A Time for Reconciliation?

Abstract

Historical events when they occur twice: the first time it is a tragedy, and the second time a farce. This Marxian dictum, often cited by cognoscenti to dismiss seemingly recurring historical situations, gains validity in the political patterns of South Vietnam during the last thirty years, with repeated instances of foreign inspired wars, political turmoil, coups d'?tat, etc. . Indeed, as non-Vietnamese ob servers, who have become habituated with reports of upheavals and mutual killings among the Vietnamese, show little surprise, compassion or even attention to in dications of political instability in South Vietnam, most Vietnamese, made cynical by events and bewildered by the continued bloodletting, helplessly expect more of the same. Unfortunately, what may pass for a farcical tragi-comedy with traces of national masochism to spectators is, given the cumulative misery and suffering traceable to the political situation, a tragedy for those who are compelled to endure it. Two years following the signing of the Paris Peace Agreement, in which the four signatory parties (the United States ; the Republic of Vietnam (RVN ? Saigon) ; the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV ? Hanoi) ; and the Provisional Rev olutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam) solemnly pledged to bring about a peaceful solution to the internal Vietnamese disputes, the murderous war continues unabated. Politically, South Vietnam is afflicted by the same, or similar, congeries of circumstances which typify the country's brief but turbulent history ? continued foreign intervention, rampant official corruption, and administrative inefficiency. Yet, as 1974 drew to a close and as clergy-led demonstrations once more agitated South Vietnam's cities, there were, incredible as it may sound, indications that peace and reconciliation (not yet concord) might finally get a chance in South Vietnam. On the surface, such an optimistic assessment does not seem to reflect the imme diate South Vietnamese realities, as tremors of gunfire, exchanges of invectives, and mutual suspicions among contending camps persist. Yet, behind street demonstra tions, and politicized military campaigns ? the usual stuff of South Vietnamese politics ? are important movements of ideas, actions, and policy reassessments, both inside and outside South Vietnam, which have potentially important ramifica tions leading to a possible alteration of the fundamental South Vietnamese political configurations. The d?tente policy among the superpowers, the Vatican's policy of rapprochement with the communist world, Watergate and the eclipse of Richard Nixon, the world-wide slump, the virtual U.S. psychological abandonment of South Vietnam (leading to a substantial trimming of economic and military aid), the Vietnamese citizens' campaign against official corruption and repression, and especially, the insistent campaign for ho?-b?nh, com do (peace and rice) ? these were among the tumultuous events of 1974, which framed, shaped, and conditioned the