Why wilt thou Examine little fibre of my Spreading them out before the Sun like Stalks of flax to dry The is beautiful but its anatomy Horrible Ghast & Deadly (Erdman 302, 167) (1) To show outrage at this objectifying examination by a person who was once a part of the speaker's own self, each of the speakers in this repeated passage invokes the rhetorical weight of the word soul, a word that in the Christian tradition defines the most essential, sacred, and inviolable aspect of the human self. By insisting on its materiality, however, -- every little fibre ... spread [...] out before the Sun like Stalks of flax to dry, a dessicating anatomy/Horrible Ghast & Deadly--the speaker is not simply literalizing an imaginative metaphor but bringing together with ironic force a cluster of older spiritual meanings and newer materialistic meanings for soul. In this ironic constellation, a precarious Judeo-Christian unity of the self as an autonomous subject claiming moral agency and thus capable of redemptive choice is pulled in one direction by a Platonic, dualistic definition of as a repudiation of bodily materiality for spiritual redemption and pulled in another by an Enlightenment science that was discovering the fibres of a nervous system linked to a material brain. Associated with this Enlightenment science through the speaker's invocation of a materialist infant joy is still another shift of meaning for soul, a center of emotional response to the senses, a defined by sensibility. To read these lines from Blake's late epics as totally material is to make the speaker sound like a victim from an Amnesty International report--or like the dismembered traitor Foucault so famously describes in his opening chapter of Discipline and Punish. To read the punishment as psychological is to make Enion or Albion, the examiners, into agents of surveillance like the prison workers in Bentham's Panopticon, which Foucault describes in a later chapter. Such a reading would seem more modern in Foucault's historicizing schema of punishment, and of social order more generally, as an increasingly internalized discipline. Yet the history of usages for the word soul in Blake's time--and the practice of his own usages--traces changes in subjectivity or selfhood that are messier than Foucault's powerful model for epistemic change in Discipline and Punish. This pattern in usage for the word soul during Blake's era is historically opposed to Foucault's model, which turns from spiritual or mental to physica l and material--and then, a little later, back to a secularized psychological meaning. In Blake's own writing, the linguistic polyvalence is wonderfully fluid, with many usages appearing even in the same work. Richard Rorty claims that such multivalence in a single, culturally central word reflects a gradual, collective, and only semi-conscious shift in episteme (Rorty 6-7); in an era of transition the multiplicity of meaning in soul would generate ironies even without conscious artistry or intention to direct them. I will argue, however, that Blake is aware of these historical shifts in the meaning of soul and that he plays creatively with those shifts. A deconstructive argument like Molly Rothen-berg's might conclude that even Blake's intentional creative play with meaning can act only as a critique of existing structures and beliefs and cannot build new structures and beliefs. That is, creative play with multiple meanings of soul might use materialist meaning to criticize a rigid dualism or a rigid a nti-corporeal morality, but it could assert no coherent new synthesis--irony would destroy agency (Rothenberg 4-6). In another critical space, I suggest that Blake uses these multiple meanings of soul to aim toward a resurrected spiritual corporeality, an embodied and imagined self based both upon Enlightenment materialism and upon Paul's I Corinthians 15:3944: All flesh is not the same flesh. …