An Introduction to Nuclear Strategy and Small Nuclear Powers: Using North Korea as a Case

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes I would like to express appreciation to Robert Ayson, Peter Lavoy, Alexandre Mansourov, T. V. Paul, and Thomas Schelling. 1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton UP 1976) p.75. 2 Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New York: Norton 2003) p.14. 3 George W. Bush, National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington DC: White House Dec. 2002) pp.1–2. 4 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Unconventional Weapons’, in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000); James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (eds.), The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge 2000). 5 David Albright and Paul Brannan, ‘The North Korean Plutonium Stock Mid‐2006’, 26 June 2006, at 〈www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/dprkplutonium.pdf〉. 6 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.69–86; Robert J. Art, ‘The Four Functions of Force’, International Security 4/4 (Spring 1980) pp.4–14. 7 See, for example, Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989); Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’ (note 2). 8 Waltz, ‘More May Be Better’ (note 2) p.20. 9 See Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1960) p.188; Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings 1993). 10 Glenn Snyder, ‘The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror’, in Paul Seabury (ed.), The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler 1965). 11 Re. Bureaucratic politics, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman 1999). About organizational politics, see Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton UP 1993); Scott D. Sagan, ‘More Will Be Worse’ (note 2) pp.62–73. 12 The Eisenhower, Carter, and Reagan administrations delegated the authority to use nuclear weapons under some circumstances to senior military commanders. For Carter and Reagan, see Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (note 9), pp.50, 187. The Soviet Union may have created a system that, if turned on, would have automatically launched a massive strike if it detected an attack. Bruce G. Blair, ‘Russia’s Doomsday Machine’, New York Times, 8 Oct. 1993. Authority to launch missiles with chemical or biological warheads was predelegated to Iraqi field commanders in 1991. 13 For example, North Korea might use ships flying flags of convenience, ship‐borne freight containers, or pleasure yachts. 14 Schelling, Arms and Influence (note 6) p.36. 15 Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (note 9) pp.187–203. 16 Schelling, Arms and Influence (note 6) pp.49–55. 17 For weapons with yields up to 200 kilotons, ‘protection against blast, initial radiation, and thermal radiation becomes practical at a half mile from ground zero’. Samuel Glasstone, The Effects of Atomic Weapons (New York: McGraw‐Hill 1950) p.375. 18 According to L.W. McNaught, Nuclear Weapons and Their Effects (New York: Brassey’s 1984) p.83, 50 per cent of tanks will sustain moderate damage at an overpressure of about 22 pounds per square inch (psi). According to Theodore C. Mataxis and Seymour L. Goldberg, Nuclear Tactics: Weapons and Firepower in the Pentomic Division, Battle Group, and Company (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co. 1958) p.15, 30 psi ‘will effectively damage a tank’. A 20 kiloton airburst will produce a 22 psi overpressure at about 800 yards. The primary kill mechanism against armored forces is prompt radiation in the form of neutrons. A 20 kiloton airburst will yield 200 rems at about 1,600 yards and 600 rems at about 1,400 yards. Samuel Glasstone, Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1977 (Washington DC: US GPO 1977) p.346. 19 Glasstone, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1977 (note 18) p.539. 20 ‘Spokesman for Foreign Ministry Assails US Cry for Preemptive Attack’, Korean Central News Agency, 6 April 2006. 21 Bermudez, ‘The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’ (note 4) p.183. 22 Homer T. Hodge, ‘North Korea’s Military Strategy’, Parameters 33/1 (Spring 2003) pp.72–3. 23 Schelling, Arms and Influence (note 6) pp. 91–125.