A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness

Abstract

Higher-order representation (‘HOR’) theories of conscious awareness are under considerable suspicion. (Following recent usage, I shall use the term ‘HOR’ to cover both higher-order perception or ‘inner sense’ accounts such as Armstrong’s (1981) or mine (1987, 1995) and ‘higher-order thought’ views such as David Rosenthal’s (1993).) HOR theories have been variously said to be extravagant, unmotivated, confused, and worse; for a sample, see Dretske 1993, Guzeldere 1997, and Siewert 1998. Yet there is a simple deductive argument for the conclusion that some HOR theory is correct. The argument is valid and each of its premisses is widely accepted. First, the explanandum. HOR theories are theories of conscious awareness, specifically in the sense of: awareness of one’s own current mental state. They are, correlatively, theories of ‘conscious states’, in the sense of states whose subjects are aware of being in them.1 Mental or psychological states divide into those whose subjects are aware of being in them and those whose subjects are not aware of being in them; HOR theories attempt to explain that difference, by supposing that what makes a state a conscious state in this sense is that it is itself represented by another of the subject’s mental states, either a quasi-perceptual state or a thought. (Some critics have supposed that HOR theories have been aimed at other explananda, in particular at the sensory qualities; the critics have expressed understandable incredulity at the idea that a mere higher-order thought or even a higher-order quasi-perception could explain the original qualitative character of a sensory state. But I know of no HOR theorist who has claimed to explain anything but awareness in the sense specified above – certainly not Armstrong, myself, or Rosenthal.2) Now, here is the argument.