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The US-China trade war, the COVID-19 pandemic, and now the Russia-Ukraine conflict have led to a new consensus from developed economies that it is necessary to reduce interdependence... However, this process of lowering interdependence has led the world to rising inflation, labor shortages, rising protectionism, shocks to the global financial system,... Will this change the international monetary and financial system? The following article has analyzed the trend of globalization in the new context and its impacts on the World Monetary and Financial System, thereby recommending a trade scenario for Vietnam. The global monetary and financial system is undergoing drastic changes, as reflected in the increase in multi-currency trade activities and new technological platforms for cryptocurrencies. These are gradually becoming a challenge to the current monetary and financial system under the dominance of the US dollar (also known as the Petrodollar system). Looking back at the history of the global monetary and financial system, a new system will replace the current system to solve bottlenecks or inefficiencies over time. Recently, economists mentioned three significant vulnerabilities in the Petrodollar system, including a persistent US trade deficit, which causes long-term imbalances; the encouragement of mercantilism, thus stimulating the actions of currency manipulation by trading partners; assets and liabilities in countries outside the United States are denominated in dollars, leading to a more robust/weaker dollar, similar to quantitative tightening/easing in those countries, which means that these countries lose their independence in monetary policy. These vulnerabilities are being challenged by the US monetary and fiscal policy itself in the post-Covid period, as well as the rise of major economies. Therefore, perhaps it is time for the world to develop a new monetary and financial system to limit its inefficiency through self-regulation mechanisms or create an entirely new system to replace it. In our view, although there are no apparent signs of the collapse of the current system, there have been changes in the system's operation. On the one hand, these changes are manifested in the dollar's role in international trade, especially in the valuation of energy, which is gradually being replaced by other currencies; on the other hand, it is reflected in the shift from fiat currencies to cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurrencies are creating certain positive benefits in promoting international trade, but they also create considerable challenges in the monetary management role of central banks.

This study examined the effect of monetary policy on assets quality indicator of Nigeria commercial bank soundness from 2009 to 2018. Cross sectional data were sourced from annual reports of commercial banks and Central Bank of Nigeria Statistical Bulletin. Assets quality indicator of commercial banks soundness was used as proxies for the dependent variables while cash reserve ratios, open market operation rates, monetary policy rates, treasury bills rates and money supply were used as proxies for the independent variables. Panel data methodology was employed while the fixed effects model was used as estimation technique at 5% level of significance. Fixed effects, random effects and pooled estimates were tested while the Hausman test was used to determine the best fit. Panel unit roots and panel cointegration analysis were conducted on the study. Findings of the study proved that cash reserve ratio, open market operations rates, monetary policy rates and treasury bills rates have no significant relationship with assets quality indicators of commercial banks in Nigeria. However, Money supply has significant relationship with assets quality indicators of commercial bank soundness in Nigeria. From the findings we recommend that Central Bank of Nigeria should intensify the use money supply as a veritable effective monetary policy tool to achieve bank soundness in Nigeria. Furthermore, CBN should redefine these monetary policy instruments such as open market operation and adjust the monetary policy rate by reducing the cash reserve ratio which will increase liquidity to enable the commercial banks to discharge their lending and investment duties effectively to the public. The cash reserve ratio should be used to complement the open market operations in ensuring that excess liquidity or lack of it in the banking system is minimized. It was further recommended that CBN should look beyond monetary policy in her regulatory governance of commercial banks as most monetary policy tools currently deployed do not have significant relationship with commercial bank soundness indicators within the periods covered in this study.

A bank is the prototypical financial institution; there are notable outward differences between the wealth invested by owners of financial institutions and that of other industries. The capital of a financial institution consists largely of financial assets and only to a small degree of the physical plant and equipment usually associated with capital in other industries. Moreover, these physical differences are associated with important functional differences. A financial institution, like any other firm, faces the problem of combining the inputs which it purchases to produce the outputs which it sells. In banking, the most important inputs are labor and deposits, and they produce liquidity services, brokerage services, accounting and information services, and the like. In this production process, bank capital has two roles: (1) It cooperates directly with the other inputs in the production of bank services, and (2) it is used to attract the deposit input by providing insurance to depositors against a decline in the value of a bank's assets; the more capital a bank has, the more the value of its assets can fall before depositors incur losses. The difference between banking (and financial institutions in general) and most other industries is in the relative importance of these two roles. The equity capital of any firm serves, in part, to guarantee the value of the firm's fixed obligations, but that function is usually subordinate to the provision of assets to the firm. However, in banking, equity capital (and equity is the form that almost all nondeposit ownership interest in bank assets has taken) typically accounts for only about a tenth of total bank resources, and most of the returns to equity capital derive from its insurance function. Bank owners invest capital primarily to attract deposits, which are then used to buy assets, and only secondarily to buy assets directly. Apart from these novel economic aspects, a study of investment in banking provides the opportunity to study the effects of government

PurposeThis paper sets out to explore three areas in which the experience of the great depression might be relevant today: monetary policy, fiscal policy, and the systemic stability of banks.Design/methodology/approachA critical review of the US data for the 1920s and 1930s is presented and stylised facts for monetary, fiscal and banking policies during the noughties are shown and compared with those of the great depression.FindingsThe authors confirm the consensus on monetary policy: deflation and massive bank failures must be avoided. With regard to fiscal policy it is impossible to confirm a widespread opinion according to which fiscal policy did not work because it was not tried. The paper finds that fiscal policy went to the limit of what was possible under the conditions as they existed then. Policy reaction after 1932 was no less bold than that of today if one accounts for sustainability issues. Lastly, the investigation of the US banking system shows a surprising resilience of commercial banks that remained profitable, at least on average, even during the worst years.Originality/valueFirst, the paper presents a systematic comparison between the great depression and the great recession, highlighting similarities and differences. Second, it suggests a relevant policy implication. Findings on commercial bank sector resilience suggest that at present national authorities have little choice but to make up for the losses on “legacy” assets and wait for banks to earn back their capital. However, to prevent future crises, at least a partial separation of commercial and investment banking seems justified.

Given the existing huge academic literature on the Asian crisis, its causes and effects, a strong case needs to be made for yet another paper or another special issue devoted to the crisis. The editors of the Asian Economic Policy Review have timed this issue of the journal to coincide with the 10th anniversary of Asian crisis. Ten years provide an automatic filter for some of the many hypotheses and claims that were made during and soon after the crisis. It also enables us to judge, in retrospect, how serious the crisis was, and whether the crisis appears to have had lasting effects. As the title of this special issue, “Ten Years After the Asian Crisis: What Have We Learned or Not Learned?” indicates, the focus is not on the causes or the immediate effects of the crisis, but rather on the lessons from the Asian crisis. The editors specifically asked authors of the papers in this special issue to indicate what they thought were the lessons that had been learned (or not learned) by the stakeholder, institution, or country they were examining. An examination of figures 1–3 in Takatoshi Ito's (2007) paper that graph data on growth rates, investment rates, and the nominal exchange rates in six Asian countries – Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – provides some powerful evidence based on a simple before- and after-crisis comparison. With the exception of the Philippines, average growth has fallen in all the countries. Linked to this is the fall in the average share of gross domestic product devoted to fixed capital investment. The depreciations in all these countries were not short-run temporary phenomena, so that the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) push for exchange rate flexibility was appropriate, although exchange rate overshooting in December 1997 – January 1998 is obvious. Of course, there is argument about the reasons for the fall in investment ratios (and consequent falls in growth rates). Ito suggests that the Asian countries were over-investing before the crisis, whereas in the case of Indonesia, Hal Hill and Takashi Shiraishi (2007) suggest that the investment environment relative to the rest of East Asia and to the Soeharto era has worsened, and needs to be improved. This point is echoed by Siow Yue Chia (2007) who also argues that Indonesia needs to raise its investment levels. There was a substantial degree of agreement that the conditions imposed by the IMF in relation to its assistance to Asian countries were far too harsh, and that some of the conditions were politically unreasonable. Of course, the recipient countries agreed to the conditions, so it has to be asked why the countries agreed. There were suggestions that, in the case of South Korea, the agreements were made under duress, and, in the case of Indonesia, the president may have had no intention of keeping to the agreement. Two powerful examples of the problems caused by governments and central banks trying to hide potentially damaging information are provided during the Asian crisis by the Bank of Thailand's failure to disclose large forward commitments, and the Bank of Korea's shift of its holdings of foreign reserves to deposits with the overseas branches of South Korean commercial banks. If the information is likely to leak anyway and have a significant impact on the financial markets, then the authorities should not try to hide the information in the first place. Although the Asian crisis led to political change in each of Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand, it is no exaggeration to say that the greatest change occurred in Indonesia. Although not directly suggested by Hill and Shiraishi (2007), it is possible to argue that at some point in time a change from the Soeharto administration was inevitable, so that some of the perceived impacts of the Asian crisis in Indonesia would have occurred quite apart from the Asian crisis. The astute reader will note that the term “twin crisis” appears in quite a few papers and comments in this issue, but the term is not always used with the same meaning. For example, in Hill and Shiraishi (2007) it refers to economic and financial problems and regime collapse, whereas in Stephen Grenville (2007) it refers to banking and balance of payments problems. This section summarizes the papers presented at the Third Asian Economic Policy Review Conference held in Tokyo on October 1, 2006, the comments by the assigned discussants, and the general discussion of each paper. The papers in this issue can be collected into two groups: those focusing on key stakeholders and institutions – the IMF (Ito, 2007), policy-makers (Grenville, 2007), and the banking system (Turner, 2007); and those papers focusing on the experiences of key countries – Thailand (Sussangkarn & Vichyanond, 2007), Indonesia (Hill & Shiraishi, 2007), and South Korea (Lee & Rhee, 2007). Ito's (2007) paper is an overview of the Asian currency crisis from an historical and cross-sectional perspective. He provides a detailed comparison of the IMF's treatment of three Asian crisis countries – Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea – with the Mexican crisis that preceded the Asian crisis, and the post-Asian crisis cases of Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina. Ito's focus is on the different conditions under which the IMF provided assistance to these eight countries, and the size and composition of the assistance packages. The comparative analysis is used to determine what the IMF learned (or did not learn) from each crisis, and the extent to which these lessons were applied to later crises. Ito suggests the similarities between Mexico and Thailand are striking – 8% current account deficits, with about 10% capital inflows, just before their respective crisis. Ito argues that the IMF, having dealt with the Mexican crisis of 1994, could not prepare and implement any mechanisms to prevent or manage a crisis before the Thai crisis in the summer of 1997. The IMF's access limits required that the support package for Mexico be put together with the USA, and the package for Thailand be put together with Japan and Asian countries. Ito criticizes the total amount of support for Thailand as being small when compared with Mexico, and with the size of forward commitments of the central bank. Ito identifies several problems with the IMF program for Indonesia, which was signed at a time of relatively strong macroeconomic conditions. First, banks closures with only limited deposit guarantees led to a run on banks and accelerated capital flight. Second, President Soeharto deviated from the IMF program. Third, there were large swings in macroeconomic policy. The signing ceremony for Indonesia's revised letter of intent provided strong symbolic evidence that the IMF was ruling Asian countries. The South Korean crisis, which caught many by surprise, is regarded by Ito as being the closest to a pure liquidity crisis as lenders refused to roll over loans to South Korean firms. To finally deal with the Korean problems, the IMF and Group of Seven had to resort to an unusual measure, jawboning commercial banks to roll over their lending. This was a switch from the lender-of-last-resort approach to the private-sector-involvement approach. In contrast to the IMF's actions taken in relation to the Asian countries and despite the view held by many economists outside the IMF that a fixed exchange rate regime is unsustainable, a fixed exchange rate (or crawling peg) was allowed to continue in the first IMF program in each of the crises of Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina. This strikes Ito as the IMF being “soft” in the post-Asian crises. Although not denying IMF assistance was beneficial, Mohamed Ariff (2007) also focuses on the conditions attached to the assistance. In particular, he is critical of the manner in which the conditions were attached. In examining and evaluating the IMF and the lessons it has learned or not learned, Ariff argues that more attention should have been paid to Malaysia, a country that chose not to seek the IMF's help. The key reasons for this choice being that Malaysia had small short-term external debt and adequate reserves. With the exception of the exchange rate system, he claims that the policies Malaysia implemented were quite similar to those undertaken in the other crisis countries. Akira Kohsaka (2007) questions the operational usefulness of a policy allocation that matches lender of last resort assistance to liquidity crises, and private sector initiative assistance to solvency crises because it will face the obvious difficulty of determining whether a country is solvent or insolvent in crisis times. Kohsaka also questions whether the IMF actually learned anything from history given that the successful Mexican case was not applied to Thailand, and that in the Russian and Argentine crises the lessons from the unsuccessful Asian cases were not applied. Jong-Wha Lee argued that Ito's approach of focusing on the role of the IMF and crisis management in each country leads to ignoring other important aspects of the crisis, for example, the question of what the key structural problems in Asian countries were. Hadi Soesastro claimed that the reason why Indonesia had to resort to the IMF was concern at the time about contagion, and the effects on the rupiah of statements made by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir. Hill raised the questions of whether the Asian crisis could have been prevented, and what vulnerability indicators were showing before the crisis. He guessed that the private sector behavior in Thailand with a lot of private capital exiting was quite different to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea where there was no indication that the private sector would exit. Although agreeing with Ito that the Asian crisis was a crisis involving a shortage of liquidity and the idea of the Asian Monetary Fund was driven by this shortage, Shinichi Yoshikuni asked what kind of crisis would be likely now in Asia where there is in fact an excess of liquidity given the current extremely large foreign reserve holdings. Chalongphob Sussangkarn suggested that to make the paper complete, a discussion on IMF reforms was required. Atchana Waiquamdee argued that the subject of research conducted by the IMF had evolved over time, it needed to now focus on how to prevent the kind of crisis in other emerging markets in terms of capital liberalization. Ito agreed that Malaysia would be an interesting case study, especially in a comparison with Indonesia. Although acknowledging that there were structural problems and macroeconomic problems in each country, Ito emphasized that he believed that, when compared with other countries, the Asian crisis was more of a liquidity crisis than the result of structural problems. His bottom-line was that Asia was shortchanged by the IMF when compared with Mexico and the post-Asian crisis countries. The purpose of Grenville's (2007) paper is to examine how economic policy-making in the countries affected, in the Asian region and at the global level, changed as a result of the Asian crisis. Despite the size of the Asian crisis, Grenville argues that, although there were significant changes to the politics in the three countries most affected by the crisis, little change has occurred in the broad approach to economic policy. One important set of Grenville's conclusions relates to the responses that did not occur in the wake of the crisis: trade restrictions were not imposed; capital restrictions were minor and removed quickly; debts were in general honored; the Washington Consensus was broadly maintained; and banking systems were supported and restructured, rather than being allowed to fail. Although the broad tenets of the Washington Consensus, with its market-based policies, remain in place, there is now a recognition that well-functioning markets require complex institutions, rules, and procedures, and that these take time and effort to develop. At the international level, the IMF remains as the principal international crisis manager; and there is still no coordination of international economic policy-making. Changes in awareness and mindsets are where larger changes have occurred. Grenville suggests the major policy change is a much greater awareness of the vulnerabilities posed by large international capital flows. Changes in the mind-set have given sharper focus to regional exchange rate arrangements – both in the implementation of a greatly strengthened foreign-exchange swap arrangement, the Chiang Mai Initiative, which pools reserves, and the vigorous discussion about an Asian common currency. At the global level, Grenville finds that there has been considerable progress in developing the institutions that will govern and assist international capital flows. For example, the IMF has implemented various useful transparency-enhancing measures, and has undergone a major change to its thinking about international capital flows. The Asian crisis was not the first where foreign capital volatility was a major factor (Mexico in 1994 illustrated this issue), but it was the (belated) catalyst for a recognition that the volume of inflows might overwhelm small and immature financial sectors, and result in asset-price booms, upward pressure on exchange rates, and, in turn, a change in sentiment accompanied by massive and hugely damaging capital reversals. This recognition has not yet been matched by a convincing policy response. Although the IMF handled more recent crises better (larger and quicker disbursements of assistance, less and better-focused conditionality, different macro-advice), there is nothing to directly address capital-flow volatility, which is apparent even in mature transparent markets, nor to put in place better systems for resolving large-scale international default. Using recent examples of capital controls introduced in South Korea, Thailand, and China, Robert McCauley (2007) takes issue with the suggestion that East Asia has followed the consensus favoring capital account openness. In worrying about the appropriate level of foreign reserves to short-term debt, McCauley also draws attention to the need to take account offshore debts of firms and financial institutions. McCauley interprets the Asian crisis as an expression of Asian financial disintegration caused by the collapse of the Japanese asset bubble, so that measures to spur regional financial integration should receive more attention. As part of any surveillance process among Asian countries, Eiji Ogawa (2007) highlights the importance of policy discussions about exchange rates issues, macroeconomic policy, and the soundness of the financial sector. He notes that there is a large gap between surveillance and regional policy coordination because there is no commitment among the Asian monetary authorities to policy coordination. Given that regional financial cooperation can complement and supplement assistance provided by the IMF, Ogawa stresses the importance of considering the relationship between regional cooperation and IMF assistance. Although “original sin” refers to countries borrowing in foreign currencies and being vulnerable when depreciations occur, Yoshikuni raised a different type of “original sin,” namely, the vulnerability of Asian countries to exchange rate appreciations given their large asset holdings (especially, foreign reserves) in foreign currencies. While agreeing about the importance of developing bond financing, he pointed to the need for appropriate regulation and monitoring as was the case with bank financing. Both Ariff and Anwar Nasution agreed that a common currency will be a long time coming to Asia. Ariff wondered whether a common exchange rate based on a basket currencies with common weights was less far-fetched, and Nasution asked how, given the de facto dollar peg in the region, competitive devaluations could be avoided. Chia took up the issue of surveillance mechanisms in Asia and suggested that the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) initiative and the ASEAN Plus Three initiative provided for some surveillance. She suggested that the “Asian way” where governments are reluctant to criticize their neighbours does not augur well for surveillance mechanisms. Lee thought that the paper had missed out on the reaction of private international investors that were particularly relevant for South Korea. In any discussion of the relationship between the crisis and reform, Lee argued that the issues of political change, and how governments get support for reform from the people need to be discussed. Although it was initially believed that a bond crisis was more difficult to resolve than a banking crisis because of the difficulty of bond holder meetings, Ito suggested that recent examples indicated that a bond crisis resolution may be much easier in the future. Kohsaka argued that reservations need to be added to the claims that the Washington Consensus was maintained and the IMF is still the principal international crisis manager. For the former, adequate preparation of a safety net has been highlighted, while for the later, the role of the IMF will have to be revised. Ito alluded to the problem that the Washington Consensus means different things to different people by pointing to John Williamson writing a book correcting what he believed were misperceptions about the meaning of the Consensus. Grenville agreed that we cannot be against capital controls in principle, but we need to argue about which controls will, on balance, be useful. He saw controls on foreigners borrowing in domestic currencies as being a control with little cost and large benefits. Grenville acknowledged that there were some regional arrangements, pooled reserves, or swap arrangements, in place before the crisis, but noted that none of them were invoked during the crisis. The fact that we still believe in markets and have not gone back to more divisive, intervention-prone methods of policy-making are, Grenville believed, quite consistent with the Washington Consensus. Philip Turner's (2007) starting point is that the weakness of local banking systems was a major cause of the Asian financial crisis because banks could not manage their risks well; official supervision was weak; banks were undercapitalized; and market discipline was undermined by misleading financial data provided by banks. Nearly all the statistical measures (profits, risk-adjusted capital and provides indicate that banks have much but the evidence also that much of the recent in bank is because of the of rates and strong for would have been much Given that measures can be argues that it is important to make a of how banking systems have effort to the of banking supervision has been by the banking crises in the emerging market countries during the the most significant as having been in the of by many The by official in the region are evidence that central banks and are more likely to to address vulnerabilities than they were before the crisis. In better information about banks market discipline more there is now much greater awareness of the importance of suggests that there are a of significant despite all these He the problems of policy-makers in much of Asia having in with a that banks that are not subject to and banking systems in some countries are still too In the risks that Asian banks now face are different to the risks they before the crisis. There are three of risks that as attention. First, there are risks that are to the of to the sector. Although with the to and banks from on risks from to are more Second, there are rate risks from the bank holdings of Third, there is exchange rate given that it is how well banks are to with that could from a large currency Nasution (2007) provides some important to the of Turner's He argues that the analysis of bank needs to examine more the of bank and also the of bank Although risk-adjusted capital ratios of banks are the of that were used to the of banks in Indonesia has limited to Although acknowledging that in in Asia have Nasution suggests that problems with still for in both and Indonesia. He also to the strong of foreign banks with their international and that might to them out the domestic Given that macroeconomic conditions were by as having to banks and banking systems (2007) with macroeconomic risks and the need for to take these effects into account when about the of the banking two macroeconomic where investment in the Asian as a result of rates, and the other where domestic leads to an of the exchange suggests that need to be provided to banks to them to capital ratios in so that they have some to when difficult a of bank in several countries, Ariff raised the problem of whether central banks have the that is better – that the Ariff suggested that banks far better than large banks during the crisis. and Kohsaka asked whether the reason for a shift in bank from firms to was a temporary of by firms to or some other reasons the of other in information are by as to banks more but whether in the relevant countries there were investors with to the Ito raised the case of the Philippines, which was not a recipient of in the banking or currency He wondered whether there was support for the argument that because the had a history of banking crises that it was better than other countries. Hill suggested that the key for the were no and no In relation to the on foreign bank Ito introduced the idea that up to foreign markets will foreign so that the foreign banks may provide support during a crisis with This idea to be supported by evidence for South Korea but was not supported by the Argentine raised the problem of how to and of banks given the of data on the relevant because of and If the was that the Asian were too on banks and not on bond and markets, was that not much had argued that it may be a little too to whether the of banks had and their will be given the amount of into banks. He suggested that although the Asian crisis us the importance of a financial markets, South Korea has an even more also pointed to the many banks and banks in South Korea that an important role in private but now they have to with private and asked whether other countries have a similar Grenville raised about the of measures we are in the of the and we have little information about In Indonesia, Grenville claimed that banks have more or less the same market share they have always they have not any of their problems, and with of 10% there are problems of He also argued that relationship was not as as it to people and If are the only then to Sussangkarn suggested that a discussion of the political of the issues, the between and is a key In Thailand, there is still a lot of between the Bank of Thailand and the of about where the is to As a there is no Bank of Thailand asked whether countries other than Thailand had information among the commercial bank which could as a useful to problems. agreed that of loans may well be an important of recent bank but it is difficult to how large it He acknowledged that the discussion of banks was of the of paper in that he had not the extent to which they have changed and the extent to which banks are the Although the financial system in Asia still remains bank the of bank in South Korea is not by other countries. argued that to measures should not be by because it could the that the they are when they are He suggested the shift in bank from firms to was the result of a structural change as well as a from firms for the crisis in Thailand, a program of financial was but the risks in this process were not was out an adequate for financial institutions, and appropriate monetary and exchange rate Sussangkarn and (2007) that were the to capital while to a fixed exchange rate system and trying to an monetary policy. the risks to economic in the 1997 crisis. As a result of the crisis, Thailand had to the fixed exchange rate system and to the IMF for financial assistance with its Although Thailand could from the IMF program by the of it took much to up problems in the particularly debt and up the loans of various financial institutions. of the key reforms from the 1997 crisis that Sussangkarn and argue should the of a similar crisis data for and economic the crisis, the of data for and economic management was The has greatly the crisis, and should to more monitoring and of problems. monetary policy An monetary policy was in to provide a monetary Although the process was not always the system is now well by the but a for the system is The also needs to be sector reforms the of a deposit system and the of capital markets have been in this although much of the required remain to be Sussangkarn and two of risks to economic as political in financial institutions, and the of One major concern is that now to that the will always their debt they cannot it Although the claimed that the of the sector was the many policies were out to hide the of the If the lessons have been learned from the crisis, this should not have Waiquamdee (2007) focuses on the lessons learned by the Bank of Thailand in the wake of the Asian crisis. The first is the of

Subject. This article deals with prospects and challenges of the impact of the Central Bank's digital currency (CBDC) on the monetary policy in Russia. Objectives. The purpose is to define the impact of digital ruble emission on the monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Russia. Methods. The study rests on general scientific research methods, including analysis, synthesis, comparison, generalization, and abstraction. Results. The paper substantiates the relevance and timeliness of the Central Bank's work to study the prospects for the introduction of digital currency as a response to challenges of modern comprehensive digitalization process. It considers goals, tools, methods of implementation, and strategic areas of monetary policy of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, unveils multidirectional consequences for the monetary policy and financial stability of the Russian banking system from the implementation of the digital ruble project. It is noted that a positive aspect is an increase in the efficiency of transmission mechanism of the monetary policy influence on the Russian economy. I show possible actions of the regulator to prevent negative trends associated with redistribution of funds in favor of the digital currency. Conclusions. The impact of the introduction of the Central Bank's digital currency on the monetary policy and financial stability of the Russian banking system can be multidirectional. To minimize possible negative effects, it is advisable to gradually introduce the CBDC. This will enable timely identification of emerging problems and focus efforts on unlocking the positive potential of the digital ruble.

The article assesses the coherence of the financial system and economy of Russia, and also reveals the uncertainties in interrelation between the flow of finance and economic activity. The work reveals the possibilities of ensuring preservation of the form and content of economic system in the process of creating and using monetary funds. An analysis of the actual change of pace in the growth rate of finances and economic activity was carried out to eliminate the uncertainty of interrelation between the flow of finance and economic activity. In the result of the analysis, it was revealed that financial and economic measures are resorted to in order to eliminate uncertainty, and thereby, to ensure the preservation of coherence of the financial system of the modern Russian economy. Financial measures include an increase in gold reserves and monetary base; economic measures include an increase in the production of crude oil and natural gas and petroleum (associated) gas, extraction and dressing of iron ores. As a result of modeling the dynamics of the financial and economic systems with application of the modified Cobb-Douglas formula it is revealed that the financial system actively follows the dynamics of the economic system and there is sufficient compensating reaction of the former.Coherence of the Russian financial system and economy determines the capability and ability to maintain the form and content of the Russian economy with the help of finance. Elimination of the uncertainty of interrelation between the flow of finance and economic activity is confirmed by active following of the Russian financial system in path of the economic system dynamics and compensating reaction of the financial system.

BECAUSE OF THE PROMINENCE of commercial banks in the U.S. financial system, banks' portfolio behavior is instrumental in most discussions of financial markets. Commercial banks interact directly with all sectors of the economy through their role as depository financial intermediaries. Commercial banks also hold more different categories of assets than any other type of financial institution . Thus, changes in monetary policy and/or the nonbank public's demands forboth money and credit are immediately reflected by adjustments in commercial banks' portfolios, which may be ultimately transmitted throughout the entire financial system. An important element of the transmission mechanism linking commercial banks' portfolio adjustment to other financial markets is their Treasury security portfolios. l The determinants of commercial banks' holdings of Treasury securities may include such items as deposit flows, changes in the nonbank public' s demand for bank credit, and other factors reflecting the short-run determinants of commercial banks' invest-

Capital adequacy ratio and monetary policy are important control measures of financial supervisory authority and monetary authority, respectively. The effective coordination of the two has greatly affected the effectiveness of monetary policy. The article selects the annual data of 16 listed commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2018, and studies the impact of capital adequacy ratio on monetary policy transmission by constructor. listed commercial banks in China from 2003 to 2018, and studies the impact of capital adequacy ratio on monetary policy transmission by constructing a panel regression model. The results show that large state-owned commercial banks play a major role in bank credit channels for monetary policy, and banks with higher capital adequacy ratios are more likely to have a higher capital adequacy ratio. The results show that large state-owned commercial banks play a major role in bank credit channels for monetary policy, and banks with higher capital adequacy ratios are more vulnerable to monetary policy shocks. In addition, the external capital constraint of minimum capital adequacy will cause a multiplier effect when monetary policy is transmitted through credit channels. The multiplier effect produced by joint-stock commercial banks is much smaller than that of large state-owned banks. The multiplier effect produced by joint-stock commercial banks is much smaller than that of large state-owned banks. Therefore, financial supervisory departments must fully consider the interference caused by the capital adequacy ratio on monetary policy, strengthen policy coordination, and unblock the transmission mechanism of Therefore, financial supervision departments must fully consider the interference caused by the capital adequacy ratio on monetary policy, strengthen policy coordination, and unblock the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.

Reviewed by: Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia by Martin Myant and Jan Drahokoupil Ararat L. Osipian (bio) Martin Myant and Jan Drahokoupil, Transition Economies: Political Economy in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. 391 pp. San Francisco, CA: Wiley, 2011. Martin Myant and Jan Drahokoupil offer a large volume aimed at revisiting the political economy of transition in the Russian Federation, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. This book focuses on the political economy of state socialism; macroeconomic transformations, including shock therapy and slow economic recovery; alternative strategies for democratic transition; and the new role of the state, including its changing economic position, maintaining the rule of law, and elements of the welfare state. It also addresses microeconomic evolutions, private enterprise, small businesses, new financial systems, and commercial banks. Almost an encyclopedia of economic transition, this 400-page volume deals with just about every aspect of this ongoing process, named and analyzed, and supported with thorough date analysis. The book begins with the system of state socialism and the successes and failures of central planning and traces the courses of transition in different post-socialist societies. Balancing between macro- and micro-evolutionary approaches, the authors cover the differences between different groups of countries in terms of productivity and economic integration during the period of sharp economic decline and slow recovery in the 1990s, the financial crisis of 1998, and the growth of the 2000s. Unlike most other works examining similar topics, this book groups together the successor states of the USSR, formerly socialist countries in Eastern Europe, and Mongolia. This wide geographic scope is rather unusual, since normally volumes on post-socialist transitions cover either the countries of the former USSR, the countries of Eastern Europe, or the countries of Central Asia. But in terms of their approach to transition societies, most of the authors of this volume are not unusual in employing comparative analysis and using a mix of economically and politically based analytical tools for the examination of transition societies. Their discussions are issue-focused rather than country-centered. Thus, the major function of this volume—and its major merit—is that of synthesis. The strongest section of this volume is Section VI, titled “Conclusions,” with subsections focused on the emerging varieties of capitalism, the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath, and the authors’ final verdict on transition. Myant and Drahokoupil offer a new classification of capitalism in transition economies on the basis of characteristics on which former socialist [End Page 317] countries both converge and diverge. Thus, these countries may be grouped in different clusters. The authors use international integration as the major criterion in delineating the types of capitalism in transition economies and assigning countries to a certain group. They offer six forms of international integration: export-oriented foreign direct investments in complex sectors, export-oriented complex sectors without foreign direct investments, simple manufacturing subcontracting, commodity exports, dependence on remittance and aid, and dependence on financialized growth. This approach is quite unusual. Moreover, such original and clearly presented contributions are always of interest to scholars and general readers as well. Specifically, the authors distinguish five varieties of capitalism in transition economies: FDI-based (second rank) market economies, peripheral market economies, oligarchic or clientelistic capitalism, order states, and remittance- and aid-based economies (310-312). FDI-based (second rank) market economies include countries of Central-Eastern Europe. Despite having developed elaborate export structures, these economies have only a second-rank position in international production networks. Peripheral market economies are those in the South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. Oligarchic or clientelistic capitalism refers to Russia, but applies equally to most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Order states are CIS countries that experienced the most limited reforms under authoritarian and arbitrary regimes and a low level of financial development with numerous obstacles to organizing new businesses (these states include Belarus and Uzbekistan). Remittance- and aid-based economies include low-income countries in the CIS and Eastern Europe. These types of capitalistic modes of organization, which emerged in the region during the period of transition, were put to the test in the 2008 financial crisis. Four stages of the crisis...

Subject. This article examines the issues of reflecting monetary policy in the Russian economy. Objectives. The article aims to identify the interrelationships between the conducted monetary policy and the development of the national economy. Methods. For the study, I used general scientific and specialized economic and mathematical methods. Results. The article confirms the correlation between changes in the key interest rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the cost of borrowing money by commercial banks. The article identifies a high level of debt on loans and acquired claims on loans provided to resident legal entities and individual entrepreneurs, and it shows that fiscal policy exerts excessive influence on the economy through fiscal measures, while government debt securities act as a compensator for negative effects. Conclusions and Relevance. The study results complement the methods of improving the efficiency of banking sector regulation, optimizing State economic policy, and reducing financial risks in the country's economy. The identified interrelationships between the conducted monetary policy and the development of the national economy may represent a certain value for government authorities, experts, and researchers, providing important analytical information for improving the mechanism of macroeconomic regulation and adapting institutions to external shocks and internal challenges.

The monetary and financial sphere of the Russian economy is considered in the article as an interconnected system, which involves cross-border movement of capital, the budget deficit formation and financing, the Central Bank monetary policy, the credit activity of banks. The article traces the changes in the functioning of the monetary and financial system of Russia in 2014-2015 under the influence of external shocks. The author challenges some of the accepted explanations of the dynamics of macroeconomic indicators, in particular, the automatic dependency in the short run of the exchange rate on the oil export prices, a critical dependence of the spectrum of interest rates on the Central Bank key rate. Thanks to the repatriation of foreign assets in the Russian economy there remains the possibility of appreciating the ruble and lowering interest rates, despite the decline in export prices and repayment of external liabilities.

Objective: to analyze the possibilities of overcoming the problems of the Russian economy related to sanctions through the introduction of a two-circuit national monetary and financial system using digital financial assets; to assess the effectiveness of such a system to stimulate economic growth, reduce inflation and ensure financial stability under the sanctions pressure.Methods: the analysis uses methods of mathematical modeling of the Russian economy dynamics, taking into account the interaction of the financial and manufacturing sectors. A system of differential equations is used to describe the cash flows in the economy, as well as scenarios with different levels of investment and CFA issuance.Results: mathematical modeling was used to analyze the prospects for Russia’s economic development under the Western sanctions policy. It showed that, although the emergency anti-sanctions measures taken by the Russian government since the beginning of the special military operation have proven effective, in the long term a significant change in monetary and financial policy is necessary, as the existing rules and methods of its implementation do not contribute to solving the problems that have arisen. The article uses mathematical modeling to study the effect of introducing a two-circuit monetary and financial system using digital financial assets. The calculations have shown that the use of a two-circuit system together with an active investment policy significantly increases the Russian economy efficiency (even under Western sanctions), saturating it with money for GDP growth and at the same time reducing the inflationary pressure of a growing money supply.Scientific novelty: the authors propose a new financial system that combines digital assets and dual goods to ensure the economy sustainability under the sanctions. The authors also developed a mathematical model that makes it possible to assess the long-term consequences of the two-circuit national monetary and financial system and compare it with traditional financing methods.Practical significance: the results of the analysis and mathematical modeling can be used in the implementation of the monetary and financial policy in the Russian Federation under the sanctions. The introduction of the two-circuit system will make it possible to target financial resources to the manufacturing sector, reduce inflation and ensure the ruble exchange rate stability.

The paper describes the central bank monetary policy that has been heavily criticized, largely due to the banks’ inability to identify emerging risks in a timely manner and to prevent threats to the stability of the entire global financial and banking system. A more rigorous expert-theoretical and public assessment is typical for analyzing the role of commercial banks in these processes, whereby they are recognized as the main culprits of recurrent crises. The excursion into the evolution of theoretical views on the problem under study allows to conclude that it is related to the credit nature of money, in which the activities of commercial banks are of great importance. This idea was shared by many foreign and Russian scientists, who at one time offered their recipes for improving the monetary mechanism, but remained not taken into account in practice. The initial positions of bank lending processes and money making on their basis in volumes and quality, often unregulated, have been analyzed. Much attention is paid to the role of the Central Bank, the bank customers and the state in shaping the credit nature of money. As an alternative to modern methods of monetary regulation, the idea of full-value money has been described. As an example, the phenomenon of the Swiss full-value money initiative in 2018 has been given. It is noted that the initiative demanded to ban issuing electronic (non-cash) money from the commercial banks in order to stabilize the financial system. The weak points of the reform include a threat to the stability of the money value, the low degree of independence of the National Bank of Switzerland. It has been inferred that the events taking place in the modern financial system may indicate significant transformations of the design and toolkit of the modern monetary policy

Understanding the current global regime shift and the standing of the macro-financial system resilience