Abstract

An \begin{document}$ N $\end{document} -person noncooperative game under uncertainty is analyzed, in which each player solves a two-stage distributionally robust optimization problem that depends on a random vector as well as on other players' decisions. Particularly, a special case is considered, where the players' optimization problems are linear at both stages, and it is shown that the Nash equilibrium of this game can be obtained by solving a conic linear variational inequality problem.

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