A Double-Edged Sword: Russia’s Hybrid Warfare in Syria

Abstract

Hybrid warfare refers to the use of conventional and unconventional ways and means, by any combination of state and non-state actors, within the same battle space. Russia has widely employed the concept of hybrid warfare in practice from Ukraine to Syria in the 2010s to advance its interests. The article is presented by solving the following problem: what does Russia’s hybrid warfare in Syria mean to Middle East security issues? The answer to the problem could be obtained by evaluating the theory and practice of Russia’s hybrid warfare. Though the concept of hybrid warfare/hybrid wars was first analysed systematically by Frank Hoffman, an American scholar, in 2007, Russian transformed its methods into a new version to accommodate their specific needs and named it after the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Federation, Witalij Gerasimov. It is necessary to explain the features of Russia’s hybrid warfare theory which helps us assess Russian actions in Syria. And these assessments could show us the efficiency of hybrid warfare. Both the theory and practice of Russia’s hybrid warfare have demonstrated that states may deal with security threats from other state and non-state actors properly by conventional and unconventional ways to keep peace and stability or protect their interests. It may offer us a potential method to eliminate terrorism and extremism in order to save weak or failed states. Yet the aggressiveness of hybrid warfare could also sabotage the vulnerable security structure in the Middle East and cause more conflicts and insurgencies. If so, what should we do to alter the situation? The framework for avoiding the dark side of hybrid warfare is based on international cooperation and assistance to failed states.