Brexit and Social Movements

Abstract

Social movement scholars have explored the extent to which social movements have engaged in protest targeting European Union (EU) policies. However, Brexit, a portmanteau of “British exit,” is a case of direct politicization of the EU itself, where the focus is not the shape of policies but the legitimacy of EU membership per se. Movements of this kind have been rare, with much of the history of European integration being categorized by a so‐called “permissive consensus” in which the public is assumed to support the process of European integration but leaves more detailed decisions to elites. Public opinion on the EU over the last three decades has, however, arguably created a “constraining dissensus,” in which governments are constrained in their actions at the EU level because of a more interested public. Public attitudes toward European integration, according to Hooghe and Marks, relate less to preferences on the traditional left–right economic political dimension but rather to issues of identity. Those with more inclusive national identities (where national identity is seen as compatible with other identities such as European identity or cosmopolitanism) tend to support European integration, whereas those with exclusive national identities tend to oppose it. These dimensions can be witnessed in social and political movements around Brexit. These dynamics also overlap with attitudes toward social liberal values, such as gender equality and multiculturalism, as was observed in polling data on the referendum. Thus, the case of Brexit also demonstrates the need for a consideration of race and gender in our understanding of pro‐ and anti‐EU social movement activity.