Australia's defense policy: medium power, even bigger ambitions?

Abstract

Abstract Australian defense policy suggests a case where strategic ambitions exceed the country's direct security needs. But there are some peculiar reasons for this state of affairs. These include the relationship between the size of the Australian continent and its proximity to maritime Asia; Australia's sense of itself as a medium power with a strong interest in the future of the wider regional strategic balance; and the long-standing judgment that Australia needs a capacity for independent military action in its own area because even its closest allies cannot always be expected to help out. The Rudd government's 2009 Defence White Paper, the first such document in nearly a decade, confirms this pattern of thinking. In particular it reflects Australia's interest in not falling behind the defense modernization in the wider region of strong and rising powers (including, but by no means limited to, China). It helps return a sense of coherence to Australian policy which went missing in the post-9/11 era. But the new White Paper risks pushing that familiar logic too far. The Australian Defence Force envisaged for 2030 includes a larger flotilla of new-generation submarines, 100 Joint Strike Fighters alongside other capable combat aircraft, air warfare destroyers and new frigates. Many of these platforms, the White Paper suggests, could be armed with cruise missiles. This leaves no doubt that the writers of this review are serious about maritime operations in the Asian century. But one is left wondering whether the Rudd government and its successors can and will deliver on the whole package, and whether a more optimistic assessment of the region's strategic future could allow for a defense force which is closer to what has gone before.