Wittgenstein's Views Research Articles

Wittgenstein and Toulmin’s Model of Argument: The Riddle Explained Away

The article undertakes the problem of a Wittgensteinian background of Toulmin’s model of argument. While appreciating the original character of the investigations set out by Toulmin in The Uses of Argument, Wittgenstein’s ideas taken to be forerunners of both Toulmin’s philosophical method and the particular elements of the model of substantial argument are traced backward, to Toulmin’s earlier books: The Philosophy of Science (Toulmin, The philosophy of science. An introduction, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1953) and An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics (Toulmin, An examination of the place of reason in ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1950). The technique of pinpointing the constituents of that model in the books preceding The Uses of Argument is superposing the layout of Toulmin’s model on the crucial arguments concerning the earlier books: the scientific one based on Newtonian optics and the moral one concerning keeping promises. Such a procedure allows identifying backing for warrants and argument fields with the methods of representation in The Philosophy of Science and with modes of reasoning in An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics. The former is traced to passages 6.3 ff of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, while the latter—to the concept of word-games (the later Wittgenstein’s language games). The claim regarding Wittgenstein’s background is that in Toulmin’s view of Wittgenstein, some parts of Tractatus concerning representing are in line with Wittgenstein’s later reflections on language games; as well as that the overall method of The Uses of Argument goes along with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic approach to philosophical problems that have to be placed in the context of their ordinary use.

Beyond pain privacy and pain meters: a new vision for pain biomarkers.

To an individual, pain is unambiguously real. To a caregiver, assessing pain in others is a challenging process shrouded in doubt. To explain this challenge, many assume that pain "belongs" exclusively to the bearer of that experience and accept the dogma that pain is private. However, privacy also entails that it is not possible to identify, share, or communicate that experience with others. Obviously, this is not true and the consequences of pain privacy would be devastating for healthcare. Pain is indeed unique and subjective, but not necessarily private. Pain is in fact readily communicable, though perhaps not as effectively and reliably as caregivers would like. On the other hand, healthcare systems mandate objective metrics in pain diagnosis. Smiley face caricatures are a staple of clinical practice and a universal standard for reporting pain levels. These conditions create a double paradox: Assess a private experience that is inaccessible, and use numerical scales to measure subjective attributes. Navigating this stressful environment, medical professionals experience intellectual dissonance, patients are frustrated, and value-based care is undermined. Offering a way out, first, we refute the privacy and objectification of pain citing philosophical, behavioral, and neuroscientific arguments. We discuss Wittgensteinian views against privacy, explore the clear evolutionary advantage of communicating pain to others, and identify neural circuits in the mammalian brain that contribute to empathy. Second, we highlight the subjectivity of pain, embracing the complexity and uniqueness of an individual's pain. We also provide compelling evidence for brain mechanisms that actively shape the pain experience according to predictive coding principles. Third, we offer a vision for the development of biomarker technologies that assess pain fairly without engendering bias against the patient's narrative. Our recommendations are based on the overwhelming appreciation that "medicine by emoji" is inadequate for capturing the multidimensional nature of pain. Our view is that the most promising candidates for pain biomarkers consist of self-reports as ground truth augmented by physiological signatures of biological relevance to pain. Integration of subjective and objective multimodal features will be key for the development of comprehensive pain assessment models.

Against a global conception of mathematical hinges

Abstract Epistemologists have developed a diverse group of theories, known as hinge epistemology, about our epistemic practices that resort to and expand on Wittgenstein's concept of ‘hinges’ in On Certainty. Within hinge epistemology there is a debate over the epistemic status of hinges. Some hold that hinges are non-epistemic (neither known, justified, nor warranted), while others contend that they are epistemic. Philosophers on both sides of the debate have often connected this discussion to Wittgenstein's later views on mathematics. Others have directly questioned whether there are mathematical hinges, and if so, these would be axioms. Here, we give a hinge epistemology account for mathematical practices based on their contextual dynamics. We argue that 1) there are indeed mathematical hinges (and they are not axioms necessarily), and 2) a given mathematical entity can be used contextually as an epistemic hinge, a non-epistemic hinge, or a non-hinge. We sustain our arguments exegetically and empirically.

A Wittgensteinian Antitheodicy

Contrary to the majority of contemporary analytic philosophers of religion, James Sterba argues in his book Is a Good God Logically Possible? (2019) that Alvin Plantinga with his famous free will defense has not succeeded in solving the logical problem of evil. However, Sterba is not alone in disputing this generally accepted view in analytic philosophy of religion. D. Z. Phillips (1934–2006) has argued that the logical problem of evil has not been solved and he further holds that it has not even got off the ground. The aim of this article is to explore Phillips’ criticism of the free-will defense and mainstream theodicies. His critique is relevant for Sterba’s atheistic stance because Phillips’ arguments are partly applicable to forms of philosophical atheism that share the same assumptions with philosophical theism. In the first part of the article, I will briefly describe the starting points of the best-known solutions to the problem of evil in analytic philosophy of religion and refer to some aspects of Sterba’s arguments. After that I will explore Phillips’ ethical and conceptual criticism against frameworks used in the discussion of theodicy. Finally, I will pay attention to Phillips’ Wittgensteinian view of the task and the aim of philosophy in order to clarify some problematic aspects of his thought.

Professional Knowledge through Wargames and Exercises

In professional military education (PME), wargames and field-training exercises are among the pedagogical tools used to teach students to be professional officers. It is generally accepted that wargames are important sources of insight – even if, as Peter Perla (2012, p. 157) points out, they are “not real.” Notwithstanding the truism that there exists a gap between the game and reality, the wargame is a tool designed to provide the learner something to aid them in the real world. There are discussions in the literature concerning which aspects of the experience and practice of gameplaying are relevant to the player’s understanding of the aspect of reality their game is about; here, Perla’s discussion of the categorization of wargaming analysis is useful (2012, pp. 231–239), as is the report <em>Wargame Pathologies</em> (Weuve et al., 2004). While, with a few exceptions, the literature on wargaming does not engage with the fundamental epistemological questions of wargaming, there is a tendency to demarcate the relevance of wargaming for professional competence to specific aspects or domains of knowledge. In this article I argue that wargaming and field-training exercises in PME shape the future officer’s understanding and professional practices in much more profound ways than commonly assumed. Starting from Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language and his discussions of what learning means and how meaning arises, I will show that, as far as learning to become an officer is concerned, wargames and exercises are intrinsically educative: learning inevitably takes place, and this learning shapes, in fundamental ways, how the officer understands and responds to situations they might face as a professional practitioner. The article proceeds in three steps. First, the theoretical basis for the argument, a Wittgensteinian view of learning and of professional knowledge, is presented; second, the nature of wargames and exercises, and their nature as sources for knowledge, are discussed; and in the final section, the implications for our understanding of wargames and exercises in professional military education of the preceding two sections are suggested.

THE “WATERWHEEL” OF GUILT: THE TAUTOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE IN WITTGENSTEIN’S NOTES

The implicit conception of conscience from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notes from 1929 is brought into comparison with the theory of conscience as a paradoxical identity of guilt and innocence by Philip Konrad Marheineke (which served as a pattern for Kierkegaardian concept of “despair”) and of conscience as a (grammatical and temporal) redoubling by Vladimir Jankélévitch. Wittgensteinian views on conscience and feeling of guilt tend to Marheineke-Kierkegaard’s model (the guilt hides in innocence and vice versa) and to Jankélévitch’s model (the wrongdoing from the past makes us regret the innocence which preceded it in a far remote past). I explore these tautological models of conscience using the example of Wittgensteinian metaphor of “waterwheel”: of an engineering failure producing a constant sentiment of guilt. Austrian philosopher describes his “incapacity to think” as a source of background, freely floating guilt. “Uselessness” and “mediocrity” or as he puts it “groundlessness of your own existence” altogether with “incapacity to think”—those are the self-accusations of the thinker. This torturing state he at the same time considers to be the source of his own philosophical productivity. Would a conscience be possible which would be free of this tautological structure and of this endless “rumination” of the petty guilt? The article proposes a hypothesis how one could break the tautological circle of an idling scrupulous conscience.

REACTION TO ‘LINGUISTIC MEANING MEETS LINGUISTIC FORM IN ACTION’

The enactivist position adopted by Figueiredo and Cuffari is argued to represent a return to a form of behaviorism which denies that mental content is constitutive of the meaning of linguistic signs in favour of the view that language is first and foremost a physical activity based on shared practices of bodily behaviour. This view is shown to be highly problematic, as it is unable to account for the fact that certain mental experiences have characteristic qualia that cannot be reduced to practices of bodily behaviour, nor for the fact that children’s linguistic abilities are radically underdetermined by the verbal behaviour to which they are exposed in the short period in which they develop these abilities. The Wittgensteinian view of ‘meaning as use’ adopted in the paper is subjected to a reductio ad absurdum, as it basically entails that there are no pots, but only uses of pots. The nature of the human mind, as attested to by quantum theory, Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem and natural language itself are argued to demonstrate that it cannot be reduced to the purely material level.

The fundamental model of deep disagreements

AbstractWe call systematic disputes that are particularly hard to resolve deep disagreements. We can divide most theories of deep disagreements in analytic epistemology into two camps: the Wittgensteinian view and the fundamental epistemic principles view. This essay analyzes how both views deal with two of the most pressing issues a theory of deep disagreement must address: their source and their resolution. After concluding that the paradigmatic theory of each camp struggles on both fronts, the essay proceeds to show that, despite their differences, these theories share some core assumptions and think of deep disagreements similarly: as grounded in fundamental epistemic differences between the parties. This underlying conception of deep disagreements the author calls “the fundamental model.” The essay provides reasons to be wary of this conception, and hence, mainstream epistemologists’ treatment of the issue.

Play and Spiel are not the Same: Anti-Wittgensteinian Arguments and Consideration of Game as a Kind of Human Play

The differences between categories of play in English and spiel in German (or jeu in French and so on) are essential because any complex ludic category includes games that are organized and restricted by roles and rules. My choice to deal with Wittgensteinian views of spiel (which is translated by default as ‘play’) is influenced by the fact that his argument in German about the impossibility and futility of a philosophical definition of spiel embodies the quintessence of the problem: the linguistic obstacle that prevents correct interpretation of human play. Methodologically, I make the philosophical question of dependence a linguistic one. The article concludes by defending the position that game is only one of the diverse activities realizing human play, which is a basic existential phenomenon that can be considered philosophically through the category of ‘other being’.

Contradictions and falling bridges: what was Wittgenstein’s reply to Turing?

ABSTRACT In this paper, I offer a close reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on inconsistency, mostly as they appear in the Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. I focus especially on an objection to Wittgenstein's view given by Alan Turing, who attended the lectures, the so called ‘falling bridges’-objection. Wittgenstein's position is that if contradictions arise in some practice of language, they are not necessarily fatal to that practice nor necessitate a revision of that practice. If we then assume that we have adopted a paraconsistent logic, Wittgenstein's answer to Turing is that if we run into trouble building our bridge, it is either because we have made a calculation mistake or our calculus does not actually describe the phenomenon it is intended to model. The possibility of either kind of error is not particular to contradictions nor to inconsistency, and thus contradictions do not have any special status as a thing to be avoided.

Aesthetic Puzzlements: Jonas Mekas's Diary Films and Ludwig Wittgenstein

In this article, I argue that by considering Ludwig Wittgenstein's methods, we can better understand and appreciate Jonas Mekas's diary films. Based on Wittgenstein's notion of “aesthetic puzzlement”, I identify the main confusions encountered by the viewer upon watching Mekas's films, such as: 1) fragmentation; 2) persistent repetition; and 3) the importance placed on the everyday. I discuss three films – Walden (1969), Lost Lost Lost (1976), and As I Was Moving Ahead Occasionally I Saw Brief Glimpses of Beauty (2000) – and demonstrate that the aesthetic puzzlements within them may be dissolved by looking at the format of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (1953). Mekas's lifelong interest in filming the most mundane and domestic scenes can be understood as a puzzlement in itself: why not just admire the ordinary whilst living in it? Wittgenstein's thought experiment in Culture and Value helps us understand the aesthetic puzzlement of Mekas's interest in filming, remembering and presenting an extensive array of everyday activities, and also explains why the viewer can find the most mundane and domestic activities in his films remarkable. Additionally, I discuss how Mekas's diary films may be regarded as coming close to Wittgenstein's aesthetic ideal of art as being able to represent “life itself”. I aim to show how Mekas's cinematic practice places extreme importance on ordinary acts and offers a mode of thinking which echoes Wittgenstein's own views on philosophy. I conclude with a discussion of “nomadism”, a notion that elucidates the peculiar form of the works of both Wittgenstein and Mekas.

Chadbourne Gilpatric and Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Fateful Meeting

On January 11 1951 Chadbourne Gilpatric met with Wittgenstein to offer him, on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation, funding for any forthcoming publications. Wittgenstein politely declined the offer as he did not believe his health would permit him to bring any projects to completion. The meeting is referred to in a letter from Wittgenstein to Norman Malcolm and is also recalled by O.K. Bouwsma. Bouwsma learned of it from conversations with Wittgenstein and by Gilpatric. However, it is also recounted in Gilpatric’s diary. Gilpatric’s account comprises the fullest account of the meeting. It has remained unedited, until now, and is here transcribed for the first time. Five years later on February 1 1956 Gilpatric submitted a report, entitled ‘Logician and Mystic’, to the Rockefeller Foundation This report adds detail to his original account and summarises the Rockefeller’s financial support of the posthumous publication of Wittgenstein’s work. It also sketches Gilpatric’s view of Wittgenstein’s work.

Oyunu Kurallarına Göre Oynamak: Richard Rorty ve Ahlak

Richard Rorty'nin felsefesi, Wittgenstein'ın dil oyunları nosyonunu kendi düşüncesine adapte ettiği "söz dağarcıkları" kavramı çerçevesinde anlamını bulur. Pragmatizmin Darwinci evrim görüşü çerçevesinde dili insanın çevresiyle başa çıkmak için geliştirdiği bir alet olarak düşünmesi ve Wittgenstein'in dili kendi kuralları olan bir oyun olarak ele aldığı teorinin senteziyle ortaya çıkan görüş, Rorty'de insanın sadece kendi çevresiyle uyum iletişim kurduğu değil, kendisini, çevresini ve hatta Varlığı anlamlandırdığı düşünsel bir çerçeveye dönüşür. Tam bu noktada bir dilin içine doğan insan, çevresiyle olan bütün ilişkileriyle beraber ahlaka dair yargılarını ve değerlerini bu dili konuşmaya başlayarak elde eder. Bir dili öğrenmek, bir oyunu öğrenmektir. Bu çerçeve içinde ahlak, toplumsal dayanışma ve bir aradalığın gereği olarak ortaya konulan dil oyununun kurallarından ibarettir.

A Wittgensteinian View of Mind and Self-Knowledge

This paper defends a Wittgenstein-inspired conception of the nature of mind and self-knowledge. Thus, it is claimed that the mind is to be conceived as expressive behaviour; and that knowledge of one’s own mind is not to be thought of as a matter of first-person access, i.e. a special sort of access available to oneself alone, but rather as a matter of ordinary access, similar to other people’s. It is also argued that this conception does not undermine the distinctness of the first-person perspective, including the asymmetry with the third-person perspective, which should be construed semantically, rather than epistemically. As a result, an alternative to contemporary conceptions of mind and self-knowledge is provided.

Precisando el fideísmo wittgensteiniano

Las influencias de Tolstói, James y Kierkegaard explican varias de las peculiaridades de la filosofía de la religión de Wittgenstein. Pero, a la vez, insinúan sus límites, porque el tratamiento wittgensteiniano de la religión y lo divino como algo fundamentalmente expresivo, patético, decisionista, termina resultando alérgico a argumentos, creencias y evaluaciones. Wittgenstein, así, permite apreciar con gran vivacidad las experiencias y los lenguajes religiosos, lo que es útil para la psicología, la sociología, la literatura y aun la teología, pero no es de igual manera sofisticado filosóficamente, pues sus tendencias fideístas lastran su intelección de las religiones con insuficiencias fenomenológicas, epistemológicas, metafísicas y político-morales.

Knowing our own Body?

Abstract How do we know the position and movements of our limbs? Wittgenstein repeatedly deals with one received answer to this epistemological question: our ‘kinaesthetic sensations’ teach us about our posture and movements. However, he does not reject only this specific solution. He puts into question the very idea of an epistemology of bodily awareness. His critical arguments are not simply reductionist, but neither are they “mainly introspective”, and nor does he lean towards a “perceptual view” (Harcourt). The paper also touches upon the issue of how Wittgenstein's views relate to Anscombe’s much discussed claim that one ordinarily knows the position of one’s limbs “without observation”.

La consideración wittgensteiniana de la psicología como ciencia

The aim of this paper is to focus on Wittgenstein’s conception about Psychology as Science. For that purpose we analyse first Wittgenstein's approach to the psychological questions conected with his new theory of meaning. Then, we intend to concentrate on his idea of Psychology as Science, separating the scientist's from the philosopher's tasks. Finally, we intend to place wittgensteinian view about Psychology as Science in relation to the different views defending a methodological dualism connected with the methodological tension unity-diversity of Science.

Las nociones de «Sachverhalt», «Tatsache» y «Sachlage» en el "Tractatus" de Wittgenstein

In this paper, I develop some reflections on the interpretation of the notion of Sachverhalt in the Tractatus, with a view to show the complexity of the tractarian view and to point out some tensions. I intend to elucidate this notion in the context of its relation to the notions of Tatsache and Sachlage, and in its relation to the two main theories of the Tractatus, the truth-functions theory and the picture theory. I hope that this elucidation sheds some light on a possible comparison between Wittgenstein's and Husserl's views and I point out some suggestions in this sense in the last part of the paper.

Deep Disagreement and the Virtues of Argumentative and Epistemic Incapacity

Fogelin’s (1985) Wittgensteinian view of deep disagreement as allowing no rational resolution has been criticized from both argumentation theoretic and epistemological perspectives. These criticisms typically do not recognize how his point applies to the very argumentative resources on which they rely. Additionally, more extremely than Fogelin himself argues, the conditions of deep disagreement make each position literally unintelligible to the other, again disallowing rational resolution. In turn, however, this failure of sense is so extreme that it partly cancels its own meaning as a failure of sense. Consequently, it paradoxically opens new possibilities for sense and therefore rationally unexpected resolutions.

Commentary on José Zalabardo’s ‘The Tractatus on Unity’

ABSTRACTJosé Zalabardo’s view of the aims of the Tractatus limits the options available to us for reading and understanding the book. I argue that an alternative kind of reading is possible, if we don’t take for granted Zalabardo’s view of Wittgenstein’s aims. A necessary condition for any alternative reading is that it can make sense of central features of the Tractatus. I start from the development of Wittgenstein’s understanding of philosophy, and show that such an alternative reading is possible.