Britain in the Indian ocean

Abstract

A YEAR of intensive discussion in London on the future extent and the nature of Britain's military commitments outside Europe and the Mediterranean has so far produced only dubious generalisations on the lips of her leaders. For instance, 'Britain must remain a World Power'. This sort of statement overlooks two facts. On the one hand, Britain never was a World Power in the sense that the United States has become one, and today Britain has no intention of exercising military power in Latin America, the Far East or perhaps even Southern Africa. On the other hand, Britain, like France and China, who also consider themselves as World Powers, has an active diplomacy and a wide range of interests in almost every continent, and military force is not the only source of power. What is really under discussion is the kind of military commitments and forces Britain should attempt to maintain in one specific area, the Indian Ocean. Another catch-phrase is: 'There is a general job of peace-keeping to be done in Asia: Britain must bear her share of it'. This begs two questions: first, whether the Western Powers really can at this stage in 20th-century history keep the peace in Asia by unilateral acts of politico-military policy; and, second, whether it is to protect special or general interests that Britain is now seeking to reorganise her military positions around the Indian Ocean without abandoning them. But the generalisations of those who distrust the trend of governmental thinking are just as debatable. Mr. Enoch Powell's remark, 'However much we may do to safeguard and reassure the new independent countries in Asia and Africa, the eventual limits of Russian and Chinese advance in those directions will be fixed by a balance of forces which will itself be Asiatic and African', neglects the fact that the whole structure of international politics may become unbalanced if this conception is accepted as a guide to current policy. Similarly, the phrase 'Britain is a European Power who should put her European interests first' overlooks two points: first, that there is little objective requirement for a marked increase in British military commitment to the defence or stability of Europe (though any reduction in it will weaken Britain's not very strong political influence there); and, second, that one advantage which several continental countries see in a closer