Kierkegaard's Works Research Articles

Adler and the Ethical: A Study of Kierkegaard's On Authority and Revelation

In the second of his three prefaces to On Authority and Revelation, Kierkegaard writes: ‘“My reader”, may I simply beg you to read this book, for it is important for my main effort, wherefore I am minded to recommend it’ The question I will put to myself to begin my reflections on the book is: why should Kierkegaard recommend it so strongly? What is Kierkegaard doing in this book? One notices in his recommendation that it is addressed to his reader who, presumably, is not simply the reader of this book but the reader of his other books as well. The Concluding UnscientUc Postscript was being published about the same time (1846), and so the reader may well have been familiar with most of Kierkegaard's main philosophical works. The recommendation then is set in this context. The book is, on the face of it, so unlike the other works, concerned with certain odd claims to a revelation by a Danish pastor named Adler. Much of the book discusses the details of a deposition of Adler given to the local bishop and some details of later defences which Adler gave of his revelation in several works and sermons. It appears to be a local squabble of no general interest and certainly not the sort of thing that had occupied Kierkegaard's philosophical attention to this point. The book, then, stands in need of a recommendation to Kierkegaard's reader who is not otherwise prepared for this genre. But the recommendation does not say, ‘Try this, though quite different, you may like it.’ It says rather that the reader should read it, and later he adds read it carefully, because it is ‘important for my main effort’. So the book is to be seen as of a piece with the other main works of Kierkegaard. This is what I should like to understand in the following discussion: how is this book important for Kierkegaard's main effort?

The Logic of the Absurd

Since the work of Kierkegaard, philosophers have been called upon to face a topic some may too readily assume has no business in philosophy in the first place: the category of the absurd. Of course, insofar as Kierkegaard can be dismissed as a religious thinker, it is possible simply to suppose that the subject of the absurd has slipped into philosophy, as one might say, while reason's back was turned, and thus holds no legitimate claim on philosophy in particular or rational thought in general. But in Kierkegaard's major philosophical work, the Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, which he planned to be the consummation and climax of his philosophical activity, I believe an argument can be discerned showing that there is a certain logic to the introduction of the category of the absurd; that the absurd is not introduced for the sake of absurdity alone, but on the basis of some serious reasoning. I would like to be able to construct my own version of that argument, which leads through the Postscript's discussion of truth as subjectivity and serves to demonstrate that its appeal to the absurd is a rigorous and logical move.' In the end, I aim to clarify both the category of the absurd and the meaning of the claim that truth is subjectivity sufficiently to have shown how it is that rather than logic barring the door to the absurd, it was reason itself who first let it in.

Nulla dies sine lineaSøren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vol. 5, Autobiographical, Part One, 1829-1848. Howard V. Hong , Edna H. Hong , Gregor Mallantschuk , Søren KierkegaardSøren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vol. 6, Autobiographical, Part Two, 1848-1855. Howard V. Hong , Edna H. Hong , Gregor Mallantschuk , Søren KierkegaardSøren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, Vol. 7, Index and Composite Collation.

Eighteen years in the making, they stand at last on the shelf: the six hefty volumes of Kierkegaard's private papers in English translation. Howard and Edna Hong, who in addition to this monumental task have also translated several other works of Kierkegaard and of Danish Kierkegaard scholarship, thus complete what we might call the heroic age of Kierkegaard translation, taking their places beside that remarkable earlier husband-wife team of David and Lillian Swenson and the

Two Issues in the Interpretation of Kierkegaard's Works

Two Issues in the Interpretation of Kierkegaard's Works

Fictionality and Authority: A Point of View for Kierkegaard's Work as an Author

Fictionality and Authority: A Point of View for Kierkegaard's Work as an Author

Kierkegaard’s Ethical Philosophy

Despite fact that he devotes hundreds of pages to consideration of ethical life, Kierkegaard is not usually thought of as an ethical philosopher except in a very broad sense. One reason for this is that his treatment of ethics is basically concrete rather than abstract; he depicts human beings in ethically paradigmatic or problematic situations more than he analyzes ethical concepts and principles. But basic reason, I suspect, is fact that he originated, in Fear and Trembling , notion of a teleological suspension of ethical. The notion of a suspension of ethical, however, presupposes a conception of ethical which is suspended, so Kierkegaard cannot be unconcerned with questions of ethical philosophy. In fact, second volume of his Either/Or contains not only a concrete depiction of ethical existence in persona of its pseudonymous author, but also outlines of a profound ethical philosophy. I would like to discuss some of its basic elements. It is generally recognized that, to extent Kierkegaard has an ethics, it is basically Kantian in nature. I want to show in what respects this is so, but also to show that it is a Kantian ethics made concrete and modified in certain significant ways. It is true, of course, that Kierkegaard's works contain explicit and implicit criticisms of ethical life-stance, and I will occasionally refer to these criticisms. But Kierkegaard did not wrestle with straw men, so primary task that I have adopted is to expound his ethical ideas and suggest some of their strengths. As I noted above, second volume of Either/Or is one of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous works; its putative author is a Judge William, to whom I will generally refer simply as the ethicist. The ethicisťs basic Kantianism is clear from his statement that the ethical is universal.1 Yet he does not develop this idea in quite same way that Kant does. In fact, he nowhere explicitly and precisely explains meaning of or provides a justification for this statement. Nevertheless, I believe that there is, in his critique of aesthetic existence, some-

Must We Reinterpret Kierkegaard?

And yet, the objection to Kierkegaard most often heard tries to argue in a completely abstract way. If you refuse to submit to proof the truth of your professed faith-why shouldn't I be justified in accepting, also without proof, any other religious doctrine The correct way to answer this question is to counter it by another: Do you profess such a doctrine And there is much more than an even chance that the answer would be, No-but I could--or somebody else could. To which Kierkegaard would reply, Let us wait until this happens and then let us see whether you--or that third party for whom you have so much concern-understand yourself in what you say about accepting certain doctrine without proof. It makes no sense to argue such questions in the conditional mood. The indicative is difficult enough. In his preface Lowrie berates Schrempf (p. 6), the man who not only translated all of Kierkegaard's major works into German and thus did more than anybody else to turn general attention to him, but who also provided his translations with prefaces and epilogues in which he was very critical of Kierkegaard. Lowrie sums up the gist of Schrempf's criticism by saying that it showed what a Kierkegaard was. I do not know how Lowrie would translate fool into the language of the New Testament. But perhaps I might remind him of this. Different people reacted in different ways to the message of Paul. But humanly speaking, the man who understood Paul best was Festus. What did he say to Paulus ? Mainei, Paule (Acts 26:24)-which in English goes very well with Paul-you are a fool. I think it is quite appropriate to call Kierkegaard a fool, and I am afraid Schrempf the detractor understood Kierkegaard much better than his admirer, Lowrie. Kierkegaard's folly is Kierkegaard's subjectivism. And this subjectivism is present in On Authority no less than in any of his other writings. There is no reason to revise our interpretation of Kierkegaard. The author of this book is still the same man who quoted, after Hamann, periissem nisi periissem (I should have perished, had I not perished) as his motto, and it would be in vain to try to share Kierkegaard's rescue while refusing first to perish with him.

The Author and the Authorship: Recent Kierkegaard Literature

The three works under review are among the most important additions of the past few years to the Kierkegaard literature in English. The importance of the new translation of the journals and papers, projected in five large volumes, hardly requires comment. The first volume of this monumental work of translation has appeared, already containing almost as many entries as the major selection from the journals that we have had available in English before, and it is safe to say that when Howard and Edna Hong have finished their work we shall have as much of the journals and papers available in English as we are ever likely to need. It will still be no more than a substantial selection from the twenty folio volumes of the Danish edition, but those whose interest in Kierkegaard is so determined that they need much more than the Hongs give us will probably want to learn Danish anyway. The other two books, aside from revealing a penchant for alliteration in their titles, are representative of the substantial, critical interpretation of Kierkegaard's work that has begun to appear in this country in the years since the Kierkegaard vogue ran its course. Neither book is an introductory text designed to initiate the casual reader into the mystique of SK, nor on the other hand does either book contain earnest warnings against the pathological irrationalism of an author who, if anything, was pathologically reflective. Both Professor Thompson and Professor Sponheim are thoroughly at home in the Danish texts of Kierkegaard's corpus, and also in his personal and cultural milieu, and they are sufficiently sure of themselves to undertake dis-

Hellmut Toftdahl: Kierkegaard først - og Grundtvig så.

Hellmut Toftdahl: Kierkegaard først - og Grundtvig så.

Morality, choice and inwardness

The present paper tries to analyse the way in which Judge William, in Soren Kierkegaard's work Either/Or, distinguishes between the aesthetic and the ethical way of life. Basically his distinctions seem to be that the ethicist is a seriously committed person (has inwardness) whereas the aestheticist is indifferent, and that the former accepts universal rules whereas the latter makes an exception for himself. — In order to come from the aesthetic to the ethical stage one must, according to Judge William, make a choice of oneself. We try to show that such a choice is only one among several factors implicit in his reasoning and that he does not at all consider it as a ‘leap’, but as based upon reasons, though his reasons are mostly of an aesthetic nature. Far from seeing the Judge as a champion of choice, we maintain that the book primarily contains a plea for a certain personality ideal. This probably has to do with the fact that he does not seem to be in doubt as to what one ought to do, only as to how to ...

The Mind of Kierkegaard by James Collins

BOOK REVIEWS 261 there is always the danger, in this hindsight or post mortem analysis of older works, of reading too much into their contents. Extreme caution must be observed and, if it is, then a proper historical judgment can be made on medieval logic, and at the same time this accurate and comprehensive estimate of medieval logic may be the means of bringing together these two great schools of logic. If Fr. Boehner's work succeeds in arousing scholars to action towards the construction of this historical judgment, his work will be justified, although his publication of such minimal results probably will not sufficiently convince many that it is urgent for this lacuna to be filled. More material and a more comprehensive outline, even though it meant a later publication date, would have achieved his purpose much more efficiently, it seems to us. The most interesting part of Medieval Logic is the section which discusses Ockham's consequences, explaining them and symbolizing them in modern notation. Of particular interest are those consequences which show that Ockham had a complete mastery of De Morgan's Laws. This is the best part of Fr. Boehner's book. Fr. Boehner is to be praised for his editing of the Burleigh text and for his attempt to promote harmony between scholastic and modern logic, or rather between the descendants of scholastics and modern logicians. There is a need of more men of Fr. Boehner's stature, logicians acquainted with both scholastic and modern logic, in order to bring about this harmony. Actually, the existence of such logicians will constitute this very harmony. The Catholic University of America Washington, D. C. THOMAS B. WRIGHT The Mind of Kierkegaard. By JAMES CoLLINS. Chicago: Regnery, 1953. Pp. 308 with index. $4.50. The title of this book accurately indicates that it deals primarily with the content of Kierkegaard's thought, " the structure of his shareable convictions." This it tries to do, without overlooking the importance of the personal attitude of response and responsibility before the truth, an oversight which Kierkegaard constantly criticized the ' dons ' for making." (p. viii) The exposition " confines itself to the philosophical aspects of his fundamental dialectic of esthetical, ethical and religious modes of experience," (p. xi) leaving to the theologians the religious and theological aspects of Kierkegaard's thought. In addition to presenting the thought of Kierkegaard, this book also " attempts to give a philosophical appraisal of Kierkegaard's standpoint." (pp. viii-ix) In this task of evaluation the focus is primarily on Kierkegaard in himself rather than as a progenitor of existentialism. He is, in this phase of Professor Collins' work, studied BOOK REVIEWS not only against his "proximate philosophical situation" of post-Kantian German philosophy but also in the light of Christian philosophical thought found in St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas. Throughout the work Dr. Collins relies chiefly upon the works of Kierkegaard himself. Thus the initial chapter, "Kierkegaard The Man" is based upon his Journals, and sketches his life as son, lover, author and witness to the truth. The second and third chapters deal respectively with the esthetic and ethical views while in the fourth and fifth the philosophical works-Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, and the " Introduction " to The Concept of Dread-are considered. The fourth chapter, " The Attack Upon Hegelianism " shows the negative aspect of these works, that is, as a critique of Hegel; while the fifth, " The Meaning of Existence," shows the positive contribution in the new theory of existence. The eighth and concluding chapter," Kierkegaard and Christian Philosophy ," examines the degree to which "Kierkegaard's detached insights can be rendered philosophically meaningful by incorporation into, and correction by, the body of Thomistic doctrine concerning existence, man, and God." (p. xii) Finally, a "Bibliographical Note" lists, among other things, the twenty Kierkegaard titles available in English, and ·the major bibliographical , expository and evaluative works in English and other languages. In the twenty-six pages of footnotes which follow there are contained some independently valuable discussions. This is a typical Collins performance: it is, therefore, the most mature study of Kierkegaard in English. It is as definitive an account of the thought of Kierkegaard as Walter...