A note on the nature of 'water'

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In his essay on the study of language Chomsky (1995) notes that substances such as tea and Sprite, although they (are believed to) contain roughly the same proportion of molecules as tap water, are nevertheless not called water. In so doing he wants to challenge the essentialist semantics of Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1972), according to which reference for words like is determined by internal structure properties, and suggests instead that special human interests and (p. 22) play a role in categorization in this case no less than in the case of artifact terms. Coincidentally, in a paper titled Water is not H20 Malt (1994) has argued along very similar lines. Both Chomsky and Malt echo concerns expressed by Wilson (1982, p. 578). However, while Wilson (1982) generally supported Putnam's psychologically externalist semantics, and Malt remains neutral on this issue, Chomsky's remarks are part of an extended plea for psychological internalism. In this paper I want to reassert the claim that water is H20, and respond in a way that is consistent with that fact to Chomsky's observations. This requires explaining why substances which are largely may be called something else (?3), and explaining why what we call does not have to be pure (?4). But first I want to clarify the extent to which the conclusions of Putnam (1975) have been challenged.