Abstract
The article discusses the compatibility of particular rational actions at the individual level with the rationality as such at the collective one. The issue arises in decision-making collisions by several individuals, when the results of a possible rational choice of an individual are restricted by interactions with other actors. Such cases of interaction are found in the economic theory, political science, sociology, management and other areas of science related to a person and a group of people. The article examines the social dilemmas that are obvious when all individuals in a social group behave as «rational maximizers of utility» what makes it difficult to come to mutual agreement and coordinate their actions. In respect to the «tragedy of the common» dilemma, the author discusses ways of overcoming the incompatibility for individual and collective rationality within the framework of a new institutional policy, as a new direction of science in the public resources management.
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