Eirik Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich — Institutional Structure, Economie Incentives and the Yugoslav Firm. The Yugoslav economic system of the seventies has evolved as a result of the governement's persistent search for new and more desirable institutional arrangements. While the process of change has gone forward largely by trial and error, the general objective has always been to find organizational forms that permit economic efficiency and incentives for innovation to exist in a socialist environment where private property rights in capital goods are effectively precluded. Particularly after the important reform of 1965, emphasis has been on economic decentralization and the creation of a system in which individual workers and consumers have substantial decision making power. As the broad trend of economic reform has unfolded in Yugoslavia, there has developed, at another level, a set of concepts and technical tools required for the practical operation of the system. Of these, the notion of Dohodak, or net product, is of special significance to economists. What makes Dohodak important is that the analysis of the firm's net product, including consideration of the rules for its formation and distribution, represents a powerful means for examining the actual functioning of the Yugoslav economy. In general, any alteration in the legal structure under which the Yugoslav firm operates will tend to influence the size and allocation of net product and, hence, the pattern of economic rewards. Then, insofar as individuals are motivated by self-interest, incentives and behavior will be affected in turn. Each act of institutional reorganization implies a set of corresponding changes in the amount and type of output produced by the firm, the rate and direction of the firm's growth, the extend and quality of effort supplied by the labor force, etc. The central premise of the study is that the regulations surrounding the formation and distribution of the firm's net product serve to define the effective economic choices open to the collective. Specifically, by considering the factors that affect Dohodak, it becomes possible to gain basic understanding of: (i) the nature of the legal and institutionnal constraints imposed on decision makers, (ii) the range of objectives that can be pursued by Yugoslav enterprises, and (iii) the probable causes of economic problems in a labor-managed economy of the Yugoslav type. In developing these themes, the evolution of the concept of Dohodak is traced over a number of historical periods since 1946. The paper then proceds to a discussion of the formation of the net product, of the firm, the analysis of legal and contractual obligations paid from the firms net product, and the consideration of internal distribution of net product between the Wage Fund and other funds. In the final section, some general remarks are made concerning the relation between Yugoslav economic organization and efficiency.
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