A estética de Peirce como uma ciência dos fins ideais

James Jakób Liszka

doi:10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i2p205-229

James Jakób Liszka

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.23925/2316-5278.2017v18i2p205-229

Copy DOI

Abstract

Argumenta-se aqui que a melhor interpretação da estética de Peirce é como uma ciência normativa de fins ideais. As influências de Peirce neste particular incluem a noção de kalos de Platão, A educação estética do homem de Friedrich Schiller, e a arquitetônica kantiana. Baseada principalmente nos rascunhos de Minute Logic em 1902 e as Palestras de Harvard em 1903, as características essenciais de uma ciência normativa são discutidas e a relação da estética às outras duas ciências normativas da lógica e da ética é analisada. O conceito de Peirce de bondade estética é desenvolvido, e os critérios para o que ele considera como um summum bonum são examinados. As próprias formulações de Peirce do summum bonum são examinados, inclusive sua noção de razoabilidade concreta, como também uma explicação interessante dos ideais fundamentais encontrada em um fragmento de manuscrito de 1903. O artigo conclui com uma discussão entre o que é chamado de estética positiva e negativa de Peirce, entendido como duas abordagens diferentes à formulação de fins ideais.

Highlights

Peirce’s esthetics was clearly a work in progress
Peirce clearly struggles with the order, role and function of esthetics in its relation to the other normative sciences of ethics and logic, principally because, as he says, he is “lamentably ignorant of it” (CP 2.120, 1902)
Even though Peirce rejects the Kantian path to the fundamental questions about the relation among truth, goodness and kalos, he seems attracted to Kant’s notion of architectonic, as a way to articulate his sense of esthetics

Summary

Introduction

Peirce’s esthetics was clearly a work in progress. As such it is burdened by starts and stops and a variety of vague, sometimes odd and inconsistent accounts. The 1902 and 1903 work do not always agree, but the more mature view appears to be the 1903 work, since it is later, but something that is presented publicly so, presumably, something that was relatively polished In those lectures, Peirce sees esthetics as the science of ideal ends, worthy ends, and it is a matter of determining what constitutes an ideal worthy of pursuit, its esthetic goodness, as he calls it (CP 5.130, 1903). The second is a negative approach, by which the habits, practices and institutions of a community are so arranged that it can have the best hope of developing a workable ideal, one which evolves over time through some process of self-correction of error This is illustrated by the vision articulate in the 1903 manuscript fragment. There is the matter of the aforementioned approaches of positive and negative esthetics

Peirce’s Influences

Architectonic and Esthetics

Aesthetic Goodness and the Criteria for Ultimate Ends

Peirce’s Proposal for the Summum Bonum

Positive and Negative Esthetics

Bloomington