ПАТРОНАЖ КАК КЛЮЧЕВОЙ ПРЕДИКТОР РОТАЦИИ ГУБЕРНАТОРОВ: ФАКТОРЫ УСТОЙЧИВОСТИ ГЛАВ РЕГИОНОВ РОССИИ ПОСЛЕ ВОЗВРАЩЕНИЯ ГУБЕРНАТОРСКИХ ВЫБОРОВ В 2012 г.

Abstract

The return of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012 did not lead to an increase in the autonomy of regional heads - on the contrary, the federal center only strengthened control over the staffing of regional executive power. Moreover, the rotation is only growing despite the positive dynamics of «United Russia» representation and support in the federal and regional legislatures. In this regard, the thesis that the good results of the "party of power" ensure the stability of governors (Reuter, Robertson, 2012) needs to be revised. The study aimed to identify the key predictors influencing the rotation of Russian governors after the return of direct elections of the heads of Russian regions. Using logistic regression analysis on panel data, the high significance of patronage as a predictor of the resignations of Russian governors from 2012 to 2020 was revealed. The hypothesis was confirmed that the higher the degree of patronage of the governor, the lower the likelihood that the head of the region will leave his post or not be promoted in the formal hierarchy. It turned out that the loyalty expressed in the results of the "United Russia" in the regional and federal elections is no longer a key predictor of the rotation of governors.