World Military Expenditures Research Articles

Influence of World Military Expenditure and Inflation on Indonesia’s Economic Growth Period 1992–2022

Influence of World Military Expenditure and Inflation on Indonesia’s Economic Growth Period 1992–2022

Analysis of world military expenditures on production and armaments in the context of modern geopolitical threats

Geopolitical threats and military conflicts in the first quarter of the 21st century have led to changes in the structure of countries' expenditures, with an increase in defense spending on production and armaments, as well as financial support for humanitarian, economic and military needs of the warring countries. The main reason for the increase in military spending in the world is the russian-Ukrainian war, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and other geopolitical risks in the Middle East and Taiwan. The growth of these risks encourages countries to increase defense spending, which further complicates the issue of financing socially important and public initiatives. It has been established that global military spending tends to increase during 2015–2023. Last year's military expenditures amounted to up to $2,240 billion, and this figure is the highest of the analyzed periods. Among the world's regions, such as North America, East Asia, Oceania, South Asia, and Europe, there is an increase in defense spending. The only region where military spending fell in 2022 was Africa, due to natural disasters and catastrophes within the region. The share of country expenditures in the structure of global defense spending has increased in countries such as the United States, China, russia, Saudi Arabia, and India. The United Kingdom, France and Japan are maneuvering in almost the same amount of spending during 2015–2023. There is also a trend in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc states, which have been increasing their spending since 2014, after the occupation of Crimea. Military and humanitarian support for Ukraine from Western partners remains a key necessity for deterring the russian aggressor, but the plan for the supply of equipment and weapons does not cover all possible needs of Ukraine, which leads to the search for other ways to maintain the country's military defense capability.

ECONOMIC RIVALRY OF COUNTRIES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE MILITARIZATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIES

Purpose. The aim of the article is to disclose the peculiarities of the implementation of economic rivalry by countries with the growing militarization of national economies and assessment of the dependence of competitiveness of countries on strategic imperatives of economic rivalry, among which are some indicators of militarization. Methodology of research. General scientific and special methods were used to achieve this goal: historical-logical and theoretical generalization - to form the conceptual apparatus of research; abstract and logical - for formulating hypotheses and conclusions; analysis, synthesis, quantitative comparison and generalization - in order to identify the positions of countries on the indicators selected for the study; econometric modelling and visualization - in order to graphically display the results of the study. Findings. The characteristic permanence of challenges, threats and gaps in the economic rivalry of countries in the conditions of strengthening the processes of militarization of the global economy is studied. The positioning of countries according to the Global Competitiveness Index and GDP per capita, the Military Strength Index and the Global Competitiveness Index in 2019 has been carried out. The world military expenditures in 2010-2018 are analysed, as well as the change in military expenditures by sub-regions of the world and the share of exporting countries in the world arms market in 2014-2018, which allowed to identify global economic imperatives that significantly affect economic rivalry countries and strengthening competitive positions. Originality. A theoretical model of economic rivalry in the global economy was developed, which allowed us to find out that the militarization of economies reflects the shift of emphasis in the global economy to forceful methods of influencing economic processes, in contrast to other studied imperatives. Practical value. The main provisions of this study in the form of evaluation proposals can be used to identify strategic imperatives of economic rivalry between countries in the militarization of national economies. Key words: global economy, economic rivalry, competitive advantages, competitiveness, international trade, militarization of economies.

한국 방위산업의 수출 성장 방향에 관한 실증연구

This study is about the direction of growth in Korean defense industry Exports. South Korea's defense industry has grown over the past 50 years, and “Defense Reform 2.0” recognizes the defense industry as one of the ways for strengthening defense capabilities. However, it is also true that the defense industry is suffering from falling sales and the global economic downturn. As overseas demand grows, it is timely to examine the gap between export policy and reality. After then, it is necessary to discuss the direction of growth. Unlike previous studies, this study conducted empirical analysis on the growth of Korean defense industry exports using economic analysis models that take into account supply and demand aspects based on time series data. In other words, the decision factors were set and models were constructed based on the Cobb-Douglas production function and Mundell-Fleming model. As a result of the analysis, the factors that significantly affect the growth of Korean defense industry exports were the number of workers in the defense industry, world military expenditure, real effective exchange rate and economy crisis. The implications were divided into the government and the defense industry. If the policy and management direction are set based on the analysis and implications of this study, it is expected that Korean defense industry exports will continue to grow.

Non-standard Sources for Arms Production and Arms Trade Data*

Even though there are a range of useful sources on defence economics data, only some of them are used widely. The main sources of export, import and output data sets are Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers-US Department of State (WMEAT), European Statistical Office (EUROSTAT) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) while SIPRI and WMEAT are for military expenditures. This paper discusses the main features and similarities of data sets from the various sources. Like other industrial/ sector data sets, the main problem for arms data sets is revisions of industrial classifications, which prevent the creation of long time series.

Convergence of Defence Burdens in Asia-Pacific Economies: A Residual Augmented Least Squares Approach

AbstractThis paper investigates convergence of military burdens in the Asia-Pacific countries. Two different datasets of military expenditure have been used in the analysis including the datasets from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT). Unlike the existing papers on convergence of military burdens, we adopt a two-step method that allows the identification of countries that contribute to both stochastic and beta convergence. In the course of investigating the stochastic convergence, we use a residual augmented least squares (RALS) unit root test. The results suggest a weak evidence for convergence of military burdens in Asia-Pacific region, which is a departure from the majority of the existing studies that have provided substantial evidence of convergence. We further examine sigma convergence and the results suggest mixed evidence for convergence of military burdens. The policy implications of the results are discussed in the conclusion section.

SIPRI YEARBOOK 2016

Komentarz poświęcono „SIPRI YEARBOOK 2016” i zawartym w nim najważniejszym tendencjom potwierdzonych najbardziej aktualną wiedzą. Coroczne opracowanie w kompleksowy sposób ukazuje aktywność aktorów międzynarodowych w kwestii światowych wydatków zbrojeniowych, międzynarodowych transferów broni, produkcji zbrojeniowej, sił nuklearnych, konfliktów zbrojnych czy multilateralnych operacji pokojowych. ędzynarodowych w kwestii światowych.

Intrastate Dynamics in the Context of Hegemonic Decline: A Case Study of China’s Arms Transfer Regime

The decline of a hegemon can create openings for lesser powers to expand their influence in the world-system. Is this what China is currently attempting to do? This paper contributes to this on-going debate by examining China’s arms transfer activities from a historical perspective. Using data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute arms transfer database and the World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers database, I argue that the Chinese arms transfer regime has evolved through three phases. In Phase One, China used gifts of arms to compete with the Soviet Union and to expand influence among Third World countries. In Phase Two, China used arms exports mainly to assist national developmental projects. Only evidence in Phase Three supports the emergence of a global strategy that attempts to extend China’s economic, political, and possibly military outreach. This paper suggests that though China has not yet become a contender for world hegemony as Arrighi argues (2007), China has formulated a globally-focused agenda which, in the medium-term, could extend its influence in regions where U.S. domination is relatively weak.

SIPRI Yearbook 2015

The commentary includes the most important trends confirmed the current knowledge in the „SIPRI Yearbook 2015”. Every year the organization in a comprehensive manner shows the activity of international actors in terms of world military expenditure, international arms transfers, arms production, nuclear forces, armed conflicts and multilateral peace operations.

Zipf’s Law and World Military Expenditures

AbstractThe paper employs Zipf’s law to examine the distribution of military spending across countries in the world over the period 1988–2012. Military spending can cautiously be treated as a crude and distant proxy for military capacity and strength, and hence states’ hard power. The paper finds that the first-in-rank country (the USA) consistently spends more on the production of military capabilities than what is projected by Zipf’s law to correspond to a balanced international structure. This, tentatively interpreted, implies the use of military strength (and the concomitant costs for acquiring it) as a tool of hegemonic status consolidation, perhaps vis-à-vis other rising global players. In turn, the countries at the lower end of the rank, although they have overall increased their military outlays, seem to spend less on defence than this is anticipated by the law. This finding may be pointing to free-riding on the military strength of allies and other major powers.

World military expenditures and global cardiovascular mortality.

Can we estimate the consequences of world military expenditures for the physical and mental health of nations that produce and purchase armaments? If anxiety and fear are promoting military expenditures, then those sentiments may well reflect poorer mental health and war-related stress as it influences cardiovascular illness rates. Further, extensive military expenditure by a society implies that other societal needs are allocated fewer resources, including nutrition, water and sanitation, health care, and economic development. We use a model focused on military expenditures to predict cardiovascular mortality in world samples of industrialized and developing countries over 2000-2011. The cardiovascular mortality model controls for economic development, smoking, body mass index, systolic blood pressure, and carbon dioxide emissions. Military expenditures as proportion of gross domestic product show significant positive relations to cardiovascular disease mortality in linear multiple regression analyses, using both cross-sectional and pooled cross-sectional time-series approaches.

Relationship between Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in ASEAN: Evidence from Indonesia

World military expenditure in post-Cold War world shows increasing trend especially in ASEAN region; Indonesia is no exception. The trend may have been supported by the argument that military expenditure has positive multiplier effects on economic growth. Unfortunately, there have been not too many studies on the effect of military expenditure on economic growth in the Indonesia context. This paper examines the topic by first reviewing literature on the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth, then by empirically testing the causal relationship between the two variables by using the Augmented Sollow Growth Model. The result shows that Indonesia's military expenditure has positive effect on the country's economic growth, which is most possibly caused by development of human capital as effect of military expenditure.

Superpower: An Insight into the Growth Era of China

The basic aim of the Project is to study if China can become the next Super Power of the world. Throughout the history we have seen that the crown of “The World Superpower” has shifted from one nation to another. So to study this shift in Power we have considered four Economies that are United Kingdoms, United States of America, China and Japan. There are Infinite factors which help a nation become a Super power but for this study the variables taken are the share of a country in world GDP, share of a country in the world trade, a country’s share in the world patents, world share of patent granted to patent applications, a country’s military expenditure in the world military expenditure. In this project we have tried to predict when China will become the World Superpower by estimating different GDP growth rates for China. The GDP growth rates considered for China are constant at 5%, 7%, 8%, 9% and 10% respectively for the period 2011 to 2050 while keeping USA’s GDP growth rate constant at 2% and world GDP growth rate constant at 5% for the same time period.

Between military spending and economic development

The global financial and economic crisis has resulted in many nations cutting back on all sorts of public spending, and yet military spending seems to be increasing. In fact world military expenditure is increasing tremendously in almost all world countries, even poor countries with low and middle incomes in Asia and Africa spend a great part of its national wealth to buy arms. In this paper, we study the effect of military spending on development opportunities in general; we then take a look at the military expenditure of the Gulf countries in order to have an idea about the importance of military buildup and army modernisation in Gulf countries and the differences in its spending priorities.

Natural resources and military expenditure: The case of Algeria

With world military expenditure rising rapidly since 2000, one of the possible drivers that has drawn less attention has been the role of natural resource revenues, especially oil. Countries as diverse as Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Timor-Leste have seen huge rises in military expenditure on the back of rapidly increasing oil revenues. Natural resource extraction can generate conflict and create an imperative to protect resource infrastructure from internal or external threats. At the same time it provides a ready source of government revenue, and in particular foreign currency. The lack of transparency often associated with such revenues may facilitate off-budget spending or large, and possibly corrupt, arms purchases. Up to now, most econometric research has not considered the role of resource revenues as a determinant of military expenditure. We provide a preliminary analysis for the case of Algeria, estimating military expenditure as a function of oil revenues and other economic and security factors from 1975 to 2008. We find some evidence that oil revenues have had a statistically significant positive effect on Algerian military expenditure.

Intensity of food deprivation: The integrative impacts of the world system, modernization, conflict, militarization and the environment

US and world military expenditures have increased dramatically in the last decade. Some cross-national treatments identify positive impacts of military spending on a range of domestic outcomes, while many others point to the converse. We review the literature and then focus on under examined relationships, including the impact of military expenditures on the intensity of food deprivation worldwide. We employ a structural equation modeling technique that permits synthetic analyses of direct and indirect impacts of a range of factors specified by the theories. We find world-system context indirectly matters a great deal to the intensity of food deprivation in nations, both in our sample of developed and developing nations, and of developing countries only. So do intra-national and international conflicts, especially insofar as they impact national modernization and military spending. While modernization is moderately enhanced by military spending for our cross-national sample of developed and developing countries, it is not for the sample of developing countries only. This may point to military technology’s spill over effects on other sectors of the economy, but solely for developed nations. For the world over, national modernization, itself a consequence of global power and dependency, directly reduces the intensity of food deprivation, while military expenditures directly heighten it. These differential relationships lead us to advocate for a more synthetic theorizing in studies of food security and hunger, while accounting for global circumstances that produce both similar and different consequences in richer and poorer countries.

Warfare and children

In 2007, 136 million children were born in the world, and 9.2 million died before they were 5 years old; 99.8% of these deaths were in developing countries, and 8.2 million were unnecessary. This is 23 000 unnecessary deaths every day. Approximately 0.2 million children die from the direct effects of war every year, and at least twice as many die from the indirect effects. However, most child deaths are caused by common childhood infections in communities that are not affected by war. In 2007, overseas development aid totalled only $104 billion, and world military expenditure totalled US$1339 billion. The 49 poorest countries in the world have a population of 1.3 billion; they spent only $27 per person on health in 2006, but the world spent $201 per person on military activity. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council account for 90% of weapons sales to developing countries, yet they are the very countries that have accepted responsibility for ensuring world security. Unfortunately, many governments in both rich and poor countries do not want to limit military spending - the vested interests that support military activity are too powerful. War is immensely harmful, but not primarily because of the horrible injuries, nor the large number of deaths it causes indirectly from infection, malnutrition, and social and political disruption. By far, the greatest harm comes from the diversion of huge amounts of money that could be used for beneficial development into harmful and destructive military activity.

What Drives Military Expenditure? A South African Study

Two facts point to the need to better understand military expenditure allocations in developing countries. The first is that the number and intensity of armed conflicts worldwide have fallen consistently and significantly since 1990 and in sub-Saharan Africa since 1999. World military expenditure fell in real terms during the 1990s but has increased since 1999 and South Africa’s milex has mirrored these movements. The second is that studies which have attempted to explain milex using standard economic techniques typically explain only about half of the differences between countries. However, some potentially influential variables are not amenable to regression analysis and this article employs additional data drawn from interviews with key informants and secondary sources. It finds that the procedures used to decide on the level and composition of South Africa’s milex are clearly formulated, transparent and are adhered to with respect to recurrent expenditures. However, recent military procurement history reveals increasing Cabinet authoritarianism, a lack of transparency, significant opportunities for corruption and, arguably, inappropriate decisions.

The U.S. Imperial Triangle and Military Spending

he United States is unique today among major states in the degree of its reliance on military spending, and its determination to stand astride the world, militarily as well as economically. No other country in the post-Second World War world has been so globally destructive or inflicted so many war fatalities. Since 2001, acknowledged U.S. national defense spending has increased by almost 60 percent in real dollar terms to a level in 2007 of $553 billion. This is higher than at any point since the Second World War (though lower than previous decades as a percentage of GDP). Based on such official figures, the United States is reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as accounting for 45 percent of world military expenditures. Yet, so gargantuan and labyrinthine are U.S. military expenditures that the above grossly understates their true magnitude, which, as we shall see below, reached $1 trillion in 2007This article can also be found at the Monthly Review website, where most recent articles are published in full.Click here to purchase a PDF version of this article at the Monthly Review website.

Introduction: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Comparative Perspective

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90. 2. Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallenstein, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–2003’, Journal of Peace Research 41/5 (2004) p.626. 3. Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington DC: World Bank 2003) pp.13–32. 4. William Eckhardt, ‘Civilian Deaths in Wartime’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20/1 (1989) p.92. 5. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington DC: World Priorities 1987 and 1996) p.28 and p.17, respectively. 6. Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.57–73. 7. For a sample of this debate, see ‘What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (2006) pp.150–69. 8. Reno, ‘Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups’, this issue, p.331. 9. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.343. 10. On this dichotomy, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004) pp.563–95. 11. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.351. 12. See, for example, Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Armed Violence (Cambridge: CUP 2007). 13. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.353. 14. Tristan McConnell, ‘Fresh Hope for Peace in Northern Uganda?’ Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 2006, p.7. 15. See, for example, Roy Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars’, American Political Science Review 89/3 (1995) p.684. 16. Johnston, ‘Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War’, this issue, pp.362–363. 17. Ibid. p.373. 18. Minawi, however, has become increasingly marginalized as his forces have suffered defeats at the hands of the National Redemption Front, as the joint rebel command is now known. 19. For a description, see Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) pp.131–214. 20. Findley and Young, ‘Fighting Fire with Fire?’ this issue p.391. 21. Greenhill and Staniland, ‘Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency’, this issue p.403. 22. On military progress in Iraq, see Gen. David H. Petraeus, ‘Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq’, 10–11 Sept. 2007, < www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf>. On the continuing political difficulties in that country, see James Glanz, ‘Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing’, New York Times, 13 Sept. 2007. 23. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: CUP 2003). See also Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2004). 24. Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul Huth and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “‘Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization 58/2 (2004) pp.375–407. 25. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger 1966), and Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: CUP 2006). 26. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (note 23). For a similar conclusion but with an argument based in the organizational culture of the military, see Colin H. Kahl, ‘In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and US Conduct in Iraq’, International Security 32/1 (2007) pp.7–46. For a more skeptical view on democratic restraint, see Alexander B. Downes, ‘Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War’, International Security 30/4 (2006) pp.152–95, and Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Cornell UP, forthcoming 2008).