공기업 거버넌스 제도와 대리인 문제: 뉴욕.뉴저지 항만공사를 중심으로

Abstract

This paper tries to analyze how the governance institutions of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey overcome agent problems in public agencies based on the Principal-Agent Theory, and find the implications that will be helpful to the governance of port authorities in Korea. The Port Authority`s governance is characterized by decentralization of personnel rights, open meetings policy, freedom of information policy, public hearings, and fiscally self-supporting system. Those characteristics are helpful in overcoming the agent problems of public agency, such as adverse selection, moral hazard, and complicated external structure, through reinforcing of monitoring agent by principal, easing of information asymmetry between principal and agent, and clarification of organizational ownership structure. Those characteristics may give many implications for the design of governance structures of port authorities in Korea.