Abstract
Abstract We report the results of a field experiment designed to increase honest disclosure of claims at a U.S. state unemployment agency. Individuals filing claims were randomized to a message (‘nudge’) intervention, while an off-the-shelf machine learning algorithm calculated claimants’ risk for committing fraud (underreporting earnings). We study the causal effects of algorithmic targeting on the effectiveness of nudge messages: Without algorithmic targeting, the average treatment effect of the messages was insignificant; in contrast, the use of algorithmic targeting revealed significant heterogeneous treatment effects across claimants. Claimants predicted to behave unethically by the algorithm were more likely to disclose earnings when receiving a message relative to a control condition, with claimants predicted to most likely behave unethically being almost twice as likely to disclose earnings when shown a message. In addition to providing a potential blueprint for targeting more costly interventions, our study offers a novel perspective for the use and efficiency of data science in the public sector without violating citizens’ agency. However, we caution that, while algorithms can enable tailored policy, their ethical use must be ensured at all times.
Published Version
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