Administrative and judicial oversight of trilogues

Abstract

ABSTRACT The system of informal legislative negotiations between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission now exist for about two decades. While so-called ‘trilogues’ aim to enhance the efficiency of the legislative process, their relative lack of transparency has led them to be criticized for undermining the possibilities of member state parliaments and citizens to meaningfully oversee, debate and participate in EU legislative decision making. We explore to which extent efforts to address these shortcomings have been successful, focussing on the oversight role of administrative and judicial actors, in particular the European Ombudsman and the Court of Justice. We argue that both the institutional structures and agendas of these actors influence the way they confront the question of trilogue transparency. Whereas the Court’s focus is on safeguarding EU constitutional principles relating to democracy, the Ombudsman increasingly takes an expansive view of the concept of maladministration.