Anti-Satellite Weapons and Arms Control: Incentives and Disincentives from the Soviet and American Perspectives

Abstract

It has become fashionable to speak of the 'militarization of space' and the United States-Soviet 'military race in space/ To many, this must certainly conjure up images of Star Wars weapons nuclear torpedo-equipped spacecraft, orbital laser battle stations continually circling Earth as they stalk enemy targets above and below. In fact, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union maintains any weapons systems in space. Rather, the military platforms in orbit are what I would term space military support systems, that is, instruments for reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, communications, navigation, detection, tracking, and early warning. These systems have no capability (in and of themselves) to destroy or otherwise to interfere with any other object in space, on land, at sea, or in the atmosphere. Of course there have been, and are now, several experimental programmes in both the United States and the Soviet Union directed toward the development of space weapons systems. These would have a rudimentary ability to interfere with, or even destroy, other objects. Examples include: preliminary investigations on the possible utility and significance of orbital missiles and nuclear bombs, manned space bombers, and explosive and anti-satellite systems. More recently, there has been discussion of space-based lasers for anti-satellite, anti-aircraft, and ballistic missile defence, aircraft-launched direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, and ground-