Introduction: Modern Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 1. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.75–90. 2. Mikael Eriksson and Peter Wallenstein, ‘Armed Conflict, 1989–2003’, Journal of Peace Research 41/5 (2004) p.626. 3. Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington DC: World Bank 2003) pp.13–32. 4. William Eckhardt, ‘Civilian Deaths in Wartime’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20/1 (1989) p.92. 5. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures (Washington DC: World Priorities 1987 and 1996) p.28 and p.17, respectively. 6. Barbara Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, American Political Science Review 97/1 (2003) pp.57–73. 7. For a sample of this debate, see ‘What to do in Iraq: A Roundtable’, Foreign Affairs 85/4 (2006) pp.150–69. 8. Reno, ‘Patronage Politics and the Behavior of Armed Groups’, this issue, p.331. 9. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.343. 10. On this dichotomy, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance in Civil War’, Oxford Economic Papers 56 (2004) pp.563–95. 11. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.351. 12. See, for example, Jeremy Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Armed Violence (Cambridge: CUP 2007). 13. Bevan, ‘Myth of Madness’, this issue, p.353. 14. Tristan McConnell, ‘Fresh Hope for Peace in Northern Uganda?’ Christian Science Monitor, 26 June 2006, p.7. 15. See, for example, Roy Licklider, ‘The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars’, American Political Science Review 89/3 (1995) p.684. 16. Johnston, ‘Negotiated Settlements and Government Strategy in Civil War’, this issue, pp.362–363. 17. Ibid. p.373. 18. Minawi, however, has become increasingly marginalized as his forces have suffered defeats at the hands of the National Redemption Front, as the joint rebel command is now known. 19. For a description, see Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1986) pp.131–214. 20. Findley and Young, ‘Fighting Fire with Fire?’ this issue p.391. 21. Greenhill and Staniland, ‘Ten Ways to Lose at Counterinsurgency’, this issue p.403. 22. On military progress in Iraq, see Gen. David H. Petraeus, ‘Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq’, 10–11 Sept. 2007, < www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/pet091007.pdf>. On the continuing political difficulties in that country, see James Glanz, ‘Compromise on Oil Law in Iraq Seems to Be Collapsing’, New York Times, 13 Sept. 2007. 23. Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge: CUP 2003). See also Benjamin A. Valentino, Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2004). 24. Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul Huth and Dylan Balch-Lindsay, “‘Draining the Sea”: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare’, International Organization 58/2 (2004) pp.375–407. 25. Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger 1966), and Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: CUP 2006). 26. Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars (note 23). For a similar conclusion but with an argument based in the organizational culture of the military, see Colin H. Kahl, ‘In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and US Conduct in Iraq’, International Security 32/1 (2007) pp.7–46. For a more skeptical view on democratic restraint, see Alexander B. Downes, ‘Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: The Causes of Civilian Victimization in War’, International Security 30/4 (2006) pp.152–95, and Downes, Targeting Civilians in War (Cornell UP, forthcoming 2008).