Abstract
This article investigates whether the European Ombudsman acts as an ‘independent’ institution vis-à-vis the European Parliament (EP). This is a relevant question because while the Ombudsman is appointed by and reports to the EP, it can also conduct inquiries into the work of the EP, in instances of alleged maladministration. Based on the empirical examination of all decisions following an inquiry by the Ombudsman in cases against the EP for an eleven-year period (2004–2015), plus the review of two recent landmark own-initiative inquiries, we inductively construct three roles played by the Ombudsman in relation to the EP, namely: ‘arbitrator’, ‘transparency watchdog’, and ‘vessel for civil society concerns’. These roles are used to operationalize the concept of independence. We conclude that the Ombudsman acts independently and is not a mere auxiliary organ of the European legislature. This is most apparent in the ‘transparency watchdog’ role, where the European Ombudsman has ensured the release of information empowering citizens to hold the Parliament accountable, or—failing that—has stimulated debate concerning such information (for instance, on the MEPs’ financial allowances) both within the Parliament itself and in the wider public domain.
Highlights
The academic debate on the European Union’s (EU) democratic deficit has been described as being ‘crowded waters’ (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007)
The European Ombudsman (EO) is expressly tasked with investigating maladministration within EU institutions and bodies—it constitutes a channel of scrutiny dedicated exclusively to how public officials carry out their activities
The EO is appointed exclusively by the European Parliament (EP), with no role to play for other EU institutions or Member States
Summary
The academic debate on the European Union’s (EU) democratic deficit has been described as being ‘crowded waters’ (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2007). The role of the EP in the ‘external’ politics of the EU has been upgraded since the Lisbon Treaty, as the Parliament gained the right to veto international trade agreements, to just give one example (Rosén, 2016) To reflect these developments, and to show how the EO engages the EP when it is acting in a more entrepreneurial manner, we complement the case analysis with a discussion of two landmark own-initiative inquiries of the EO. This choice of cases allows us to contrast a situation where the EO aligned with the EP to challenge the Commission and the Council (i.e., the TTIP inquiry) with one where the EO acted alone to challenge all three institutions (i.e., the trilogues inquiry) (see Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017, in this issue) Observing this contrast is relevant for the EO’s independence because it shows us whether or not an alliance with the EP has an impact on its activity.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
