Building Local Integrity Systems in Southern Europe: the case of urban local corruption in Spain

Abstract

From 1997 to 2007, Spain suffered from major cases of political corruption associated with local urban development. To analyse their causes, this article examines the institutional mechanisms designed to monitor and control the performance of local policy-makers and to ensure they operated independently from private influence. It also analyses their actual effectiveness with reference to particular cases of local corruption unveiled during that decade. The Spanish case shows that local representatives had a large amount of power in distributing financial gains within the municipality, but faced little pressure to account for their actions. It argues that insufficient control mechanisms on the activities of local representatives from 1997 to 2007 can adequately explain the intensity and spread of local corruption in Spain.Points for practitionersThe article contributes to a better understanding of the factors and the causes that explain local corruption, particularly in countries where local governments fit with the ‘strong-mayor’ type. Following the Local Integrity System framework, it provides a strategy to analyse the role and impact of control mechanisms, distinguishing between internal and external controls, and administrative and judicial controls. The article also helps to understand, and presents evidence of, the mismatch between ‘formal’ institutional mechanisms on the one hand, and their actual implementation and effects on the other.