We present in this paper a model of multilateral bargaining in the labor markets. Employers bargain with various groups of workers, and workers bargain with various employers. In each potential firm workers and employers set a reservation salary and profit level, respectively. A worker or employer is willing to participate in a firm only if he can obtain at least his reservation level for that firm. The reservation levels in a particular firm are based on the opportunities of, i.e., the outcome of the bargaining between, workers and employers in other potential firms. Given the reservation wage levels, employers make salary offers to each worker in each potential firm. These offers are then used to determine new reservation levels. This concludes one bargaining round. A stable remuneration scheme is a bundle of profits and salaries that does not change from one bargaining round to the next. At a stable remuneration scheme it is possible to have both voluntary and involuntary unemployment, and firms with vacancies.