autodefensas, grupos violentos de direita, foram desmobilizadas. Essa lei, que visava reintegrar membros de grupos armados fora da lei à vida civil, estabeleceu “sanções alternativas” e conferiu à contrainsurgência das autodefensas uma natureza política. Desafios da justiça transicional na periferia: Lições do massacre de Nueva Venecia argumenta que, apesar do desenvolvimento de instrumentos legais relacionados aos direitos das vítimas e à justiça transicional, o Estado colombiano não conseguiu reparar e restaurar a dignidade da população estudada.

Highlights

  • The Ciénaga Grande de Santa Marta is the most important and largest extension ecosystem of mangroves of the Colombian Caribbean

  • This paper presents the evaluation of the effectiveness of the tools of transitional justice in the massacre of Nueva Venecia, 15 years after it occurred

  • The Unit for Victims do not recognize the displacement cases occurred in the context of events and situations presented during the armed conflict, especially, those related to the production and commercialization of drugs, as well as the actions of illegal armed groups post demobilization of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), known as criminal gangs to the service of drug trafficking (Bacrim in Spanish)26 (Ibid., p. 151)

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Summary

Juan Pablo Sarmiento

Em 2005, o governo de Álvaro Uribe aprovou a Lei de Justiça e Paz (no 975/2005) e 40 leis adicionais para desmobilizar grupos armados fora da lei atuando na Colômbia, mas apenas as autodefensas, grupos violentos de direita, foram desmobilizadas. Palavras-chave: massacre de Nueva Venecia, conflito armado interno colombiano, justiça transicional, Lei de Justiça e Paz. In 2005 the government of Álvaro Uribe approved the Justice and Peace Law (no 975/2005) and 40 additional laws intended to achieve the demobilization of armed groups outside the law in Colombia, but only the violent right-wing groups called autodefensas were demobilized. In 2005 the government of Álvaro Uribe approved the Justice and Peace Law (no 975/2005) and 40 additional laws intended to achieve the demobilization of armed groups outside the law in Colombia, but only the violent right-wing groups called autodefensas were demobilized This law, which aimed to reintegrate members of outlawed armed groups into civilian life, introduced “alternative sanctions” and gave to the autodefensas’ counterinsurgency a political nature.

Introduction
Another tool
The truth and the historical memory
Findings
Conclusion
Full Text
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