Исходная версия буддийской анатмавады и её философское и духовно-практическое измерения

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Introduction. In spite of the fact that the doctrine of an?tmav?da/anatt?v?da (i. e. the denial of the self-identical and continual subject of experiences) has framed the whole structure of Buddhist philosophy and underlain Buddhist meditational practice, discussions between Buddhologists as to whether it means the radical severance from Brahmanism and comes back to the Buddha himself have abided for more than a century. The author’s decisions on these issues are undertaken here. Content. While basing himself on the texts included into the P?li canon the author argues that the doctrine under discussion constituted the original core of the Buddha’s philosophizing in the context of his preaching and missionary activity, scrutinizes rational arguments offered by him for it, demonstrates that not only substantial but empirical self inadmissible for him. He also states lineages between “the Pali Buddha” (the founder of Buddhism as he was presented in the fullest corpus traditionum) and his heirs, i.e. the early stages of the Buddhist philosophical schools both traditional (Therav?da in the first place) and Mah?yanistic ones (headed by Madhyamaka) and displays how the latter developed different aspects of the same doctrine. Conclusions. The author infers that all attempts to “soften” this in the first place anti-empirical doctrine (in spite of all attempts from the side of Buddhist apologetics to state its purely empirical character) are not justified by the Buddhist text sources. Some salient shortcomings in “the Pali Buddha’s” arguments contra the concept of ?tman are displayed as well as their incompatibility with the essentials of religious consciousness. Nevertheless, the author acknowledges significance of the very reflection on an?tmav?da in the framework of practical philosophy.