О ВОЗМОЖНОСТИ ФОРМИРОВАНИЯ ОБНОВЛЕННОЙ ПАРАДИГМЫ ТЕОРИЙ ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНОГО И ГРУППОВОГО ВЫБОРА

Abstract

It is proposed to make adjustments to V. Pareto’s theory of utility, recognizing the category of individual utility as primary in relation to the category of individual preferences. With this approach, the properties of preferences become derivatives of the properties of the utility function, and the latter turns out to be uniquely determined up to linear transformations. Attention is drawn to the fact that when analyzing the problem of group choice, researchers relying both on maximizing the group utility function and on binary comparisons of alternative social states traditionally strive to ensure that the social optimum meets the requirements of Pareto efficiency. The failure of such attempts in the article is associated with ignoring the peculiarities of the choice made in hierarchical and network groups. A two-tier model is proposed as a starting point. First, the collective welfare function «constructed» by the members of society is maximized, and then the redistribution of the received benefits through horizontal interaction leads to the consistency of their interests. It is shown why, in practice, making a choice is accompanied by the use of an aggregated social utility function, delegation of the functions of a large group to specially created small groups. The need to pay attention to the formation of adequate motivation in small groups is particularly justified.