Yogic Perception Research Articles

A Buddhist's guide to self-destruction: Jñānaśrīmitra on the structure of yogic perception

AbstractThis article explores the structure of cultivated religious experience. For the Buddhist philosopher Jñānaśrīmitra (c. 980–1040), the religious experience of the Buddhist yogin (yogipratyakṣa) is not spontaneous or sporadic but must be intentionally and rationally cultivated. I argue that Jñānaśrīmitra's picture parallels certain contemporary constructivist accounts of religious experience, according to which the prejudices, expectations, and interpretative structures of the practitioner shape the character of the experience in question. Despite this, however, Jñānaśrīmitra maintains that religious experience is direct, non-conceptual, and ineffable. Even though cultivation begins by focusing on rationally understood, effable conceptual content (the Buddha's teaching of the Four Nobles' Truths, for instance), the yogin's relation to that content is transformed through cultivation (bhāvanā). Cultivation makes awareness-events with conceptual content vivid (spaṣṭa) in such a way that they lose their conceptual character, coming to affect the practitioner's mind as if they were external to it. In this way, precisely in virtue of beginning the process of cultivation with certain expectations about the Buddha's teaching, Buddhist yogins come to have a direct and non-conceptual experience of the breakdown of their own mental streams and the dissolution of the sense of self.

The Compatible and the Comparable – Searching for Doctrinal Sharedness between Kamalaśīla and Northern Chan

Abstract The Samyé debate (792–794) between the Chinese Chan monk Moheyan and his Indo-Tibetan opponents has long been one of the key issues in the study of Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. This article attempts to approach this debate from a different angle, by focussing on the common ground that enabled the debate in the first place, instead of the doctrinal opposition between the two parties. This article argues that there are several areas where Kamalaśīla’s doctrinal positions are comparable to or even compatible with the doctrinal positions found in Northern Chan texts. First, the article points to the centrality of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra and how it signifies their commitment to a form of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. Second, the controversy revolving around the “Single Vehicle” (Ekayāna) is discussed. Third, the article discusses how to understand the “interface” between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka in Kamalaśīla’s texts and Northern Chan texts. Lastly, the article compares yogic perception discussed by Kamalaśīla and the extrasensory apprehension alluded to in Northern Chan texts.

Polemical Paths: Tsongkhapa and Taktsang on Yogic Perception

Tibetan Buddhist polemics are often perceived as a type of hairsplitting or logic chopping, where defeating one’s opponent is more highly prized than arriving at truth. This assumes that Tibetan polemicists are obsessed with inconsequential minutiae and invested in nitpicking, trite attempts at self-aggrandizement. This article seeks to undermine the notion of Tibetan polemics as mere quibbling, arguing that what appears to be competitive carping in fact involves high stakes. Each Tibetan Buddhist philosophical system is constituted by tightly imbricated tenets, which not only are deeply interconnected with each other but individually comprise a microcosm of that system’s broader philosophical view. Inconsistencies between two systems’ seemingly subsidiary tenets thus demarcate proxy battles indicating larger conflicts over each system’s total cogency. To explore this point, I investigate one “polemic” initiated by Taktsang Lotsāwa (1405–77) against the Gelug school concerning yogic perception and where it occurs along the adherent’s spiritual progression. Although this point seems trivial at first blush, a deeper analysis reveals that it is central to Taktsang’s entire philosophy. Taktsang is invoking a wider philosophical framework in which reality transcends appearances. Impermanence entails appearances, and so cannot be an object of yogic perception, which necessarily perceives reality. Tsongkhapa, on the other hand, argues that reality remains accessible to appearances, and so yogic perception can realize impermanence. In this small debate, much larger stakes become clear—the very connection between appearances and reality, a cornerstone issue of both ontology and epistemology.

Seeing Afar

“Piercing gazes” or “penetrative stares” are common idioms in English. Yet, on reflection, these phrases oddly suggest an extramissive, projective connotation of vision, countering our learned understanding that sight passively receives light. Nevertheless, these projective connotations are highly intuitive. Exploring Indian debates on yogic perception through a cognitive science lens, this paper argues that extramissive theories of sight constitute our most basic intuitive understanding of vision. Yogis are said to have extra powerful extramissive visual rays that allow them not only to apprehend distant objects but penetrate spiritual truths. Buddhists, by contrast, reject that the senses are extramissive. Still, they retain extramissive connotations when they explain yogic perception as a type of mental—rather than sensorial—feat. The explicit Buddhist rejection of extramission alongside their implicit retention of extramissive metaphors corroborates the thesis that extramission was highly intuitive within an ancient Indic milieu. Indeed, it likely constitutes a pan-human intuition.

Structure and Authorship of the KusumÀ·jali

This paper suggests that the classic of Indian theology, the Nyāya-kusumâñjali is in fact two texts: an earlier treatise in 65 ślokas, and Udayana’s (mostly prose) commentary on it. Internal evidence consists in: (a) the ślokas read as a continuous text; (b) there are extremely long prose passages without verses; (c) Udayana does not comment on his own verses, only on the ślokas; (d) the basic plan of the two texts are markedly different; (e) different content of some chapters: ch. 1 about karma vs. rituals to reach heaven, ch. 2 about creation vs. eternality of sound, and in ch. 5 Udayana doubles the arguments for God; (f) Udayana deals extensively with atoms and yogic perception and rejects the concept of śakti, in contrast to the verses; (g) there are a few manifest disagreements (on creatio continua and the sacredness of god-images). External evidence for the thesis: (a) there are mss. of the verses only; (b) there are many commentaries on the verses only; (c) these commentators—with a single exception—do not seem to take Udayana for the author of the verses; (d) the first commentary on Udayana names his own work a subcommentary; (e) in his other works, it is atypical of Udayana to insert ślokas in his text; (f) a legend of the Bhāduṙī Brahmins stating that Udayana “received” the Kusumâñjali.

Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches ed. by Steven M. Emmanuel

Reviewed by: Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches ed. by Steven M. Emmanuel Jingjing Li (bio) Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches. Edited by Steven M. Emmanuel. New York: Columbia University Press, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback $30.00, ISBN 978-0-231174-87-9. The call for diversifying and globalizing philosophy has garnered growing scholarly attention. The newly published volume, Philosophy's Big Questions: Comparing Buddhist and Western Approaches, edited by Steven M. Emmanuel, is another crucial contribution to the initiative of making comparative philosophy a cross-cultural dialogue between intellectual traditions. Drawing upon theories preserved in Buddhist and Western philosophies, authors in this collection present a diversity of viewpoints to advance the current philosophical discussion and, thus, add "new possibilities for thinking about old questions" (p. 7). In appreciating the intellectual insights and diverse voices from non-Western philosophical traditions, all the eight chapters in this volume make philosophical research, both in content and method, more inclusive. That is why contributors to this volume do not follow the traditional way of sorting philosophical inquiries into subfields, such as epistemology, metaphysics, or ethics. Rather, their chapters revolve around major philosophical questions that make these subfields possible. As such, they not only make philosophical writings more accessible to non-specialists, but also introduce readers to the practice of philosophy itself. As remarked by Gilles Deleuze, "the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it."1 Indeed, a true philosophical question does not predetermine its answers and, thus, cannot be resolved with a simple "yes" or "no." Rather, by reconceptualizing the presumptions that constitute a philosophical problem, people can reimagine philosophy as a field and rethink philosophical practice as a meaningful way of life. Following this line of reasoning, Chapter 1 asks the question of how we should live (p. 23). Expanding the widely held understanding of happiness as merely "subjective well-being," Stephen J. Laumakis proposes to connect the comprehension of human flourishing with the larger discussion about a "morally appropriate human life" (p. 24). Turning to Western and Buddhist thought, Laumakis positions these thinkers in their respective contexts to detail their [End Page 1] approaches. On the one hand, philosophers in Euro-American traditions tend to define a good life in terms of the person-action-consequence paradigm as presented in Aristotle's virtue ethics, Kant's deontology, and Mill's consequentialism (p. 28). On the other hand, Buddhist clerics examine what counts as a morally appropriate life in their soteriological project of liberating sentient beings from suffering, where Theravāda Buddhists promote the arhat ideal for attaining a personal release from saṃsāra (p. 41), and Mahāyāna followers propose following the Bodhisattvas' path to attain awakening for all (p. 44). Instead of reading Buddhist theories as a version of virtue ethics or consequentialism, Laumakis brings thinkers from these two traditions into dialogue to explore how Buddhist approaches can advance Western moral theories, not only because of the reciprocity of metaphysical investigation and moral cultivation in Buddhism, but also due to the Buddhist way of motivating moral actions (p. 52). Chapter 2 moves on to enquire, "what is knowledge?" (p. 58). Considering how Buddhist epistemology lays the ground for metaphysical investigation of the ultimate nature of reality and the moral cultivation needed to realize awakening, Douglas Duckworth compares the reciprocity of knowledge and practice as the vision and method required for awakening (p. 60). Drawing upon the writings of Dignāga (c. 480-540) and Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660), Duckworth outlines three sets of epistemic issues: how conceptual and perceptual knowledge are differentiated and correlated (p. 62); how self-awareness, defined as knowledge by acquaintance, is lived by perceivers--a knowledge that is not about something but rather serves as the foundation therefor and, thus, cannot be reduced to representational knowledge, such as conception or perception (p. 68); and how Buddhists articulate Yogic perception as the knowledge of skill to be embodied by practitioners for the realization of awakening (p. 71). Altogether, the Buddhist answers to these three issues invite scholars...

Эпистемология йогического восприятия: школа Дигнаги – Дхармакирти

One of the specific features of Indian philosophical thought in comparison with Western tradition is its addressing the subject of yogic and contemplative prac­tices. The article focuses on the interpretation of yogic experience in terms of Buddhist epistemology (pramāṇavāda – the teachings on the instrument of valid cognition). The concept of yogic perception (yogipratyaksha), which dates back to the Buddhist philosopher Dignāga, later becomes the subject of pan-Indian philosophical debates. The author analyzes the Buddha’s teachings on the Four Noble Truths as an object of yogic perception. If, according to Dignāga, yogic perception grasps its object directly, beyond its verbal elucidation by teachers, while the Noble Truths are transmitted through the Buddha’s word, the question arises as to how can they constitute the object of direct apprehension? The article proposes to understand yogic perception in the light of the three stages of under­standing in Buddhism: 1) śrutamayī (consisting in hearing) – the memorization from the words of teacher; 2) cintāmayī (consisting in reflection) – a critical ana­lytical discourse about the form and meaning of what was learned at the previous stage; and finally, 3) bhāvanāmayī (consisting in contemplation) – an individual appropriation of the ideas analyzed at the previous stage in meditation. The author argues that, according to this algorithm, only the intellectual mastering of Buddha’s teachings can shape a mindset that brings forth yogic liberating in­sight – the goal of the Buddhist soteriological aspirations

Dissenting Yogis: The Mīmāṁsaka-Buddhist Battle for Epistemological Authority

While dissent connotes a type of split or departure, it can bind as much as it separates. This paper traces a millennium-long history of debate between Buddhists and other religionists who championed the Vedic authority rejected by the Buddha, a camp that came to be known as “Mīmāṁsā.” My analysis illustrates dissent can have the paradoxical feature of forging strong relationships through its seeming antithesis: opposition. Specifically, I explore Mīmāṁsaka-Buddhist debate on meditation. Buddhists argued that meditation could yield authoritative spiritual insight once a meditator had honed their yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa). Mīmāṁsakas rejected yogic perception, arguing only the scriptural corpus of the Vedas had authority. By undermining yogic perception, Mīmāṁsakas aimed to defang religious movements, like the Buddhists’, who appealed to meditative experience as legitimate grounds for dissent. Counterintuitively, such exchanges were essential for the construction of each faction’s identity and were continually mutually formative over the long history of their interaction.

Seeing as Cognizing: Perception, Concepts and Meditation Practice in Indian Buddhist Epistemology

Abstract As Buddhist literature makes abundantly clear, the Buddha’s knowledge is an instance of yogic perception; it radically differs from the ordinary cognition of empirical objects and results from a special training that includes ascetic toil and meditative practices. This essay aims to explore the role of special cognitive processes – in particular the Buddha’s vision of the Truths and cognitive processes relating to meditation practices – in the Buddhist epistemological tradition of South Asia. It argues that, given the Indian philosophical context, an epistemology with Buddhist presuppositions had to consider why and how meditation practices can make a difference as regards the results of cognition. Passages from Dharmakīrti’s work will be examined that show how Dharmakīrti represents yogic perception and the function of meditation practices (especially visualization) in transforming habitual processes of conceptualization.

Prajñākaragupta on Yogic Perception and Omniscience

This paper aims to clarify Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of yogic perception, focusing especially on the notion of avisaṃvādi in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika III 286, on which E. Franco has recently provided a new reading, pramāṇasaṃvādi, on the basis of Prajñākaragupta’s description (PVA 327.32–33). By examining the same portion, this paper concludes as follows: 1. By considering Dharmakīrti’s argument on yogic perception in the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Sanātānāntarasiddhi, the reading pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi is preferable to Franco’s suggestion; 2. A Sanskrit manuscript and a Tibetan translation reveal that Prajñākaragupta takes the verse as an antaraślokaḥ to which no explanation is added. Therefore, the portion (PVA 327.32–33) should be considered his own argument, not a paraphrase of the verse; 3. From Prajñākaragupta’s viewpoint, the notion of avisaṃvādi is understood in the context of the Buddha’s omniscience as a kind of yogic perception, which guarantees his words on all objects, including supra-sensible objects like the other world (paraloka) because, as Dharmakīrti has argued in Pramāṇavārttika I 215, the Buddha’s words have verifiability for other perceptible and inferable objects.

Indian Buddhist Apologia of Yogic Perception (yogipratyakṣa)

[only abstract in English; full article and abstract in Lithuanian] The article is dedicated to the analysis of the conception of yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) in Indian Buddhist philosophy. By relying on the primary Buddhist Sanskrit sources and contemporary critical studies, the historically relevant questions are raised: how yogic perception has been treated in Indian Buddhist tradition, and especially in the texts by the eminent representatives of its Yogācāra-Vijnānavada logico-epistemological school (Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, Ratnakīrti)? Why was it recognised as a valid source of knowledge, and what role was it granted to in the general Buddhist epistemological scheme (pramāṇavada)? Combined – textological semantic, hermeneutical and comparative – methodologies are applied in the course of analysis. The following conclusion has been made: while representing a coherent empiricist and phenomenalist approach, Buddhism has supplemented the classical Indian system of valid means of knowledge with two more means, namely, with that of yogic perception and authoritative testimony (āpta). However, by acknowledging the validity of yogic perception the Buddhists agreed, that it does not ensure per se the cognition of the truth and should be verified by the other valid means of knowledge. Most important from the Buddhist perspective is that such extraordinary perception should correspond to Buddha’s experience and its conceptual description.

How to Deal with Future Existence: sarvāstivāda, Yogic Perception, and Causality

This paper mainly addresses the following issues: how Buddhists deal with future existence, the difference between yogic perception and the cognition of ordinary people with regard to future entities, and how Buddhists resolve the contradiction between the theory of momentariness and that of action and its fruit. According to the Sarvāstivādins, a future entity exists in reality as long as there is cognition that has this entity as its object. According to the Sautrāntikas, however, that theory does not hold true. A future entity is just what will occur hereafter, and it is never the case that such an entity exists at present. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not directly negate an opponent’s argument that the distinction between past and future entities is made by yogic perception, but implicitly accept it. They state that because a future entity is situated in a causal stream (saṃtāna), yogis can cognize it through purified worldly cognition (śuddhalaukikajnāna). As for an effect that will occur in the future, Buddhists do not seem to follow the model that one and the same agent of action will necessarily receive the fruit of past action, which is often seen in other schools such as the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas. Rather, Buddhists adopt the theory of the uninterrupted succession of cause and effect.

JOGINĖS PERCEPCIJOS (YOGIPRATYAKṢ A) KONTROVERSIJA INDIŠKOS EPISTEMOLOGIJOS KONTEKSTE

Straipsnyje analizuojama joginės, ar ypatingosios, percepcijos (yogipratyakṣa) prigimties samprata indiškosios epistemologijos kontekste. Remiantis pirminiais Indijos filosofinių mokyklų (darśana) sanskrito šaltiniais bei šiuolaikiniais kritiniais tyrimais bandoma atsakyti į klausimus: kaip įvairiose mokyklose aprašoma ir kategorizuojama joginė percepcija? Koks vaidmuo jai suteikiamas bendroje Indijos epistemologinėje schemoje (pramān ̣avada)? Kaip ši percepcija verifikuojama ir jos pažinimas validuojamas ir kokia polemika šiuo klausimu vyko tarp skirtingų Indijos mokyklų? Kodėl ir kokiais argumentais remdamasi joginę percepciją atmeta ortodoksalioji mimansos (mīmāṃ sā) mokykla? Tyrimui pasitelkiama kompleksinė – tekstologinė semantinė, hermeneutinė ir lyginamoji – metodologija. Daroma išvada, kad joginę percepciją pripažįsta ir į bendrą pažinimo sistemą inkorporuoja beveik visos filosofinės Indijos mokyklos: joga, samkhja, budistai, vedanta, njaja, vaišešika ir kt., tik skirtingai ją interpretuoja. Paradoksalu yra tai, jog vienintelė mokykla, demonstruojanti radikalų nepasitikėjimą jogine percepcija, yra vediškosios hermeneutikos ir ritualistinės egzegezės tradicija – mimansa ir jos atstovas Kumārila Bhaṭṭa (7 a.). Atskleista, jog mimansos mokykla neigia ne konkrečius pavienius joginio pažinimo teiginius ir ne pačią joginės percepcijos galimybę, bet tokio ypatingojo pažinimo loginio pagrindimo nenuoseklumą, perteikimo kitiems lingvistinį tikslumą ir antjuslinio pažinimo naudą legitimuojant apreiškimo (śruti) teiginius paprastiems žmonėms.

The Girl Who Knew Her Brother Would Be Coming Home: Ārṣajñāna in Praśastapādabhāṣya, Nyāyakandalī and Vyomavatī

Although seldom mentioned in the secondary literature on Vaiśeṣika, the cognitive category of ārṣajnāna (ṛṣi cognition) is accepted as a distinct category of vidyā (knowledge) within both early and later Vaiśeṣika texts. This article deals with how ārṣajnāna is conceptualized in Praśastapādabhāṣya (PBh), Śrīdhara’s Nyāyakandalī (NK), and Vyomaśiva’s Vyomavatī (Vy). The main focus lies on how ṛṣi cognition is treated in these texts and what terms are used in the process. I aim to clarify the analysis of ṛṣi cognition apparent in the above sources and outline the implications this might have for the somewhat grander objective of a mapping of the semantic landscape of cognition and knowledge in Vaiśeṣika texts. The categories of yogic perception (yogipratyakṣa) and siddhic vision (siddhadarśana) are also treated since they are included within a shared discourse.

Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness – Edited by Eli Franco in collaboration with Dagmar Eigner

Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness – Edited by Eli Franco in collaboration with Dagmar Eigner

Franco, Eli, and Dagmar Eigner, Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness

Franco, Eli, and Dagmar Eigner, Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness

BOOK REVIEW: Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness. By Eli Franco and Dagmar Eigner, eds

BOOK REVIEW: Yogic Perception, Meditation and Altered States of Consciousness. By Eli Franco and Dagmar Eigner, eds

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasaṃvedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajnānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramāṇa-pramāṇaphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramāṇavārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.

Realizing the unreal: Dharmakīrti’s theory of yogic perception

The Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 7th century C.E.) developed a theory of yogic perception that achieved much influence among Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet. His theory includes an odd problem: on Dharmakīrti’s view, many of the paradigmatic objects of the adept’s meditations do not really exist. How can one cultivate a meditative perception of the nonexistent? This ontological difficulty stems from Dharmakīrti’s decision to construe the Four Noble Truths as the paradigmatic objects of yogic perception. For him, this ontological problem manifests in an epistemological corollary: “impermanence” (anityatā) and other features of the Noble Truths are conceptual, but the adept’s meditative perception of them must be nonconceptual. How can a nonconceptual cognition apprehend a conceptual object? A key aspect of Dharmakīrti’s theory of concepts provides a solution to this problem. Specifically, Dharmakīrti maintains that a concept, when taken as a mental event, can be considered a particular and thus an object of nonconceptual cognition. Taking this approach, Dharmakīrti downplays the notion that yogic perception is an encounter with real things in the world, in part because it is phenomenally akin to hallucination. Instead, what counts for Dharmakīrti—and what differentiates the adept’s realization from the madman’s hallucination—are the salvific effects induced by the meditative experience.