Capital-constrained supply chain with multiple decision attributes: Decision optimization and coordination analysis

Abstract

A Supply Chain Finance (SCF) system involving and a commercial bank and a capital-constrained retailer is designed in the imperfect capital market with non-zero bankruptcy costs. A decentralized borrower-lender game is analyzed, and the optimal centralized strategy is developed for SCF from the perspective of multi-attribute utility (MAU) maximization, including maximizing the expected profit and the service level, as well as minimizing the bankruptcy cost. Furthermore, we analytically and numerically explore the coordination condition for SCF and conclude that the bank financing scheme with a suitable combination of decision preferences can realize coordination, even super coordination. Through sensitivity analyses and numerical experiments, we discuss the impacts of the borrower's initial capitals on the upstream firm's pricing decision and dig out why he has incentives to support the retailer's choice of adopting SCF. The findings of this study reveal that the capital-constrained retailer would require more initial capital when maximizing MAU than maximizing the expected profit, and thus the equilibrium order quantity and the bankruptcy risk would also be higher. Moreover, based on a suitable combination of decision preferences, our proposed bank financing scheme can realize coordination, even super coordination.