Abdürrezzak Bedirhan: Ottoman Kurd and Russophile in the Twilight of Empire

Abstract

In a January 1914 article in London journal The National Review, Walter Guinness described situation in Ottoman eastern Anatolia. (1) Events in that distant region were topical, even for a British audience. The Ottoman Empire had long served as a barrier to Russia's southern expansion, but now it was reeling from catastrophic defeats of Balkan wars and its breakdown and final partition appeared imminent. Ottoman eastern Anatolia, just across Russia's Caucasian border, was heating up as a site of great-power competition. Russia had been locking horns with Germany for more than a year over a scheme for future reform of region's administration, ostensibly for providing greater security to region's Armenians against more numerous Kurds. In Impressions of Armenia and Kurdistan Guinness called attention to incapacity of Ottoman administration to maintain order, precarious position of region's Armenians, and shadow of Russian military power ... thrown across Caucasian frontier. The region's Armenian minority, Guinness noted, traditionally had regarded prospect of Russian rule with ambivalence. But because of region's chronic and sometimes violent disorder, Russia's recent tack away from repression of its own Armenians in domestic policy, and skillful Russian propaganda, it now seemed that eastern Anatolia's Armenians looked with favor at prospect of Russian rule. What Guinness could not fathom, however, was the liking which Kurds show for Unlike beleaguered Armenians, Kurds dominated local politics, were very free of any form of Turkish interference, and had no obvious reason to wish to break from Istanbul. Yet, Guinness discovered, many Kurds indeed not only welcomed prospect of Russian rule but were even carrying rifles supplied by Russia. (2) For a European correspondent in 1914 notion that imperial Russia could hold appeal for Muslim tribesmen was difficult to comprehend. After all, as Guinness laid out, even Ottoman Armenians' affinity for Russia was conditional, more product of alienation from Ottoman administration than attraction toward Russia. That Russia could command fear and demand respect was understandable, but what of positive value could Russia offer? Historians of Near East have by and large missed this question for three sets of reasons: their starting assumptions about imperial Russian policy in region, limited access to sources, and a polarization of historiography. Typically, historians of Near East have reduced Russia's impact on region to projection of unidimensional military and diplomatic power, overlooking such things as impact of Baku's oil industry on migration patterns in Iran and wider influence of socialist movements in Caucasus? Moreover, when they do discuss Russia's influence in region at beginning of 20th century, they operate within a narrative framework constrained by nationalist teleology and restrict their focus to Russian sponsorship of Christians in general and Armenians in particular, all but ignoring Russia's relationship with Kurds. In addition to these conceptual assumptions about nature of Russia's interaction with Middle East, linguistic barriers endemic to transregional research spanning Russia and its non-European borderlands, coupled with earlier obstacles to obtaining access to Russian and Ottoman archives alike, also help explain why scholars have left Russia's relationship with Kurds in obscurity. Nonetheless, formerly restricted access to sources can provide only part of explanation. Contemporary observers from Europe and America, including diplomats, missionaries, and journalists such as Guinness, were aware of Russia's dealings with Kurds and informed both their governments and their publics about them. Perhaps largest part of explanation stems from polarization of what might be termed Anatolian historiography but, in reflection of underlying problem, is instead known as separate Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish historiographies. …