Al‐Azhar and the Salafis in Egypt: Contestation of two traditions

Abstract

Al-Azhar's religious authority extends beyond Egypt to many parts of the Sunni world. Its claim to authority is not uncontroversial: at various times it has been the subject of scrutiny for political and non-political movements including the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafi movement in Egypt, and Salafi actors abroad. Egyptian Salafis have long criticised Al-Azhar over various issues, doctrinally and jurisprudentially. Salafi ‘ulamā’ in Egypt dedicate sermons, lectures, religious rulings and publications to undermining Al-Azhar's religious credibility and commitment to what the Salafis consider to be “authentic” Islam. The Salafis might be a marginal influence in Egyptian society and lie on the periphery of Egypt's religious field, but Al-Azhar has actively sought to counter their influence. Al-Azhar's leadership became more concerned with the Salafis during the later years of the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, who allowed Salafis to preach freely to counter the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The state at the time was concerned with the Muslim Brotherhood's popularity after they performed well in the 2005 Egyptian elections. Although much has been written on Al-Azhar as a religious institution and on the Salafi movement in Egypt, there is limited research on the contestation and interactions between the two. This article starts by looking at the history of the Salafi movement in Egypt, and its transnational nature. It then, by way of further background, examines Al-Azhar's status and co-optation by the state in Egypt, making the institution a representation of ‘official Islam’ in the country. The article then, relying mostly on primary sources, analyses the theological divide between al-Azhar and the Salafis in Egypt. Finally, the article outlines the socio-political contestations that have shaped the interactions between the Al-Azhar and the Salafi movement in Egypt. This article finds that the Salafi-Azhari contestation revolves around three overlapping issues: Salafi disdain for Sufism, the Ahl al-Ḥadīth-Ash‘arī creedal divide, and socio-political contestation in modern Egypt. Al-Azhar, despite occasional conflict with the state and sustaining frequent attacks from the Salafis, remains the first and foremost religious authority in the country and enjoys the status of the gatekeepers of Islam. The Salafis have largely remained beyond the margins, and were further sidelined by Al-Azhar and the state following the rise of ISIS. Muslim reformists of the 19th century, such as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh, are identified as Salafis, but contemporary Egyptian Salafis do not subscribe to their modernist aspirations. Today, ‘Abduh and al-Afghanī can be described as “enlightened Salafis”, calling for a return to the Qur‘ān and ḥadīth in the quest to reinterpret Islam by emphasising the need for reason and logic. They were critical of the social stagnation of Muslim societies, which according to them was a consequence of Muslims blindly imitating existing rulings of Sunni schools of thought that were not adapted to deal with the changing circumstances of Muslim societies.1 Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), a disciple of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, steered the Salafi movement towards a more conservative outlook, especially towards the end of his life when he fostered relations with ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Sa‘ud, the founder of the modern Saudi state. Riḍā mourned the abolition of the caliphate and was determined to revive it. He supported Ibn Sa‘ud's leadership, arguing that he was the ruler most committed to preserving the Muslim community. ‘Abduh, on the other hand, thought poorly of the House of Sa‘ud and its clerics, derogatorily identified as Wahhābīs. He stated that the Wahhābīs were “[more narrow-minded and disgruntled than the blind imitators]”.2 Riḍā ignored his mentor's disdain of the Wahhābīs to publish the works of the Najdī ‘ulamā’ (the “Najdī” being a reference to the period before the establishment of the modern Saudi state) in his magazine, Al-Manār. The magazine, established in 1898, included the works of the eponymous founder of the Wahhābī school of thought, Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb. Riḍā himself wrote treatises to counteract the criticisms levelled against Ibn Sa‘ud and his cohorts of ‘ulamā’ for their fanaticism and rigid interpretation of Islam. In Al-Sunna wa al- Shī‘a aw al-Wahhābīyya wa al-Rāfiḍa (Sunna and Shī‘a or Wahhābīyya and Rāfiḍa), Riḍā attacked Shī‘a figures for their religious deviance and corruption, while praising Ibn Sa‘ud's commitment to protecting Islam from Shī‘a practices.3 Ibn Sa‘ud respected Rashīd Riḍā, which contributed to Riḍā's aura of authority in religious matters. He attempted to rehabilitate Wahhābīsm, including by challenging a Wahhābī ‘ālim for condemning those who believed that the earth was not flat.4 In the words of Henri Lauzière, for Riḍā, “it was better either to judge the Wahhābīs on the basis of their pragmatic and moderate political leader or to accept the fact that some fanaticism was better for the umma than the erosion of Islamic identity.”5 However, Riḍā himself embraced conservatism towards the end of his life, evident in his antagonistic positions towards the Shī‘a mentioned above. Riḍā's networks of clerics enjoyed similar patronage from Saudi Arabia. He sent his disciple Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqī there to foster relations with the Najdī ‘ulamā’. Al-Fiqī became widely respected in the kingdom, and continued Riḍā's efforts, although he did not enjoy the authority that Riḍā exuded. Many of Riḍā's Egyptian followers migrated to Saudi Arabia during the early postcolonial era. In 1926, al-Fiqī established a Salafi association in Egypt, Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya. High-profile members of the association were regular travellers from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, and the association received support from the Saudi ruling family. In 1954, Prince Nāyif paid a visit to Egypt and met with Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya's ‘ulamā’. Nāyif described the ‘ulamā’ of Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya as the Saudi kingdom's “religious ambassadors”. He committed to giving 100 Egyptian pounds to the association annually.6 Al-Fiqī died in 1959. His position as the head of the association was filled by ‘Abd al-Razzāq ‘Afīfī (d. 1994: Riyadh), an al-Azhar graduate. Like al-Fiqī, ‘Afīfī was influential within Najdī religious circles. He studied at the college of Shari‘a in Riyadh. His leadership of Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya was short as he decided to return to Saudi Arabia in 1964, to become director of the Institute of the Judiciary. ‘Afīfī was replaced within Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya by ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Wakīl, who led the association from 1960 until 1969.7 During this time the association was weakened by Nasser's decision to merge Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya with another religious association known as Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. The state's move undermined the autonomy of Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya as it was treated as an extension of Jam‘iyya al-Shar‘iyya. Al-Wakīl left Egypt and pursued studies in Saudi Arabia until his death in 1971. The remaining Egyptian Salafi ‘ulamā’ dedicated their efforts to social services and scholarly endeavours, which protected them from being targeted by Nasser's regime. Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya maintained political quietism as part of its ideology, at least when it was politically necessary to do so – the organisation was consistently vocal against imperialism, hardly ever a controversial position. In its early years the organisation had expressed support for King Farouq (r.1936-1952).8 When the Free Officers Movement removed the monarchy in a military coup, the organisation offered messages of support to the movement's leader, Muḥammad Naguib, and his senior officers. The decision to transfer loyalty as soon as power shifted to the nationalists was justified by the view that political involvement would contribute to the destabilisation of the community. Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya ensured that it was loyal to the state and that the state noticed. Following the failed attempt on Nasser's life in 1954 by a militant member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya pledged sympathy for Nasser. Ḥāmid al-Fiqī paid a visit to him and the group publicly asserted its apolitical stance in implicit solidarity with the state. Nasser was pleased with Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya and expressed his gratitude in a letter. In 1956, the group commended Nasser, describing him as “The Great Arab Leader” for his efforts to nationalise the Suez canal.9 This obeisance enabled the Salafis in Egypt to distance themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood, and carve out a semblance of an autonomous future away from the scrutiny of the state. This arrangement persisted until the fall of Mubarak, when the Egyptian Salafi movement began to fragment along apolitical and political lines. It would be inaccurate to argue that Egyptian Salafis within Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya did not comment on political events at all. Its leaders issued condemnations of some political figures in the Arab world. In 1991, Al-Tawḥīd, a Salafi magazine published by Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya, dedicated a section to condemning Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi, and even declared their infidelity to Islam. The magazine discussed Saddam's transgressions in Kuwait and his tyrannical rule in Iraq.10 In an earlier publication, Al-Tawḥīd supported Saudi Arabia's decision to allow US troops to be based on Saudi soil to help repel Saddam's forces. The article even went on to attack the activist Salafis who emerged during this period to criticise the Saudi ruling family for its acquiescence to the US. In line with its support for the Saudi religious establishment, and its figurehead at the time, Shaykh ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Ibn Bāz (Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993-1999), Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya supported Ibn Bāz's fatwā permitting Saudi Arabia's collaboration with the US.11 Egypt's Salafis recognised that there was safe political involvement—speaking out against imperialism and against Egypt's enemies—and unsafe political involvement. Despite Al-Azhar's long-held status as the vanguard of Islam in Egypt, the institution has had its struggles. In the early nineteenth century it underwent the modernisation of its educational, organisational and administrative structures prompted by the country's Ottoman ruler, Muḥammad ‘Alī. Ḥassan al-‘Attār (1766-1834), who studied medicine as well as religious subjects, was critical of religious education as too limited. His relations with Muḥammad ‘Alī's government contributed to his contentious appointment as the Shaykh of Al-Azhar in 1831. The position of Shaykh of Al-Azhar became significant in ensuring that the state's desired reforms were implemented. Al-‘Attār, supported by his disciples including Rifā‘a Rāfi‘al-Ṭahṭāwī, expanded and modernised Islamic education by bringing it, in the words of Nathan Spannaus, “in line with contemporary European norms”.12 From 1895 to 1930, the state introduced further policies that transformed Al-Azhar's educational structures and allowed the institution to control religious education in Egypt. Although these policies empowered the ‘ulamā’ of Al-Azhar, they also opened the institution to the criticism of being subservient to the state, tainting their religious legitimacy.13 Reformist Azhari scholars who valued the modernisation of Islamic religious education dominated the institution's leadership. The likes of Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905) further emphasised the reformist agenda. He and his colleagues advocated ijtihād to replace taqlīd (imitation of existing rulings), which they considered crucial to ensure social progress in Muslim societies. Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (1881-1945) strengthened the reformist elements within the institution, and called for reforming the curriculum of Al-Azhar by combining religious education with scientific knowledge. Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya took it upon itself to push back against Al-Azhar's reforms, promoting conservatism and preaching religious purification. In the words of Nathan Spannaus: “Criticism of al-Azhar's educational and religious approach played a significant role in the group's orientation; its main ideologue and leader, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Wakil (1913-1970), developed his influential anti-Sufi stance while a student at the Azhar branch in Tanta, where he was attacked for questioning his teachers’ Sufi-infused instructions.”14 When the institution was bureaucratised under Gamal Abdel Nasser's rule in 1961, the government ensured a “state-controlled religious monopoly”.15 In the words of Malika Zeghal, “Nasser's modernization of al-Azhar was a way for the ra'is to control closely the religious institutions and to appropriate religion, without making it disappear from the public sphere.”16 Al-Azhar began to endorse state decisions including through issuing supportive religious rulings (fatāwā). Nasser's government appropriated Al-Azhar's endowments in 1952, which weakened its economic power and paved the way for later changes. The modernisation of the institution also saw the insertion of non-religious subjects into the curriculum of its primary and secondary schooling systems. At tertiary level Al-Azhar students were given the option to enrol in non-religious courses including engineering, pharmacy and medicine. The bureaucratisation of Al-Azhar co-opted most of its clerics but also produced peripheral ‘ulamā’ who continued to challenge Al-Azhar leadership and the state.17 Salafi ‘ulamā’ have long kept a hawkish eye on Al-Azhar's leadership, not hesitating to criticise the institution's ‘ulamā’ for their alleged dilution of Islam. The criticism of Al-Azhar and its leadership revolves around three overlapping issues: Salafi disdain for Sufism, the Ahl al-Ḥadīth-Ash‘arī creedal divide, and socio-political contestation in modern Egypt. Rashīd Riḍā's conservative turn involved him promoting a strict interpretation of tawḥīd (monotheism) in an effort to preserve the correct ‘aqīdah (creed). This attracted criticism from Sufi Azharis including Shaykh Yūsuf al-Dijwī, who published in Al-Azhar's magazine, Nūr al-Islām. Al-Dijwī noted Riḍā's avid support for ‘Abd al-Azīz Ibn Sa‘ud and critically examined the Wahhābī movement for their practice of takfīr (declaring the infidelity of others), which he considered abhorrent. Riḍā replied by attacking al-Dijwī and the Sufi tradition in general. Riḍā wrote that al-Dijwī defended corruption in religion.18 He criticised al-Dijwī's support for Sufi traditions that violated what Riḍā considered correct religious practice. Riḍā highlighted the practices of shrine and grave visitations, praying to the dead, intercessions, circulating graves as if they were the Ka‘bah, and celebrating the birthdays of Sufi saints. Riḍā argued in this article that many Azhari scholars had written to him criticising al-Dijwī's publications. According to him, these silent detractors were not part of Al-Azhar's leadership and feared for their positions if they opposed al-Dijwī publicly. The article continued with Rashīd Riḍā attacking Al-Azhar's reliance on so-called “old” religious traditions propagated by the Ottomans. He took offense to al-Dijwī's criticisms of the Najdī tradition and went on to defend the Wahhābīs on a number of issues. According to Riḍā, the accusation against the Wahhābīs regarding their practice of takfīr was inaccurate, as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his cohorts of clerics engaged in the practice with caution and restraint, and relied on the consensus of the community before making a takfīr declaration.19 Riḍā sought rhetorically to bring the Wahhābīs into the Sunni fold by vouching for them as Ḥanbalīs in their practices, claiming that he had carefully studied the works of the Wahhābī ‘ulamā’ before forming his views about them.20 Riḍā defended the Wahhābīs for what he considered to be their commitment to Islam, arguing that they had removed corrupt practices from their homeland such as the worshipping of graves, trees and rocks. He expressed incredulity that al-Dijwī would choose to attack the Wahhābīs and disregard their track record of preserving authentic Islamic practices.21 In 1937 al-Fiqī established Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya's magazine, Hady al-Nabawī. The magazine promoted Salafi creed and featured prominent scholars from overseas, publishing the works of Ibn Taymiyya and Saudi ‘ulamā’. Other Salafi ‘ulamā’ wrote in the magazine about ‘deviant’ Sufi practices. They included Abū al-Wafā’ Darwīsh, who penned an article titled al-Iḥsān wa al-Taṣawwuf in 1945. Darwīsh was critical in his article of the concept of taṣawwuf (Sufism). He argued that Sufism was alien during the time of the Prophet and the rightly guided caliphs. He further stated that Sufism was a Greek word, drawing a link to the translation by the Abbasids during al-Ma'mūn's rule (786-833) of the works of Persians, Greeks and Hindus. Through this link he asserted the inauthentic nature of Sufism in Islamic traditions.22 These works, critical of the Sufi tradition, did not sit well with Al-Azhar's leadership. The efforts to protect Al-Azhar from Salafi influence saw the Azhari leadership expel a Saudi student of Najdī background in the 1930s. ‘Abdullah al-Quṣaymī (1907-1996) criticised al-Dijwī and Sufism in a publication entitled Al-Burūq al-Najdīyya fī Iktisāḥ al-Zulumāt al-Dijwīyya (The Lightning Bolts from Najd for the Removal of the Dijwī Darkness). Al-Quṣaymī was known for his Wahhābī orientation, which obviously dismayed the Azhari leadership.23 Riḍā condemned the expulsion and defended al-Quṣaymī's criticisms of Sufism.24 One of the strongest critics of the Azhari Sufi tradition was ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Wakīl, who headed Anṣār al-Sunna in the 1960s. Al-Wakīl wrote a book titled Hadhihi hiya al-Ṣūfīyyah (This is Sufism), published in 1955.25 Until today the book has been a source of reference for Salafi ‘ulamā’ in Egypt when discussing Sufi traditions in the country. Al-Wakīl highlighted what he considered to be the ‘deviance’ of Sufism. Al-Wakīl is known as ‘the Hammer of Deviations’ for his vocal disdain for ‘philosophers’, Baha'is and other groups. But his foremost target was the Sufis. As stated by Richard Gauvain, “Without a doubt, however, in al-Wakīl's view, the worst of all Muslim deviants are the Sufis – not, we should add, just the monistic proponents of ‘drunk Sufism’, such as Mansur al-Hallaj (d. 922) or Muhyi al-Din Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240), but all Sufis, past and present.”26 Al-Wakīl's anti-Sufi awakening was first articulated in a published treatise, Maṣra‘ al-Taṣawwuf (1953), in which he explained his conversion to Salafism. Al-Wakīl narrated his experience under the tutelage of Azhari professors at the university's branch in Tanta. He alleged that corrupt practices, amounting to infidelity, were common including “un-Islamic” songs and chants.27 Al-Wakīl was also critical of the relationship between Sufi shaykhs and their students (murīd), which he characterised as exploitative. He alleged that Sufi Shaykhs dictated to, enslaved and abused their students, and that the students had few avenues to escape as Sufi tradition made it difficult to transfer to another ṭarīqa (Sufi order). One of the factors that compelled Al-Wakīl to publish this treatise was his attempt to respond to Sufi Shaykhs who had reported him to public prosecutors for his polemical fire against Sufism.28 “The Sufi orders present a way to purify the soul, amend ethics, and strengthen society's standards. The orders lead the disciple on the path of fulfilling the Prophet's directions in practice so he will become a true and honest Muslim believer. Only the one who took upon himself the Sufi road in true devotion will feel the influence of the Sufi ṭuruq, and then God will favour him with spiritual inspiration through which he could accomplish the realization of spiritual awareness.”29 The quietism of most Egyptian Salafi clerics shielded them from being targeted by the country's succession of autocratic regimes. In Nathan Brown's words: “Egypt's Salafis lived a precarious existence under the Mubarak regime. The apolitical nature of their teachings put security services at ease and Salafi preachers and learning centres were generally left unmolested as long as they steered clear of any political topics.”33 This was not universally the case. A Salafi branch in Cairo led by Nash'at Ibrāhīm, ‘Abd al-Maqṣūd and Fauzī al-Sa‘īd were known to be more political. Another Salafi organisation in Alexandria, Al-Da‘wah al-Salafiyya, had an encounter with Egyptian security services in 2010: one of its members, Sayyid Bilāl, died in police custody.34 Despite these occasional cases, the state under the Mubarak regime was generally receptive towards Salafi ‘ulamā’, allowing them to preach freely. The freedom that the state afforded to Salafis increased following the Brotherhood's impressive performance in the 2005 election. The state saw the Salafis as a helpful tool to counter the growing popularity of the Brotherhood. At about the same time, Salafi satellite channels such as Al-Raḥma, Al-Nās and Al-Ḥikma started to become platforms for Salafi ‘ulamā’ to preach throughout Egypt and the Arab world. The channels allowed the likes of Muḥammad Ḥassān, Isḥāq al-Ḥuweiny and Muḥammad Ya‘qūb to become celebrities, working with other Salafi ‘ulamā’ in the region including those from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.35 Salafi ‘ulamā’ now had both the permission and the means to speak about issues concerning Salafi creed and practices. Through his popular channel, Al-Raḥma, Muḥammad Ḥassān expressed his disdain for Egyptian Sufi culture. He pointed to Muslims who visited shrines asking for assistance and forgiveness, declaring these acts to be removed from Islam and amounting to infidelity on the ground that they contradicted the oneness of God (tawḥīd).36 Having said this, Ḥassān was careful not to declare all Sufis as engaging in deviant acts. He divided them into two categories. The first was those who signified their devotion to Allah through prayers and dhikr (an act of remembrance in which prayers are uttered and repeated). In identifying this category he repeated Ibn Taymiyya's view that some Sufis followed the correct practices of Islam and displayed their devotion to God. The second category were those who danced, took drugs, chanted, and played musical instruments. He considered these Sufis as extreme in their practices.37 Ḥassān appeared on Al-Raḥma in 2011 after Al-Azhar and Sufi leaders criticised Salafi clerics for their rhetoric against Sufi practices in Egypt. The media spokesperson for the Egyptian Sufi order Al-‘Azmīyya, ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm al-‘Azmī, called into the programme and praised Ḥassān for his clarity in assessing Sufism in general. However, al-‘Azmī criticised other Salafi preachers for their uncompromising attitudes and superficial assessments of Sufism, including slandering Sufis as “grave worshippers”.38 The increasing popularity of Salafis after 2005 caused al-Azhar ‘ulamā’ to dedicate more concerted efforts to counter the growing clout of Salafis, especially following reports of attacks on Sufi shrines attributed to the Salafi influence. Al-Ṭayyib confronted the Salafis on myriad issues, including their foreign origin. In a television interview, Al-Ṭayyib was asked to comment on Salafi preachers who were gaining popularity, and their connections to Al-Azhar. He replied that true Al-Azhar scholars would not alienate others, unlike the Salafi tradition. He referred to their uncompromising attitudes towards other schools of thought. Al-Ṭayyib acknowledged that many Azhari ‘ulamā’ were Sufi Shaykhs themselves.39 Such acknowledgement from Al-Ṭayyib demonstrates the strength and acceptance of the Sufi tradition within Al-Azhar. Al-Ṭayyib was also asked to clarify his connection with Sufi orders in Egypt. He did not deny the association, although made the qualification that he was not a Sufi Shaykh himself. Al-Ṭayyib discussed his Sufi lineage through his father, grandfather and brother, who were Sufi Shaykhs. Al-Ṭayyib's ancestral Sufi connections began with the Khalwatīyya order that was brought to Egypt by ‘ulamā’ from Turkey and is followed by many Azhari ‘ulamā’. One the order's clerics was Shaykh Aḥmad al-Dardīr, a prominent Maliki jurist who taught at al-Azhar. His work remains instrumental in the curriculum of al-Azhar, especially within the college of Shari‘a. Al-Ṭayyib in his interview explained the legitimacy of the Khalwatīyyah, arguing that its Shaykhs were prominent ‘ulamā’ from al-Azhar. Al-Ṭayyib emphasised the teachings of al-Dardīr, quoting him as saying “our ṭarīqat (order) is knowledge” to illustrate that the main goal of the order was knowledge. He highlighted other aims of the order, including assisting the poor and solving problems within communities.40 Sufi traditions are receptive of meditation and spiritual guidance from Sufi shaykhs. For Salafis in Egypt these practices violate the oneness of God. In a two-hour lecture titled Shirkiyyāt al-Ṣūfīyah (The Sufi association of God with other beings), Sa‘īd Raslān, a Salafi cleric known for his anti-Azhar orientation, overt support for the Saudi ruling family and abhorrence towards the Muslim Brotherhood and activist Salafis, outlined the “deviant” nature of Sufism. The lecture singled out a number of Sufi orders, including the Khalwatīyyah, and the writings of Aḥmad al-Dardīr. He described the compilation of contemplative prayers by Sufi shaykhs as beyond acceptable religious norms.41 It is well-established that Al-Azhar follows the Ash‘arī and Māturīdī schools of theology.42 As mentioned above, the institution also embraces several Sufi orders when it comes to spiritual asceticism. Al-Azhar accepts the legitimacy of all the four Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Ḥanafī, Mālikī, Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī), as well as both the Shī‘a Ja‘farī and Zaydī schools. In contrast, the Salafis are largely opposed to Ash‘arī and Māturīdī theology; the lack of support is rooted in history. The Ash‘arī school, founded by Abū al-Ḥassān al-Ash‘arī (d.935), emphasises rational philosophies (kalām) and the importance of reason as a source of knowledge. The school promotes intellectual endeavours which allow the Qur’ān and aḥadīth to be reinterpreted while taking existing interpretations into consideration to account for changing circumstances. The Salafis align themselves with the Ahl al-Ḥadīth championed by Muḥammad Ibn Ḥanbal, reject kalām (speculative theology), and promote a literalist interpretation of religious sources. According to some accounts, al-Ash‘arī may have endorsed Ḥanbalī literalism, but that position changed as “he came to develop a distinctly Ash‘arite approach by combining the best of rationalism and traditionalism. He argued that the sole reliance on Scripture (al-nass) is the attitude of the lazy or the ignorant, whereas reliance on reason alone (al-‘aql) is dangerous. The best approach, he believed, was to combine reason with revelation.”43 A brief examination of the differences should suffice to provide context to understand the Egyptian Salafi-Azhari animosity. One point of contestation looks at providing the existence of Allah through the philosophical tool of kalām (speculative theology). Salafis have traditionally rejected speculative theology in proving the existence of God. To them, God's existence is obvious, and the need to prove it is unnecessary. To the Salafis, kalām in particular is problematic as its dialectic processes will only destabilise the attributes of Allah. The rejection of kalām contributes to another thematic dispute between the Salafis and Ash‘arīs, with the former accepting every attribute of Allah mentioned in the Qur’ān and Muḥammad's traditions as literal and unquestionable. The Salafi tradition affirms every noun that is attributed to Allah in the Qur’ān. For example, Ibn ‘Uthaymīn highlighted the verse “Rather, both His hands are extended; He spends however He wills.” [al-Mā'idah: 64].44 “So it is apparent from this verse that Allah, the Most High, has two real Hands. It is obligatory to affirm them for Him. If a person were to say: “The actual intent of the two Hands is the power of Allah,” then we say in response: This is to alter the apparent meaning of the verse, and this is something not permitted – and it is not permitted to utter such speech because to do so is to speak about Allah without knowledge.”45 Ahl as-Sunna wal-Jama‘ah [Sunni Muslims] are the Ash‘arites and Maturidis (adherents of the theological systems of Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi and Imam Abul-Hasan al-Ash‘ari). In matters of belief, they are followers of any of the four schools of thought (Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki or Hanbali) and are also the followers of the Sufism of Imam Junaid al-Baghdadi in doctrines, manners and [spiritual] purification.54 Sa‘īd Raslān described Al-Azhar's attempts to marginalise the Salafis as the product of an age-old animosity, which according to him originated with the divide between the Ahl al-Ḥadīth and the Ash‘arīs and Sufis. Raslān described the Salafis’ clerical opponents as the “Shuyūkh Mawalīd Al-Azhariyyīn” which is meant to refer to Azhari ‘ulamā’ who celebrate saints, a practice that Salafi ‘ulamā’ consider deviant as a matter of course. Raslān referred to Al-Azhar leadership's tolerance for graduates who held controversial views including Muṣṭafā al-Rāshid “al-Azhari” [added by Raslān, denoting affiliation with al-Azhar], whom he described as a heretic. Raslān also mentioned Muḥammad ‘Abdullah Naṣr “al-Azhari”.56 These two graduates of Al-Azhar are controversial within Egyptian religious circles as they preach a more liberal approach to issues including alcohol and women's dress. Another Azhari academic whom Raslān singled out is Sa‘ad al-Dīn al-Hilālī, who teaches Islamic ju