Abstract

Nordic Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) employ ex-vessel debris coolability as a severe accident management strategy (SAM). Core melt is released into a deep pool of water where formation of noncoolable debris bed and ex-vessel steam explosion can pose credible threats to containment integrity. Success of the strategy depends on the scenario of melt release from the vessel that determines the melt-coolant interaction phenomena. The melt release conditions are determined by the in-vessel phase of severe accident progression. Specifically, properties of debris relocated into the lower plenum have influence on the vessel failure and melt release mode. In this work we use MELCOR code for prediction of the relocated debris. Over the years, many code modifications have been made to improve prediction of severe accident progression in light-water reactors. The main objective of this work is to evaluate the effect of models and best practices in different versions of MELCOR code on the in-vessel phase of different accident progression scenarios in Nordic BWR. The results of the analysis show that the MELCOR code versions 1.86 and 2.1 generate qualitatively similar results. Significant discrepancy in the timing of the core support failure and relocated debris mass in the MELCOR 2.2 compared to the MELCOR 1.86 and 2.1 has been found for a domain of scenarios with delayed time of depressurization. The discrepancies in the results can be explained by the changes in the modeling of degradation of the core components and changes in the Lipinski dryout model in MELCOR 2.2.

Highlights

  • Severe accidents (SA) progression in nuclear power plants (NPPs) involves a large number of complex interacting phenomena and is normally divided into in-vessel and exvessel phases

  • Analysis of the in-vessel phase of SA progression focuses on the thermal-hydraulic behavior in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and primary circuit, degradation and relocation of the core, debris bed formation in the lower plenum, debris bed remelting, and interactions with vessel lower head and structures, such as vessel wall, instrumentation guide tubes (IGTs), and control rod guide tubes (CRGTs), that can result in vessel failure

  • The time of transitions (Ttr) is defined as the time of core support plate failure Tref plus 3600sec; this value was chosen based on the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) Time

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Summary

Introduction

Severe accidents (SA) progression in nuclear power plants (NPPs) involves a large number of complex interacting phenomena and is normally divided into in-vessel and exvessel phases. Nordic Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) employ filtered containment venting (FILTRA-MVSS System [6]) and exvessel debris coolability (Figure 1) as a Severe Accident Mitigation (SAM) strategy. Success of this strategy is dependent on melt release conditions from the vessel, which were identified as the major contributor to the uncertainty in Science and Technology of Nuclear Installations

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