WTO Rules Research Articles

Understanding the U.S.-China Trade War

ABSTRACTThree major concerns drove the U.S. into initiating the trade war, and they are (a) the concern that China’s chronically large trade surplus was depressing job creation in the U.S. (b) the concern that China was using illegal and unfair methods to acquire U.S. technology at an effectively discounted price; and (c) the concern that China seeks to weaken U.S. national security and its international standing. On the dispute over China’s exchange rate and trade imbalance, the first conclusion is that it was marked by analytical confusion over the meaning of the term ‘equilibrium exchange rate’. The second conclusion is that China’s trade imbalance reflects the economic conditions in both China and U.S., and that the efficient and fair solution of the problem requires policy changes in both countries. On the industrial policy dispute, the first conclusion is that the issue of forced technology transfer is largely a dispute about China using its market power to benefit itself at the expense of its trade partners. The second conclusion is that China’s use of market power can last only until the other large countries could unite and retaliate as a group. The inevitability of retaliation means that China should replace the joint-venture (JV) mechanism for technological diffusion with other ways to strengthen its technological capability. On the U.S. concern about whether China trade weakens its national security, the first conclusion is that the notion of national security that is commonly adopted in the U.S. trade policy debate is ignorant about the primary determinants of U.S. capability in innovation. By focusing instead mainly on how to hold down China technologically, the long-run outcome will be a technologically weaker U.S. and hence, a more vulnerable U.S. The second conclusion is that the U.S. must identify a clear, short list of critical technologies and critical infrastructure for the recently reformed Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to cover, and update this list constantly. Otherwise, the broad and changing nature of notions about national security would allow the bureaucratically driven phenomenon of mission-creep to steadily expand the coverage of the CFIUS process, thereby steadily rendering CFIUS to be operationally capricious. Our principal policy suggestion to China is that, because China’s economy in 2018 is very different from that in 1978 (e.g. many parts of China now look like Singapore and China is Africa’s biggest donor), there should be more reciprocity in China’s trade and investment relations with the advanced economies despite China’s status as a developing economy under WTO rules. Our principal policy suggestion to President Trump is to stop equating strategic competition with economic competition. Strategic competition is normally a zero-sum game. While fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run.

Revitalising Multilateral Trade Governance

The WTO provides extensive flexibility for members to engage with each other. Using this, WTO members should identify a road map for the future and a work programme to update and expand the rulebook to address trade-distorting nontariff policies that are not or only partially covered by current WTO rules. Expanding the WTO rulebook, accepting greater reciprocity and improving the organisation’s operation are necessary for revitalising the WTO.

A Study On the Less Duty Rule of EU Anti-Dumping Law

최소부과원칙(Lesser Duty Rule)이란 공동체 산업의 피해를 제거하기에 충분하다면 반덤핑관세액은 덤핑마진보다 적게 부과되어야 한다는 것이다. 즉 최소부과원칙은 비례의 원칙 중 두 번째의 하부명령인 필요성의 원칙을 잘 구현하려는 것이다. WTO 반덤핑협정에는 회원국 당국의 재량으로 인정되어 있지만 유럽연합의 경우에는 집행위원회(the Commission)가 반덤핑관세 부과시 의무적으로 최소부과원칙을 적용해야 하는 점이 다른 점이다. 그러나 문제는 최소부과원칙의 적용시 피해액 산정에 있어서 가장 중요한 구체적 기준을 현행 기본규칙에서는 명시하고 있지 않다는 점이다. 그리하여 유럽연합이 피해마진을 산정할 때 사용하고 있는 목표가격의 설정, 거래 대 거래 방식에서의 네거티브 제로잉의 사용 등이 WTO 반덤핑협정상 공정한 가격비교의 원칙에 위배되는 것은 아닌지가 문제되고 있다. 이것은 EU 당국이 최소부과원칙을 적용하였다고 할 지라도 최소부과원칙의 전제조건인 네거티브 덤핑을 제로잉하여 덤핑의 결과를 왜곡하면 피해액 산정도 따라서 왜곡되기 때문이다. 이러한 유럽연합의 최소부과원칙의 적용방식은 다음과 같은 문제점을 가지고 있다. 첫째로, 염가판매마진 방식으로 덤핑마진을 산정하면서 가상의 목표가격에 근거하여 적정한 이윤을 산출하므로 실제가격보다는 항상 높고 유럽연합 당국의 자의가 개입될 수 밖에 없다는 점이다. 둘째로, 유럽연합법원의 판례에 따른다고 할지라도 피해마진을 산정하는데 전제가 되는 적정한 이윤을 도출해내는 구체적인 기준을 제시하고 있지 않다는 점이다. 셋째로, 유럽연합 당국의 개별사건에서의 반덤핑조치 부과 규칙(regulation)에는 덤핑수입품이 없었다면 달성할 수 있었을 적정한 이윤율에 대해서는 명시하고 있지만, 적정한 이윤율을 산출해내는 구체적 근거에 대해서는 명시하고 있지 않아 그 산출 근거를 잘 알 수 없다는 점이다. 넷째로, 유럽연합은 EC 대 인도산 면화류 침대용품(Cotton-Type Bed Linen) 사건 이후 덤핑마진 산정시에는 더 이상 제로잉을 하지 않지만 피해마진 산정시에는 여전히 모델 제로잉 방식을 사용하여 제로잉하고 있어 문제가 될 소지는 있으나, 피해마진이 덤핑마진보다 작다면 이러한 피해마진을 반덤핑관세액으로 부과하여도 WTO 규정을 위배하는 것은 아니라는 점이다. 왜냐하면 덤핑마진을 초과하여 반덤핑관세액을 부과하지만 않으면 WTO 규범에 합치하기 때문이다. 이상의 문제점을 해결하기 위해서는 종국적으로는 WTO 차원에서 합리적인 피해인정 산정방식에 대한 규범화를 마련하여야 할 것이다.The Lesser Duty Rule is that the amount of the anti-dumping duty shall not exceed the margin of dumping established but it should be less than the margin if such lesser duty would be adequate to remove the injury to the Union industry. So the second sub-principle of the principle of proportionality, the principle of necessity is well given body to the Lesser Duty Rule in the EU Anti Dumping Law. But it is the problem whether the EU’s method in assessing the margin of injury i.e. setting up of target price, transaction to transaction method, negative zeroing in applying the Lesser Duty Rule is violating the principle of fair comparison in the WTO Anti Dumping Agreement or not. That is why the most important criteria in the calculation of amount of injury is not written in the Basic Regulation 2016/1036. The reason why is that firstly, the method of calculating the reasonable profit on the basis of target price while assessing the dumping margin by price underselling margin is always higher than the real price and leads to the EU institution’s arbitrary decision. Secondly, we don’t know the detailed grounds on the reasonable profit rate because the reasonable profit rate achievable without dumping products is stated in anti dumping regulation imposed by the European Commission but the detailed grounds on the reasonable profit rate is not in the regulation. Thirdly, the Court of Justice of European Union does not rule the concrete criteria about the reasonable profit in calculating the injury margin too. Fourthly, since EC-Cotton-Type Bed Linen from India case, EU does not do zeroing in calculating the dumping margin. But EU does zeroing in calculating the injury margin by model zeroing method. But it is not violating the WTO’s rule. The reason why is that if the injury margin is less than the dumping margin, the Commission is allowed to impose anti dumping duty the full margin of dumping or less under the WTO Rule. Ultimately, norms and standards shall be arranged in WTO level to find the reasonable method in calculating injury margin.

Non-Tariff Measure under WTO Laws: Case Study on the Application of Local Content Requirement for 4G LTE Devices in Indonesia

Under the WTO laws, countries are allowed to protect their national industry by imposing tariffs as well as non-tariff measures (NTM). While the WTO is committed to reduce tariff, it does not have uniform treatment towards NTMs. One type of NTM that becomes the disputed subject of several WTO cases is Local Content Requirement (LCR) because while it can help national industry, it is seen as discriminatory towards imported products. This work discusses whether the application of the Tingkat Komponen Dalam Negeri (TKDN) or LCR provisions for 4G LTE communication devices in Indonesia is in conformity with WTO laws. By analyzing relevant WTO agreements and rulings, this work will demonstrate that Indonesia’s LCR provisions in 4G LTE sector may not be in conformity with the GATT and TRIMS but at the same time it does not violate the GATS, ASCM, and GPA because such LCR provisions do not fall under those three agreements. In light of those, this writing suggests that the government of Indonesia bring the LCR provisions in 4G LTE sector into conformity with WTO laws by revoking the provisions mandating the need to use local over imported products to avoid potential claims from other WTO members.

Using the WTO to Facilitate the Paris Agreement: A Tripartite Approach

Climate change is undeniably the greatest threat humanity has ever faced, and its challenges can only be addressed through multilateral means. Lacking in accountability and enforcement mechanisms, however, the Paris Agreement requires additional support to achieve its full effect. This paper proposes a novel approach for refocusing the multilateral trading system and facilitating the Paris Agreement. Although not perfectly aligned with the goals of the Paris Agreement, the WTO’s multilateral framework could provide the necessary flexibilities to work towards meeting the Paris Agreement’s targets. There are three prongs to using the WTO as a vehicle to achieve progress on climate change. First, the preamble to the Agreement Establishing the WTO explicitly recognizes sustainable development as a goal, seeking to protect and preserve the environment. It also recognizes the need for developing countries to share in the growth in international trade. Giving meaning and effect to sustainable development is key to facilitating the Paris Agreement. The second prong recognizes that certain types of climate change mitigation measures may require violating WTO rules. In such circumstances, limited carve-outs in the mold of the Public Stockpiling Exception relating to food security, with additional built-in sunset provisions, would provide support for countries working to meet their targets, allowing them the ability to break from WTO rules to support domestic industries. Finally, the third prong envisions the negotiation of a multilateral or plurilateral agreement to help give effect to the Paris Agreement, much as the WTO already works in tandem with WIPO in relation to TRIPS and with the WCO in relation to the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA). Key to this agreement would be special and differential treatment (S&DT) provisions. The TFA contains next generation S&DT provisions, which could be leveraged in the context of a future plurilateral or multilateral agreement to help give effect to the Paris Agreement.

China's SOE Reform: Using WTO Rules to Build a Market Economy

This paper challenges the widespread view that existing WTO rules are insufficient for dealing with state capitalism in China, which has been further emboldened by the latest rounds of state-owned enterprise (“SOE”) reforms. Through a careful review of WTO agreements and jurisprudence, it is argued that new rules are not necessarily needed because the unique challenges created by China’s state capitalism can be appropriately addressed by the WTO’s existing rules on subsidies coupled with the China-specific obligations. A more realistic approach would be to encourage China to undertake market-oriented reforms through WTO litigation based on existing rules rather than trying to negotiate new rules.

Free Riding on Enforcement in the World Trade Organization

Many policies that appear to violate WTO rules remain unchallenged, even as they have a significant economic impact. Why is this? We argue that the likelihood that a country challenges a protectionist policy is linked to how concentrated or diffuse that policy is. When it is concentrated, litigation is a private good. But when a policy is diffuse, affecting many states, litigation is a public good and countries face a collective action problem: each country seeks to free ride on others’ litigation. The resulting selection effect has two consequences. First, we see a longer enforcement delay for diffuse trade violations. Second, states require higher odds of success to overcome the collective action problem, meaning that conditional on being filed, cases that challenge concentrated policies are less likely to succeed. Examining all WTO disputes, we leverage selection effects to test our argument using data on the timing and outcomes of trade disputes.

The greater Eurasian partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative: Can the two be linked?

Abstract Responding to changes in the world, Russia has proposed the Greater Eurasian Partnership for the international cooperation agenda. At the same time, the possibility of linking that partnership with the Belt and Road Initiative for international cooperation is one of the key factors in implementing this agenda. Alignment between the development strategies of Russia and China in the field of global, regional, and bilateral relations lays the foundation of successful cooperation between a number of countries, regions, and organizations. For the Eurasian Partnership to succeed, it must strictly adhere to WTO rules and take a tolerant attitude toward the diverse mechanisms for cooperation that various countries and regions have developed.

ON THE PROBLEMATIC ISSUES OF FURTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU-UKRAINE ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC REGULATION

The present article deals with separate problems of modernization of foreign economic legislation in accordance with the requirements of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU. It is proposed the introduction of effective technical regulation measures that do not harm the Ukrainian economy, to accelerate the adoption of customs regulations, to simplify the registration of branches of European business entities in Ukraine, as well as to develop the interpretative principles for the application of WTO rules in the EU-Ukraine relations are presented.

Deep and Not Comprehensive? What the WTO Rules Permit for a UK–EU FTA

AbstractWTO rules prohibit Free Trade Areas (FTAs) that provide tariff-free access or services liberalization in only one or a few sectors. In this sense, a narrow, sectoral approach to concluding an FTA between the EU and the UK would contravene WTO law. However, assuming the EU and the UK were able to agree a substantially broad tariff-free FTA, WTO rules would not prevent them from moving further to maintain the bulk of the benefits of the Customs Union and the Single Market in a few key sectors. They could establish customs union-like conditions by coordinating external tariffs in some sectors and agreeing on relaxed Rules of Origin (RoOs) administered lightly and Single Market-like access could be approximated through sectoral Mutual Recognition Agreements. Such an approach would enable continued deep integration, whose desirability has been signalled on both sides. It would fall short of current market access levels even in the selected sectors, and, in the case of tariff coordination, re-create some of the limits to an independent trade policy that Brexit aimed to remove. If the trade-off were deemed desirable, however, the approach could be reconciled with WTO rules including the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ requirement that equal treatment be awarded to all WTO Member States.

Lost in Transition?

With less than a year to go until the two year negotiating period comes to an end, hardly anyone still doubts that Brexit is a complex process. A transition period – agreed in principle by the EU and the UK in the draft withdrawal agreement - is considered necessary to ensure an orderly Brexit. The rationale behind it is twofold: nobody expects an agreement on the future relationship between the UK and the EU to be negotiated and ratified by 29 March 2019; and even if it were, there would not be enough time for governments, traders, and individuals to prepare for its entry into force. Given there is no political appetite for an extension of the period for negotiating the withdrawal agreement, a transition based on the status quo of the UK’s EU membership is the only way to avoid the EU-UK relationship finding itself in a disruptive limbo with trade on the basis WTO rules and other forms of cooperation either not happening or based on largely out-dated international treaties. As this contribution aims to show, a status quo transition sounds simple but, like all things Brexit, putting it in place will be legally challenging. This paper distinguishes four dimensions to transition: the UK-EU dimension; the EU-internal dimension; the UK-internal dimension; and the external dimension. It will discuss key challenges pertaining to each of these dimensions.

Making WTO Dispute Settlement System Useful for LDCs

The World Trade Organization, a forum of multinational bargaining for trade under an international regulatory authority, has adhered compromising provisions for all member countries. The natural rule ‘stronger pie more and weaker are hanged up in the better dream of future' is indirectly refl ected in the WTO rules (the agreements, commitments and a few decisions of Ministerial Conferences) as well. While weaker countries (including independent economic territories) had shown strong reservation in opening up Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, General Agreement on Trade in Services and Agricultural market during negotiation, the richer had persuaded in inserting scattered, fl exible and concessional provisions in different Agreements of WTO; and Ministerial Conferences had made decisions and commitments to support and compensate them. The ultimate indication of trade performance is measured on their transactions and on the free movement of their goods and services. In case if the treatment is not fair or the regulatory compliance is not fulfi lled, remedy ought to be accessible. Since its commencement, just a single case was initiated by Least Developed Countries for settlement through the Dispute Settlement Body due to the doubt on the procedure and effectiveness of DSB. The article tries to analyze that why weaker (especially LDCs) countries are reluctant in joining DSB and framing way-out to resolve the problem by making convenient provisions for the weaker, LDCs as well.

Brexit and Public Procurement: Transitioning into the Void?

On 29 March 2017, the UK notified its intention of leaving the EU. This activated the two-year disconnection period foreseen in Article 50 TEU, thus resulting in a default Brexit at the end of March 2019. The firming up of a draft agreement on a transition period to run until 31 December 2020 can now provide a longer timescale for the Brexit disconnection, as well as some clarity on the process of disentanglement of the UK’s and EU’s legal systems. The draft transition agreement of 19 March 2018 provides explicit rules on public procurement bound to regulate ‘internal’ procurement trade between the UK and the EU for a period of over 15 months. However, the uncertainty concerning the future EU-UK relationship remains, and the draft agreement does not provide any indication on the likely legal architecture for future EU-UK trade, including through public procurement. The draft agreement has thus not suppressed the risk of a ‘cliff-edge’ disconnection post-Brexit, but rather solely deferred it. The transition is currently not into an alternative system of procurement regulation, but rather into the void. There have also been very limited developments concerning the UK’s and EU’s repositioning within the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA), which creates additional legal uncertainty from the perspective of ‘external’ trade in procurement markets due to the absence of a ‘WTO rules’ default applicable to public procurement. Against the backdrop of this legal uncertainty, this paper critically assesses the implications for public procurement of the March 2018 draft transition agreement. In particular, the paper identifies three shortcomings that would have required explicit regulation: first, the exclusion from the scope of coverage of the of the draft transition agreement of procurement carried out by the EU Institutions themselves; second, the continued enforcement of the rules on contract modification and termination; and third, the interaction between procurement and other rules. The paper also and flags up some of the areas for future EU-UK collaboration that require further attention. The paper then goes on to revisit the continued uncertainty concerning the EU’s and UK’s position within the WTO GPA. It concludes that it is in both the UK’s and the EU’s interest to reach a future EU-UK FTA that ensures continued collaboration and crystallises current compliance with EU rules, and to build on it to reach a jointly negotiated solution vis-a-vis the rest of WTO GPA parties.

The Role of Institutional-Legal Capacity and Power in Explaining the Performance of Developing Countries in WTO Disputes against the G2

Abstract This article analyses the performance of developing countries in WTO disputes against the USA and EU (the G2) from 1995 to 2012. It investigates the influence of four factors – WTO rules and norms, institutional-legal capacity, market power, and trade dynamics – on two samples, namely disputes initiated and successfully concluded against the G2. Generalized Linear Models (GLMs) are used to analyse the data. They show that, while relative bilateral exports also play a role, the institutional-legal capacity and market power of developing countries (as represented by GDP) play the most important role in allowing developing countries to initiate disputes against the G2, and to complete them successully.

WTO Rare Earths Case’s Influence on China’s Domestic Regulatory Changes

This article reviews the influence on China’s domestic governance exerted by a high profile WTO case – the Rare Earths case. It argues that China’s domestic regulatory framework for rare earths has been phenomenally reshaped by the WTO Rare Earths case. First, China removed the export restrictions on rare earths in order to implement the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) Rulings. Second, China improved environmental legislation to facilitate its defence in the WTO Rare Earths case, and incorporated environmental protection concerns in its regulatory philosophy. Third, China invested more administrative resources in mobilizing local governments to better implement rare earths policies, which cover the mining, production, circulation, and industrial consolidation of rare earths. While the first measure was mandatory in terms of China’s obligation to implement WTO DSB rulings, the second and the third initiatives resulted from China’s voluntary adjustment of its governance in reaction to the WTO Rare Earths case. Reading China’s engagement with the WTO Rare Earths case in the broader context of China’s performance in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS), it is evident that China is a firm supporter of the WTO DSS: China has kept its good record of compliance with the WTO rulings, maintained its reputation as an active player in the WTO DSS, and embraced WTO’s far-reaching impact on its domestic management regime.

Negotiating from the margins: how the UN shapes the rules of the WTO

ABSTRACTWorld Trade Organization (WTO) rules on agriculture are among the most contentious issues in the international political economy due to agriculture's importance in the production of tradable commodities as well as economic development and food security in developing countries. In this article, I analyse a surprising and unexpected actor playing an important role in shaping WTO rules on agriculture – the United Nations (UN). While UN actors do not have a seat at the bargaining table, I argue that they invoke their delegated and moral authority and initiate actions to shape global trade rule-making. I demonstrate that UN actors have influenced the discourse, agenda and outcomes of trade negotiations by analysing three cases: (1) the Food and Agriculture Organization orchestrating a Uruguay Round agreement in favour of food insecure developing countries; (2) the World Food Programme's blocking of trade rules on international food aid during the Doha Round negotiations; (3) a proposal by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food for a legal waiver to protect public food stockholding that was taken up by WTO member states in 2013.

Brazil responses to the strategies used by the tobacco industry to resist Tobacco Control National Policy

Brazil responses to the strategies used by the tobacco industry to resist Tobacco Control National Policy

Potential Conflicts between Agricultural Trade Rules and Climate Change Treaty Commitments

Climate change – among its many other challenges – also impacts on conditions of competition along the whole food value chain. This article posits that many mitigation and adaptation policies imply a differentiation between otherwise identical products with different climate footprints. Where imports are affected, there is a potential for trade frictions. The main issue appears to be a climate-smart treatment of so-called ‚non-product-related like products.‘ Now that national governments start implementing their commitments under the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, they have to closely look at the trade and investment impact of their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). The NDC presently available remain silent on concrete measures involving product differentiation according to footprint differences, by way of border adjustment measures, subsidies, prohibitions, or restrictions. The non-discrimination principle enshrined in the multilateral trading system can be a problem for such differentiations. No climate-smart agricultural measures have as yet been notified to the WTO. But several renewable energy programmes have been found to violate WTO rules. Potential problems could arise, for instance, from differentiating tariffs, import restrictions or taxes according to climate footprint. Conditions of competition might even be affected by labels signalling products with a bigger footprint, or through subsidies and incentives compensating domestic producers subject to emissions reductions, prohibitions, and input restrictions. A second major problem lies in the way the Paris Agreement and the WTO address the Development Dimension. In the Paris Agreement the Development Dimension is addressed by the notion of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR), leaving basically all Parties free on how to take development into account in their NDC. On the other side, the so-called 'Special and Differentiated Treatment' (SDT) foreseen in all WTO agreements for developing country products and services appears incapable to deal with the global impact of all emissions, regardless of their origin, or with the negative impact on developing country exports to climate-smart markets in developed countries. In conclusion we suggest that a review of the climate-relevant trade and investment rules is necessary at the international level, involving climate, agriculture and trade regulators, supported by scientific, economic and legal expertise. The purpose of this review is to avoid litigation jeopardising the implementation of the Paris Agreement. At the same time, such a review must be wide-ranging, because the objective is to ensure maximum policy space for climate mitigation and adaptation without negatively impacting on other countries, or unduly restricting trade and investment, especially in poor developing countries. Last but not least, this intergovernmental and inter-institutional review is urgent, because the results should provide as quickly as possible the legal security necessary for regulators, NDC developments and reviews, and international standard-setting processes.

International Economic Law Might Improve Water Governance in Peru

Has the well-known fragmentation between Human Rights and Water and Investment Law been exacerbated by the protection offered to foreign investors under Peru’s recently signed Regional Trade Agreements and under WTO rules, both enforceable under their specific dispute settlement procedures? This chapter shows that commercial treaty rules are an evolving source of legal obligations which may actually help to improve Peru’s water governance. Traders and investors can still trust arbitrators to safeguard their legitimate interests. On the other side, trade-distorting social and environmental dumping can now be attacked under the new, comprehensive treaties. Regardless of the relative economic impact of different water uses, Peru cannot trade away its international obligations by condoning “water grab” investments and violations of fundamental human rights and environmental norms. The only caveat is the unilateralism even of well-meant standards “made in Washington”. Nonetheless, while WTO still ensures non-discriminatory treatment of foreign operators, it will not systematically protect investment treaties and contracts with regulatory “freeze clauses” in cases of serious violations of ius cogens or peremptory social and environmental law, including water grabbing. And developing countries accepting higher standards can count on their developed trading partners to enforce such standards in countries with competing producers.

Appellate Body Report onEU−Biodiesel: The Future of China's State Capitalism under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement

AbstractChina's unique economic system poses increasing challenges to the world trading system and attracts growing academic and policy debate. WTO members have frequently resorted to antidumping measures in dealing with price distortions caused by the Chinese government's influence on the economy. The Appellate Body's decision in the recentEU–Biodieseldispute starts to remove the flexibility of condemning state intervention and price distortions under the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement through antidumping measures. This decision, read with the relevant WTO jurisprudence on the ‘ordinary course of trade’ test and subsidies, suggests that price distortions resulting from state intervention should be addressed under other WTO rules. Therefore, it is necessary for WTO members to shift their focus to, and explore the capacity of, the other rules to overcome the challenges arising from China's state capitalism.