Work Of Heidegger Research Articles

A Critique of Stanley and Williamson's Intellectualist Account of Skill

One prominent intellectualist position in the debate on the nature of skill, famously defended by Stanley and Williamson (2001; 2017), claims that skill and knowing-how are reducible to knowledgethat. To defend this claim, Stanley and Williamson argue that skill and knowledge-that develop in a sufficiently similar way through different learning stages. In this paper we offer a novel argument to reject this version of intellectualism on methodological, descriptive, and conceptual grounds. We do so by drawing on the work of Heidegger, Dreyfus, and Ryle on skill. We first offer a descriptive account of skilful action based on the work developed by these authors, and we then move on to show that skill and knowledge-that exhibit significant differences. First, while skills cannot be imparted merely linguistically, some forms of knowledge-that can be exclusively imparted and learned verbally. Second, weshow that the temporal learning curves of skill and knowledge-that are importantly different: the former usually requires a more or less extensive training process, whereas the latter may be acquired in a relatively sudden fashion. Finally, we show that, while the structure of most forms of knowledge-that is aggregative, the structure of skilful understanding is dynamic and holistic, which entails that prior skill stages cannot be retrieved and re-enacted at will.

The state of the question in early Heidegger studies

AbstractThis article surveys the state of the literature in English‐language scholarship on Heidegger's early work (1919–29). The survey falls into roughly two halves. The first is devoted to scholarship on Heidegger's intellectual development during the 1920s, focusing on four themes: Heidegger's relationship to Husserl; Heidegger's early phenomenology of religious life; Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle; and Heidegger's retrieval of Kant's First Critique. The second half focuses on work on the early Heidegger that has arisen out of the reception of his early thought into mainstream Anglophone philosophy. It examines Hubert Dreyfus's interpretation of Heidegger, the status of “das Man” and social normativity, Heidegger's concept of death, Heidegger's conception of authenticity, and truth (with a very brief overview of further topics).

KRISIS METAFISIKA DAN FILSAFAT SEBAGAI TUGAS BERPIKIR: PERSPEKTIF HEIDEGGER

This article aims to reflect further Heidegger's thought on the crisis of metaphysics and philosophy as a task of thinking. Philosophy since ancient times, even today, has been oriented to seek and formulate the essential and universal concept. Is it true that searching for the ontotheological nature is the most important task of philosophy? Is it true that these single principles can reflect the truth? By using the method of library researh and critical analysis of Heidegger's works and studies on the crisis of metaphysics, this article shows that philosophy essentially does not aim to formulate absolute, universal and single notion. Philosophy is also not a project of producing standard, abstract, sophisticated and technical concepts. The important task of philosophy is to encourage men to think, an art of understanding. Thinking is not a calculative thinking (instrumental-technical rationality) but meditative and reflective thinking. Under philosophy as the task of thinking, Being, namely the totality of reality, is responded with amazement, humility and simplicity. Philosophy must liberate itself from the metaphysical trap of totalitarian power which tends to hegemonize others in the name of a single truth, to philosophy that celebrates the plurality of truths with humility dan simplicity. That is the real meaning of philosophy as philo-sophia, the love of wisdom.

하이데거의 시간 이해

This paper discusses Heidegger's understanding of time. His theory of time is entirely connected to the question of being. Time is not a physical sub-stance or a natural reality as duration, but a ground where the meaning of existence is revealed. From this point of view, Heidegger first conducts an existential analysis to understand time. The reason for this analysis is that the question of existence is made in Dasein, the ground of the openness of existence. After introducing this point of view, this thesis clarifies the understanding of time shown in Heidegger's major work, Existence and Time.
 For this purpose, the whole history of Existence and Time is briefly summarized first. Here, after referring to the previous lecture notes The Concept of Time and von Hermann's Being and Time explanations, I briefly explain the understanding of time shown in Volume 11 of Augustine's Confessions, which provided insight into Heidegger's theory of time. After that, the understanding of time shown in Being and Time is analyzed. Here is the time of existence and the meaning of existence. The analysis proceeds with the terms of the moment and the time of decision, the transcendence of time and de-self, and the deliberative thought of time explanation. After explaining Heidegger's understanding of time in this way, the last chapter 4 discusses how the theory of time in Being and Time corresponds to the understanding of time in contemporary physics.
 Through this analysis, it is revealed that time is real, and that without time, there is no existential event for human beings, and all reality does not exist. It also concludes Heidegger's argument that time cannot be understood as a physical reality and must be understood ontologically in temporality. Along with him, he emphasized the need for a philosophical shift to newly explained reality through a new understanding of time beyond traditional realism.

Heideggerian things. Perspectives about things and the practical occupation of Dasein in three periods of Heidegger's work (1927-1951)

In the following work we will analyze and interpret three elaborations around the conceptions related to things, intramundane entities and the practical occupation of Dasein in the world, in three works corresponding to three moments of Heidegger's elaborations: the first, from the time of Sein und Zeit and the other two, to a transition period and after the Kehre. In this framework we intend to demonstrate and circumscribe the implications of the change in perspective in both periods, which move from the centrality given to the practical and functional field of Dasein, to a markedly relational approach that is radicalized in his 1951 writing. We will see, this distinction allows us to identify and relate a displacement of the emphasis in the manual model of primary relationship with the world and in the ethical projections that such treatments suppose.

SECRET OF “ALWAYS ALREADY” (OF THE LOST TRACE OF PHENOMENOLOGY) IN DECONSTRUCTION OF DERRIDA

Based on key texts of Derrida as well as his interviews and recently published seminars the article presents a “micrological” analysis of deconstructivist thought in the context of its appeal to phenomenology of Husserl and fundamental ontology of Heidegger. Derrida begins his intellectual path with a reflection on the most important topics of Husserlian phenomenology and discovers in the descriptions of temporalization a paradoxical movement of the immanent self-deconstruction of phenomenology. It from within undermines its own basic principle of the primordial givenness of the living present to itself in its whole presence. From the point of view of Derrida’s deconstruction, the living present of self-presence of the transcendental ego, like itself, is no longer the original source of sense, meaning, knowledge and experience but rather the effect of difference. Derrida discovers the radical constitutive dependence of the present on the trace of the inevitably lost past, thus, his thought resolutely destroys the primordial nature of the present and roots it in the true “origin” as a game of delays and differences. Similarly, Derrida criticizes the project of fundamental ontology. While Heidegger conceives of the ontological difference between being and Being as the last hidden basis of any question in the discourse of metaphysics, Derrida insists that this differentiation is derived from différance as an even more primordial movement of difference. And although Derrida claims to have a more essential comprehension of the core of metaphysics compared to Husserl and Heidegger and even confidently classifies their philosophical work ones to the field of metaphysics, he continues to use the resources of phenomenological and transcendental discourse again and again, leaving them without any criticism. The most telling example here is the use of the phrase “always already” (toujours déjà, immer schon), incredibly common in the works of Heidegger and Husserl (as well as most other most famous modern phenomenologists) and accompanying most of Derrida’s texts. In this article we seek to draw attention to the mystery power of this phrase, which hides the secret of the origins of phenomenological, fundamental-ontological, transcendental, and deconstructivist discourses as such, and also to demonstrate the possibilities of self-deconstruction of deconstruction, which with new urgency returns us to the problem of defining the limits of metaphysics and the “margins of philosophy”.

Ecology, Anti-Christianity, and the Far Right

Ecology, Anti-Christianity, and the Far Right

Martin Heidegger’s Work «The Origin of the Work of Art» as Methodology for Understanding Creativity

The purpose of the article is to conceptually logicalise the procedurality of the creation act based on the analysis of M. Heidegger's work«The Origin of the Work of Art». The research methodology has primarily been based on the futurological or value-futurological method, which is the author's proposal of V. Sievers. It is only effective in the context of our research, unlike established historical, comparative, axiological, and phenomenological methods, since it is based on the idea of a coordinated approach to the perception of reality and the simultaneous movement of a person in it. Moreover, as follows from the very name, it is itself a direction and a criterion of movement in it. The scientific novelty of the study is that based on the analysis of M. Heidegger's work «The Origin of the Work of Art», the act of creation is divided into two stages: the vision of truth in the circle of «nothing» and the hypothetical phasing of acquisition based on the act of creation as a result of the status of a thing. An interpretation of one of the oldest problems in philosophy – the problem of «qualia» – is offered, and a new approach to understanding the category «existential» is also presented. Conclusions. The signs of a thing highlighted in Heidegger's text are a state of such fixation of a set of defined steps, which indicates the formation of creative conditions. In contrast to creation, the conditions of creativity should be understood and considered as the result of the gradual accumulation of groundless multiplication of creations that in the process of their interaction cause a historical movement in the sequence of two opposing components in unity: natural and social. The concept of mental serves as a boundary and a connecting link between them. In addition, existential or valuable experience is a field of reflection that forms historical forms of human mental and material activity organisation. Key words: art, creation,methodology, category «nothing», Observer, truth, entity, substance, captured action, qualia, existential.

HEIDEGGER ON “POSSIBILITY”

This article by M. Sinclair is devoted to the problem of modality in the philosophical works of M. Heidegger his study of being-possible as one of the modes of being. The author analyzes in detail the evolution of the concept of “possibility”, starting from the 1920s and ending with the later works of Heidegger, as this philosophical category undergoes certain changes. The author also analyzes the role played by Aristotle’s ontological philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology in the formation of Heidegger as a thinker. Finally, the article presents the interpretations of the Heidegger category of possibility by modern researchers such as I. Thomson, W. McNeil, J. Wolfe and many others. It is concluded that the category of the possible was key for Heidegger in his construction of the structure of being, and the disclosure of various aspects of this category occurred throughout the entire philosophical path of M. Heidegger.

Radical conservatism and the Heideggerian right: Heidegger, de Benoist, Dugin

The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”.

From Skepticism to Superstitious Fear: an Analysis of the Novel by M. R. James "You whistle, I won't keep you waiting."

The article analyzes the poetical features of creating an alarming atmosphere and depicting the terrible in the novel by the famous British author of ghost stories M. R. James "You whistle ...". The purpose of the work: to trace the mixing of traditional Gothic and special author's methods. Special attention is paid to symbolism and the so-called "children's" mythology. The transformation of the main character's views from scientific skepticism to superstitious fear of the infernal, through overcoming the boundaries of his consciousness, is traced. The features of chronotope, spatiopoetics and sonosphere are investigated. The special functioning of the found artifact – the whistle – as a guide to a parallel oneiric space is noted. The concept of vision and blindness as the most important components of cognition of the world is actualized. Attention is paid to M. R. James' invariable "punishment" of the hero for excessive curiosity. Noteworthy is the motive of the "call", stated in the title of the novel, which is a reinterpreted quote from Robert Burns' verse "Song". The methodological base involves the synthesis of both philological and philosophical, as well as culturological approaches. An important result is the conclusion about the mixing of the traditional Gothic landscape orchestration of events and modern location, as well as the use of folk superstitions as a key to understanding transcendental phenomena. The aspects of scientific novelty include the use by the author of the article of modern psychological and philosophical concepts for a deeper and more detailed analysis. In particular, the works of Heidegger, Trigg, Harman and others are studied. Through this, "fear" - as the main element of Gothic novels, is explored comprehensively. Resorting to such an analysis, it becomes possible to give an answer to the question about the continuing popularity of the genre of "ghost stories". The paradoxical position of the author of the novel M. R. James is noted, who, being a man of science, demonstrates how strong the influence of irrational forces and subconscious fears on a rational person can be. This explains the choice of the title of the article.

Narrative as Metaphor: Inquiry on the Effects of Metaphors in Narrative Paradigms

本文探討隱喻在敘說研究或敘說心理學中的關鍵作用與意涵，並從方法、方法論，再到認識論及本體論，逐層討論。在方法層次中，隱喻能在諮商中協助參考架構、世界觀之轉換，問題外化之命名等；在研究中，隱喻可協助對研究參與者故事做整體性反思，增進詮釋連貫性。在方法論層次，隱喻可協助呂格爾「三層摹擬論」的前構、形構、再構過程中之順利轉換。最後認識論及本體論層次，隱喻揭示了人所存有世界的本體性特徵，即宛若世界。此「世界」只能藉由隱喻或敘事文本來摹擬，本身就包涵「是」與「不是」的辯證性認識論。但文本摹擬之差異性或偏離性並不視為誤差，而是一種創造性，也是文本世界之生命力所在。This study addresses the key effects and meanings of metaphors in narrative studies and narrative psychology. Metaphors have importance in the development of hermeneutics, and Ricoeur studied it in the book La métaphore vive. The development of hermeneutics has two major turns. The first major turn is Wilhelm Dilthey's contributions, who made important contributions to a methodology of the humanities and other human sciences. The second major turn is that Martin Heidegger's contributions, shifted from Wilhelm Dilthey's theories. Martin Heidegger is counted among the main exponents of existentialism. Heidegger's groundbreaking work is in ontology (the philosophical study of being or existence) and metaphysics. And since then, hermeneutics has advocated detours to understand human beings that requires language or narrative text. The role of metaphors in the narrative is what this study aims to explore. The literature as well as practical counseling experiences have found different schools of counseling seem to believe that metaphors help the process of counseling. The purpose of this study is to explore how metaphors help.Also, the main approach of this study is to explore the links and important discourses between narratives and metaphors in greater depth through the review of critical literatures. The study explores how metaphors help step by step from how metaphors are applied, and from the methodology aspect, the epistemology aspect and the ontology aspect. When it comes to how metaphors are applied, metaphors stimulate transformation in reference frames, viewpoints of world, and the naming of the externalized problems, etc. In this study, metaphors stimulate the study participants to reflect on stories holistically and improve the consistency of interpretation. The role of metaphors comes from what Ricoeur called a rhetorical property. At the methodology level, metaphors have what Ricoeur called poetics, including mimesis and pictorial-semantic fusion. Therefore, metaphors stimulate the transformation process of pre-figuration, configuration, and re-figuration of Ricoeur's ＂threefold mimesis＂, which are the core frame of narrative, in the text. Also, the pictorial nature of metaphors assist in the construction and interpretation of the story. At the epistemological level, metaphors themselves contain a dialectical epistemology of ＂to be＂ and ＂not to be＂, and this dialectic helps to promote the hermeneutic circle among understanding, interpretation, and construction. It is an open circle and a creative mimesis. Finally, at the ontology level, metaphors reveal the ontological characteristics of the human beings' world - the ＂as if＂ world. This world can only be drawn up by metaphors or narrative texts. However, the difference (écart) of the texts is not regarded as an error but rather regarded as a type of creativity and liveliness of the text. Moreover, the secondary reference of metaphors and narratives, the hermeneutical detour nature of narratives, helps people move from a limited situation of unformed meaning towards a state of existence and authentic self. In other words, the ontology or existence of man reflected in metaphors or narratives is essentially the ontology of meaning construction. The so-called authentic self (Eigentlichkeit) or transcendent state is not the appearance of the real self or the given ultimate goal or answer but rather a possibility of development and a process of continuous meaning construction and becoming. In the history the earliest narrative works of human beings are cave paintings of primitive humans and related witchcraft rituals or dances. The initial imitations of these life experiences have brought about reflection and consciousness, which allows human beings to go into the world of meaning construction from the unconscious and organic world. This also allows for the birth of art and culture. Therefore, human beings are in this metaphorical and narrative-like world and can constantly construct or reconstruct meanings of life.

The Philosopher's Corner

Heidegger's philosophy has long been one of the core references for information systems (IS) researchers, often drawing upon one of two distinct perspectives he employed in his writings. The first of these perspectives is found in Heidegger's work on presence, and the second in his work on relations. We refer to these two as his presence perspective and his relation perspective. The presence perspective builds on ideas developed in early sections of his major work, Being and Time (1927:1996), contrasting the presence of being-in-the-world with that of readiness-at-hand. The relation perspective builds on ideas developed in later sections of Being and Time, elaborating on the concept of being-with [Mitsein]. We discuss the ways these two key perspectives in his philosophy are intertwined and reinforce each other when we consider them together, and how they amplify and extend each other's scope of effect in human situated practice. We argue that Heidegger's philosophical perspective on human existence is a powerful theoretical lens for understanding both the subjective and the objective poles of our experience of being in the world. It provides an integrated framework for research on both poles that is useful across the IS field.

The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon ed. by Mark A. Wrathall

Reviewed by: The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon ed. by Mark A. Wrathall S. Montgomery Ewegen WRATHALL, Mark A., editor. The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021. xxxviii + 867 pp. Cloth, $125.00 This colossal volume contains an impressive 220 encyclopedic entries on words and concepts perceived as being integral to Martin Heidegger's corpus. The entries are written by a veritable "Who's Who" of accomplished Heidegger scholars from diverse interpretive approaches and geographical backgrounds (though there are a few glaring omissions). The Lexicon also includes an extremely detailed biography, an exhaustive list of Heidegger's works, as well as a hearty bibliography of secondary scholarship. Although this substantial volume contains much of value for scholars of all levels, there are a few general shortcomings that the reader should keep in mind. To begin with, the inside flap boasts of a "comprehensive" collection of Heidegger's vocabulary. In claiming such comprehensiveness, the Lexicon gives the impression that only the words/concepts that were given individual entries mattered to Heidegger, and that other words/concepts that are not given entries are not as important to his thought. Such a structure, inevitable for a project such as this, runs the risk of deciding for readers which words/concepts are crucial to Heidegger's work, and which [End Page 611] are of secondary or tertiary importance. One might respond to this criticism by pointing out that no volume, no matter how "comprehensive," could consider every word/concept that was important to a thinker. But such a response proves the point of the underlying criticism: namely, that the very notion of a "lexicon" that would somehow comprehensively present the work of a thinker is bound to fall short in this respect. Second, although each entry is informed by extensive and often impressive familiarity with the secondary literature that pertains to the issue at hand, an engagement with that scholarship is largely missing from the entries themselves. Rather, most (though not all) of the entries are presented with dictionary like authority, as if the information being presented therein is somehow "definitive." (This is owed in large part to Wrathall's desire, as he explains in his preface, that each entry begins with "something akin to a definition" before delving more deeply into the issue at hand.) As such, the entries tend to lack the sort of dialogical exchanges typical of scholarly engagements (though there are many entries for which this is not the case). This issue is obviated a bit by the use of a "Further Reading" tab placed at the bottom of many (but not all) of the entries; yet, even with this, the impression remains that the entries are somehow settling the matter under consideration, rather than merely offering one scholar's informed understanding of it. This is perhaps less of an issue for the seasoned Heidegger scholar, who will likely already approach these entries with circumspection; however, it remains a risk for the tyro, who might mistake these offerings for the "last word" on the matter. In this way, Wrathall's intention that the Lexicon be used "both for a quick reference while trying to decipher Heidegger's prose, but also as a means to dive more deeply into scholarship on Heidegger's philosophy" succeeds on the first point but flounders somewhat on the second. The Lexicon thus presents itself as a comprehensive list of "key terms" that are "clearly and concisely" defined. In other words, it serves as a kind of standing-reserve of Heideggerian terminology, with the words neatly ordered and available for the reader's use. (Somewhat ironically, Wrathall uses the example of Zuhandenheit ["readiness-to-hand"] in order to show how subentries work, and this is precisely how the entries themselves come across within the volume: as neatly catalogued ready-to-hand definitions waiting around to be put to use by the Heidegger scholar.) In this way, the Lexicon can be seen as providing a kind of grid or frame—a Gestell, if you will—by means of which Heidegger's sprawling corpus is turned into, to draw on Wrathall's own definition of Gestell from the Lexicon, "a stock of goods" that sits "on call and...

The existential turn in philosophy of education: In defence of liberal autonomy

Abstract In recent years, there has been a marked shift in concern among some philosophers of education from political transformation to personal transformation. In the past, critics of liberalism, both egalitarian and communitarian, promoted political, social, economic and educational reform—but always subscribed to the freedom of the individual, the sovereign subject, to seek fulfilment. Now, influenced by an existential turn in the work of Heidegger, Sartre and Levinas, which originates in Hegel's dialectic of freedom, and postmodernist notions of transgressive self-creation, proponents of personally transformative education call for a decentring of the egoistic self so that we might recreate ourselves as ethical beings whose unconditional obligations are to ‘the other’ in a shared world. However, this vision of idealised existential subjects stripped of contingent worldly attachments and selfish egocentric impulses, enjoying idealised ethical relations and what I term ‘existential freedom’, is radically undetermined. It could only be achieved if individual wills were merged into a collective will or consciousness, and personal autonomy was eliminated. Meanwhile, crucial educational and political questions concerning how the practical affairs of autonomous individuals—real people—should be managed in a liberal democracy, and how young people should be educated for responsible citizenship, are neglected (at least among those influenced by the existentialist turn), as the formative and socialising functions of education are undermined. I conclude that the existential turn towards personally transformative education leads us nowhere.

Критика естественнонаучного метода у Хайдеггера

One of the main statements of the work is that in the analysis of development prospects it is necessary to rely on the very roots, the origins of the develop­ment of our civilization, and it is on their philosophical foundations that set the vector of the development of civilization for the future, for many centuries to come. This was pointed out by V.S. Stepin, who, speaking about the philo­sophical foundations of modern science, distinguished the ontological and cate­gorical grids of concepts that are always used when thinking about the future. In many of his works, M. Heidegger spoke about the same, and even more defi­nitely. It is necessary to critically analyze the mathematical method of modern natural science, possible risks and dangers in applying this method to the hu­man world. The paper is devoted to the analysis of the natural science method in the works of Heidegger. This method is associated with the philosophy of Descartes. As Heidegger shows, from the Cartesian concept of the evidence of the “thinking self”, the evidence of mathematical rules follows. These rules are associated with the key concept of measurability, or computability of the physi­cal world. Heidegger connects this computability with the concept of objec­tification. In principle, a person is not objectified, but modern science tries to consider him within the framework of its quantitative method. Heidegger states that such an approach will inevitably lead to the appearance of a human machine. In conclusion, the paper raises the question of the role of quantitative methods in physics and philosophy.

Analysis of Heidegger's "Ge-Stell" Thought of Modern Technology and Art.

Heidegger is not actually an antitechnologist or a revivalist. He does not think we need to escape from technology while criticizing it, nor does he miss a certain “golden age” in human history. Heidegger cannot provide us with specific methods to solve many problems in the technological age, but his reflection and questioning provide us with a possible way of redemption, which is of great significance to the development of our current era. After analyzing Heidegger's related works and related literature by many scholars, this paper finds that most of the research stays on aspects such as the existence, the nature of art, the nature of technology, the crisis brought about by technology, and the rescue of technology by art. Part of it involves the relationship between technology and art, but rarely concentrates on thinking about the relationship between technology and art. Based on this, through the exploration and analysis of the origin of ancient techniques and the reconsideration of the essence of modern technology, this paper takes the “Ge-stell” thought in the context of Heidegger's thinking on technology as the breakthrough point and reexamines technology. It understands and expounds the development of art; tries to study the inner connection and connotation between Heidegger's modern technology, art, and modern technology “Ge-stell”; and grasps the relationship between technology and art as a whole. By analyzing and pointing out the “Ge-stell” essence of technology, the blood relationship between technology and art has been cut off, and art has been brought into the control of technology, resulting in an unprecedented survival crisis for human beings. Finally, the rescue in the technological era is proposed. It can provide philosophical guidance and new thinking for the development of the current society and the plight of the times it is facing.

Heidegger's understanding of philosophy in secondary literature of his first, second, and third periods of thought

In this paper, aligning with the focus international researchers have dedicated to Heidegger's major works in order to contribute to the elucidation of his teachings, our intention is to establish a hypothesis grounded in Heidegger's secondary literature spanning his first, second, and third periods of thought. This will be accomplished through an examination of his speeches, presentations, lectures, correspondences, notes, interviews, and the like. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is aimed at demonstrating that Heidegger's body of work does not constitute a static and definitive delineation of philosophy that commences and concludes in a prescribed manner: instead, it represents a contemplation of the concept of philosophy throughout his entire oeuvre, achieved by engaging in the discourse of philosophy, problematizing metaphysics, and scrutinizing ontology. In this vein, this essay delves into Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and metaphysics during his first period of thought, his comprehension of the problem of metaphysics in his second period of thought, and his interpretation of the interplay between ontology and theology/teologics in his third period of thought. The ultimate objective is to shed light on Heidegger's methodology, which underpins both his initial phenomenology and subsequent thought: the method of posing questions. Specifically, the act of questioning has led to a critique of the obscuring of the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein, a critique that delivers an essential disruption to philosophical thought. Consequently, this underscores the necessity of establishing the foundations for the task of thinking.

The Hermeneutical Task of Postcolonial African Philosophy: Construction and Deconstruction

Meta philosophical issues surround the topic of African philosophy. What should be counted as African philosophy, and what makes African philosophy so notable has long been a matter of reflection by African and African descended thinkers? One stance taken by African thinkers leans toward ascribing philosophical status to the collective worldviews of Africans embedded in their traditions, language, and culture. By criticizing ethnophilosophy as being unanimous and uncritical, professional philosophers epitomize a philosophy to be a universal, individualized, and reflective enterprise. This tendency of appropriating cultural traits as philosophical and thereby tending to emphasize particularity by ethnophilosophers on the one hand and the universalist claim by professional philosophers puts African philosophy in a dilemma and whereby makes it counterproductive to the neocolonial liberation struggle. The article's central argument is that African philosophical hermeneutics is a panacea for the 'double blockage' that the philosophers currently look into contemporary African philosophy. African hermeneutics is the extension of German and French hermeneutical tradition with the works of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricœur. Hermeneutics is a mediation between culture and philosophy and also universality and particularity.

On the World of the Virus

Abstract This short article deals with the concept of the world, and that concept's ability to engage with the impact of the coronavirus and the remaking of image theory anew. The concept of the world can, it is argued, be utilized to offer a sustained engagement with the influence of COVID-19, particularly as the concept of the world is manifested in the work of the philosopher Martin Heidegger. To understand Heidegger's work on his most important idea of the world, this article briefly looks at image theory, at Heidegger's introduction of the notion of the gigantic, at the author's own engagement with the gigantic in the microscopic image, and finally at how we can develop and revise our appreciation of the world of the virus.