Carbon tax for energy-intensive enterprises: A study on carbon emission reduction strategies

Abstract

With the implementation of the carbon tax policy, the carbon emission reduction (CER) actions taken by leading enterprises in energy-intensive industries will significantly influence the CER decisions of their following firms. To delve into the boundary conditions of leading and following enterprises’ CER strategies, this paper constructs three tailored CER decision-making game models, specifically targeting leading and following enterprises in these industries. These models are designed to compare and analyze the impact of carbon tax on various CER decision modes. The study mainly derives: (1) Carbon tax is not always conducive to boosting the carbon reduction efforts of both corporations. Only when the carbon tax is smaller than a certain threshold will the carbon abatement efforts of leading and following corporations be proportional to the tax. Moreover, only when the lead firm abates its carbon emission does it contribute to the degree of carbon abatement effort. (2) The overall profitability of the supply chain (SC) is optimized when only the lead company reduces its carbon emissions. In this scenario, not only does the lead corporation’s carbon reduction efforts increase, but the lead corporation and the followers also realize a win–win profit. (3) The model with the highest carbon abatement effort is not necessarily conducive to the environment. When the unit product carbon abatement emissions of the two corporations are within a certain threshold interval, the ambient impact of carbon abatement by only the leading firm is greater than that of no abatement by both corporations. The effect on the environment is minimized when both corporations make CER.