World Trade Organization Norms Research Articles

Home remedies: flexibilities to onshore pharmaceutical manufacturing under WTO rules

Abstract In the wake of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 pandemic, governments globally have intensified efforts to localize the production of pharmaceuticals, leveraging local content requirements and incentives to mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities. This shift has revealed tensions with World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations, notably highlighted in Turkey—Pharmaceutical Products (EU). This article explores policy-based flexibilities within the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994, the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement that may justify measures inconsistent with WTO norms under specific conditions. Analysing public health exceptions, national security imperatives, and government procurement policies, the paper elucidates how these flexibilities can be mobilized to support onshoring initiatives while adhering to international trade obligations. The findings suggest a nuanced approach to reconciling public health goals and economic strategies with global trade rules, providing a critical framework for policymakers navigating the complex interplay between national interests and international legal commitments.

PERAN WTO DALAM MENYELESAIKAN SENGKETA PRICE RANGE SYSTEM ANTARA PERU DAN GUATEMALA TAHUN 2013

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an international organization that facilitates international cooperation in the field of economy and trade. The position of the WTO as an international regime to date certainly has an important influence in the context of a country's national economic progress. In addition, the World Trade Organization has a function to resolve trade disputes experienced by its member states. One of the disputes faced was Peru's price range system on agricultural products that were considered detrimental to Guatemala in the two countries' free trade agreements. This is evidenced by the violation of Article 4.2 by Peru, namely the determination of additional import costs is not allowed in an agreement and is not an ordinary customs duty. Based on the above issues, the authors try to see how the WTO facilitates the implementation of negotiations between the two sides based on the concept of dispute settlement mechanism. Later in obtaining the data source, the author browses news, international trade documents, WTO norms and official statements relating to the topic of this research online. The article found that the WTO established a panel as a mediator to resolve the trade dispute and asserted that Peru had violated international trade norms applicable to the WTO and this was a permanent decision to be exercised by Peru.

Ex officio Claimant: A Challenging Proposal for Reforming the WTO

The members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are still very reserved in pursuing cases and rather willing to seek traditional negotiating methods for settling their disputes. Decisions to engage in litigations are subject to numerous non-legal determinants. Moreover, many developing and least-developed WTO members face the problem of accessibility of the system provided by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). Those states have been standing aside the DSU arena with no opportunity to enjoy the benefits of legal protection. Finally, affected private companies cannot access the DSU system, nor participate in procedures as third parties. Those entities always need to exert pressure on their governments to bring a claim and to obtain financial support for litigations. All those circumstances in the pre-litigation stage prevent effective delivery and distribution of justice in the WTO community. Therefore, the author proposes a reform of the DSU system by means of establishing a new central institution in the WTO – the ‘Independent Surveillance Body’ (ISB). This expert body would act as an institutional ex officio claimant empowered to survey the implementation of the WTO norms and to initiate procedures against members that violate the WTO law. World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System, Ex-officio Claimant, Pre-litigation, Distributive Justice.

Aktivna legitimacija u postupku rešavanja sporova pred Svetskom trgovinskom organizacijom

The issue of locus standi in the dispute settlement system before the World Trade Organization (WTO) is attached to the entities which can be parties to a disputes, as well as to conditions for the status of complainant or respondent in the certain dispute. Formally, the WTO dispute settlement system is considerably open for all WTO members in the initiating stage of dispute. The WTO members have unlimited autonomy regarding commencement of procedure and locus standi is not subject to ex ante control by any institutional body of the WTO. Nevertheless, the WTO members are expected to act in good faith during initiation of procedure. The WTO member should, in good faith and with appropriate level of 'self-regulation', evaluate possible outcome of a dispute and, in accordance with it, decide about initiation of procedure against another member. The standing before the WTO dispute settlement system is exclusively reserved for the WTO members. Non-member states and territories have no access to this forum. Also, private entities and companies have no locus standi. Private entities cannot be subject to the WTO norms and cannot enjoy rights and benefits from the WTO law. Giving the locus standi to private entities would cause fundamental reform of the WTO legal system by imposing the principle of direct effect of the WTO norms. Consequenses of such reform would be unforeseeable. It would also lead to disturbance of the established balance of rights and obligations inside the WTO. Companies, nevertheless, through their formal and informal operating, can have a significant de facto role in procedures before the WTO dispute settlement system.

Anti-Circumvention of Anti-Dumping Measures: Law and Practice of Ten World Trade Organization Members – Australia

Laws dealing with practices that ‘get around’ tariffs imposed by World Trade Organization (WTO) Members on dumped or subsidized goods are well established in some Members but have only recently been introduced in Australia. The compliance of these laws with WTO norms is open to debate. The economic rationale for penalizing some kinds of commercial practice as circumvention may be similarly contested. This article outlines the Australian laws and accompanying investigation procedures, with available case studies, and poses questions about the need for them and about their legitimacy in policy terms.

Intellectual Capital of Enterprises and Its Role in the Integral Process

In August 2012 Russia entered the World Trade organization (WTO) and took all the obligations on establishment of this organization according to the Marrakesh agreement. As a participant of the international trade system, Russia obtains a legitimate access to a very much unified legal space and international legal protection guaranteed by WTO norms, which should finally promote development of Russian foreign trade and Russian interests abroad. Thus, annually, within the framework of the world trade, economic participant benefit from application of simplified customs procedures $ 900 bn. Within Russia, according to the data of the Economic Cooperation and Development organization, this benefit may be $18 bn. concerning protection of rights of intellectual property, the Russian Federation has not taken any additional obligations, – and During the period of negotiations the national legislative base was brought in line with the WTO norms. This article is going to consider questions of creation and usage of the intellectual capital in export-oriented innovative enterprises related to development of science and high-technology production, exportation of developed technologies and high-tech products.

EU’s Monitoring of China’s Compliance with WTO Obligations

To World Trade Organization (WTO) members, admitting a country with a rapidly expanding economy into the WTO was a great experiment as the country would make significant decisions concerning resource allocation. In the history of the world trading system, never has a country of such trading importance and system incompatibility with WTO norms been admitted. Given China's trade weight, its anticipated gigantic trade surge would disrupt the market of its trading partners, and the rule-based multilateral trading system would be endangered if China opted to ignore the WTO rules. To safeguard itself, the European Union (EU), like the United States, imposed upon China a comprehensive protocol which has more far-reaching obligations beyond the WTO. The EU also kept a close watch on China's behaviour in the WTO. With no task forces to monitor China's compliance, the EU has taken full advantage of the built-in mechanisms in the WTO, i.e., Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, as well as other measures (including bilateral channels and unilateral measures). This is pursued in the broader context of China's rise and with a broader vision of integrating a rising China into the existing global economic order. After all, a WTO-adhering China is conducive to cementing China's place in the global economy, buttressing the internal reform process, and strengthening the rule of law, which is in the interest of the world. For the EU, the real question is how to encourage China to change its economy into one that relies more on domestic demand than on export on one hand, and one that allows market access to more imports and protects IPRs on the other hand. Therefore, monitoring shall be conducted to facilitate a smooth and thus healthy China-EU trade relation, which will .nally hinge on EU's patience and skills in dealing with a rising China.

Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement

This article aims at making a preliminary assessment of China in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system from an international socialization perspective. When China joined the WTO in November 2001, it was not clear how China would behave in the WTO dispute settlement. At first, China proved to be a conciliatory defendant and reluctant complainant. Recently, however, China’s profile in dispute settlement has shifted to a more proactive one, leading some observers to label its behaviour ‘aggressive’. I argue that China’s behaviour should be viewed in a different light. From totally rejecting international third party adjudication in the past, China – by permitting WTO panels to determine its fate in trade disputes – has started to exhibit new willingness to accept binding international adjudication. In this context, China is demonstrating respect for international rules as well as its faith in western legal norms and institutions. Through more intense participation in WTO dispute settlement, China is also becoming increasingly vested in the maintenance of WTO norms and rules, and consequently, the WTO dispute settlement system is playing an important role in socializing China.

Doha Reform of WTO Export Credit Provisions in the SCM Agreement: The Perspective of Developing Countries

Export credit instruments are important tools for enterprises used by developing and developed countries to face risks of default of transactions and to offer purchasers extended payment of their goods. Although they contribute to foster international trade, their misuse is likely to distort competition in the marketplace. In order to prevent competition being based on the amount of support received by the domestic Export Credit Agencies more than on price and quality of goods traded, states developed international rules within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the manner in which those rules have been written creates an unbalanced playing field between developing and developed countries. During the Doha Development Round, some countries proposed amendments in the current WTO norms in order to modify items (j) and (k) of the Illustrative List of Annex I of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement and reduce the unbalances due to the financial and risk conditions of developing countries against developed countries. This contribution will analyse the interests of developing and developed countries in the Doha proposed reforms aimed at restoring a level playing field among WTO Members.

Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement

This paper aims at making a preliminary assessment of China in the WTO dispute settlement system from an international socialization perspective. When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2001, it was not clear how China would behave in WTO dispute settlement. At first, China proved to be a conciliatory defendant and reluctant complainant. Recently however, China’s profile in dispute settlement has shifted to a more proactive one, leading some observers to label its behavior “aggressive.” I argue that China’s behavior should be viewed in a different light. From totally rejecting international third party adjudication in the past, China - by permitting WTO panels to determine its fate in trade disputes - has started to exhibit new willingness to accept binding international adjudication. In this context, China is demonstrating respect for international rules as well as its faith in western legal norms and institutions. Through more intense participation in WTO dispute settlement, China is also becoming increasingly vested in the maintenance of WTO norms and rules, and consequently, the WTO dispute settlement system is playing an important role in socializing China.

Sense and Sensibilities of China and WTO Dispute Settlement

This paper aims at making a preliminary assessment of China in the WTO dispute settlement system from an international socialization perspective. When China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in November 2001, it was not clear how China would behave in WTO dispute settlement. At first, China proved to be a conciliatory defendant and reluctant complainant. Recently however, China’s profile in dispute settlement has shifted to a more proactive one, leading some observers to label its behavior “aggressive.” I argue that China’s behavior should be viewed in a different light. From totally rejecting international third party adjudication in the past, China - by permitting WTO panels to determine its fate in trade disputes - has started to exhibit new willingness to accept binding international adjudication. In this context, China is demonstrating respect for international rules as well as its faith in western legal norms and institutions. Through more intense participation in WTO dispute settlement, China is also becoming increasingly vested in the maintenance of WTO norms and rules, and consequently, the WTO dispute settlement system is playing an important role in socializing China.

Trade Related Environmental Measures in Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO: Irreconcilable Differences?

Problem statement: WTO adopted a multilateral trading system without ignoring the importance of protecting environment. Exceptions in Article XX, Clause (b) and (g) checks trade at the cost of environment. It is difficult to establish a relationship between Trade Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. For the past ten years there have been simultaneous efforts to reconcile the differences between the two. Approach: Therefore, the author was intrigued by this topic and followed an analytical method of study with the help of various WTO documents available online as well as in books. Against this background, this article pursues three main goals to achieve. Firstly, it examines whether Public International law can be used in the WTO. In answering this question the author analyses the relationship between Trade Measures in MEA and WTO and how a meaningful balance can be struck between the two. The author has tried to find a solution to such conflicts in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The Public International Law by applying the principle of lex specialis settles the conflict in favor of environment. Results: But somehow for years, WTO and its Dispute Settlement Body have been settling disputes between trade and environment in favor of trade. The second goal of this study is to determine whether sustainable development and its principles are intending to achieve a normative status in International law. In examining this issue it is pertinent to note that the International Case laws like the Gabcikovo Nagymaros Dispute becomes of utmost importance. The treaty laws also add to the presence of Sustainable Development. The author has also discussed the response of the WTO to sustainable development in the light of leading case laws. Conclusion: Towards the end the author has offered humble suggestions to reconcile the differences between TREMs in MEAs and WTO norms using sustainable development as an effective tool. The application of only the WTO law is not sufficient; it should also apply International law to the disputes. Such an approach would help in handling climatic changes and trade in genetically modified organisms.

Unravelling the Trade and Environment Debate through Sustainable Development Law Principles

The goal of this paper is to see whether, and how, Public International Law (PIL) principles and, in particular, International Environmental Law (IEL) principles can be used in order to find a balance between trade and environment in the study of the legal relationship between Trade Related Environmental Measures (TREMs) in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. TREMs can ban, limit or affect in other ways international trade and this may lead to a conflict with WTO Agreements norms and rules. Three main approaches have been followed by States and scholars in this last decade to solve these conflicts: a 'WTO approach', an 'extra-WTO approach' and a 'cooperative approach'. Within these approaches several PIL aspects have been used including treaty law provisions and customary rules, such as the lex specialis rule. The non isolation of the WTO from PIL has been stressed by many important authors. IEL principles are becoming more important within the international community, and in particular the law of sustainable development. In fact, principles such as the precautionary principle and the common but differentiated responsibilities, among others, are being strengthened both by academics (the ILA principles of International law Relating to Sustainable Development) and by the entry into force of recent MEAs (Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, Rotterdam Convention, etc..), where these principles play a pivotal role. Currently, sustainable development is only mentioned in the preamble of the Agreement that establishes the WTO. Furthermore, WTO jurisprudence has not strongly recognised the legal nature of some of its principles. Notwithstanding these difficulties, we consider that the WTO could learn from other organisations which foster free trade such as the European Community. In fact, Art. 6 of the EC Treaty maintains clearly that all European policies must be undertaken accordingly to the overall sustainable development goal. If this were to be the case also in the WTO, then sustainable development should be included within the text of the different Agreements and mentioned as one of the organization's goals. Hence, panels and appellate bodies would use sustainable development law principles to interpret WTO norms and decide trade and environment disputes. In conclusion, we argue that PIL principles have already been used to deal with trade and environment disputes and that some IEL principles can currently be used within the WTO dispute settling system. Furthermore, we consider that, if sustainable development law progresses and its principles are strengthened by MEAs, the WTO Agreements should explicitly include sustainable development as one of its goals. This would allow WTO panels and appellate bodies to consider sustainable development as the framework under which to decide trade and environment disputes.