Критика естественнонаучного метода у Хайдеггера

Abstract

One of the main statements of the work is that in the analysis of development prospects it is necessary to rely on the very roots, the origins of the develop­ment of our civilization, and it is on their philosophical foundations that set the vector of the development of civilization for the future, for many centuries to come. This was pointed out by V.S. Stepin, who, speaking about the philo­sophical foundations of modern science, distinguished the ontological and cate­gorical grids of concepts that are always used when thinking about the future. In many of his works, M. Heidegger spoke about the same, and even more defi­nitely. It is necessary to critically analyze the mathematical method of modern natural science, possible risks and dangers in applying this method to the hu­man world. The paper is devoted to the analysis of the natural science method in the works of Heidegger. This method is associated with the philosophy of Descartes. As Heidegger shows, from the Cartesian concept of the evidence of the “thinking self”, the evidence of mathematical rules follows. These rules are associated with the key concept of measurability, or computability of the physi­cal world. Heidegger connects this computability with the concept of objec­tification. In principle, a person is not objectified, but modern science tries to consider him within the framework of its quantitative method. Heidegger states that such an approach will inevitably lead to the appearance of a human machine. In conclusion, the paper raises the question of the role of quantitative methods in physics and philosophy.