Structure, ingredient sense and assertoric strategy

Abstract

In this article, we will revisit a motivation to consider the advantages of a theory about structured contents over a semantics of possible worlds. We will argue that a structure represents the strategic organization of the content of “p” under conditions in which asserting it does not imply contradictory consequences. These are the winning conditions for the assertion of ‘p’. When ‘p’ is modally sensitive – it can change its winning parameters – knowledge of the structure thus represents the rational point for assertions (about non-actualized realities) that are organized to maximize what can be deduced from ‘p’. In these cases, the known relevant structure is intensional. We will argue that actualist Possible World Semantics, seeking the conversion of intensional knowledge into a de re representation of possible states, pays the price of being blind to structural divergences; it can only poorly explain these structural divergences between non-actual states of information and correlate it with divergence between winning strategies of assertion. Our argument will begin exposing Frege’s legacy; resort to Dummett’s concept of ingredient sense as an alternative to Kripke’s grade two knowledge; and briefly go through a semantic strategy of Stalnaker and Thomason to represent modal statements. In addition to these authors, we will explore the contribution of Russell, Kaplan and Ecthemendy to our argument.