The motivation for this paper stems from the dearth of systematic philosophical treatises on Caribbean Philosophy. It is true, like Paget Henry (2000) pointed out, that Caribbean Philosophy has been carefully embedded in the practices of non-philosophical discourses almost to the point of concealment. This paper will attempt a philosophical examination of one category, that of creolization, which has been used to interrogate the question of identity in the Caribbean space by non-philosophers. The question to be raised and to which answers will be attempted is this: To what extent can the category of creolization be used to interrogate the question of idehtity in Caribbean Philosophy? Any attempt to answer this question will presuppose that there must be something that is distinctive about Caribbean philosophy, despite the fact that the Caribbean space is a conglomeration of many people, cultures and races. On the other hand, can it be the case that we are under an illusion to assume that there is something that is distinctive about peoples that are as diverse as the Caribbeans? Our attempt to answer these questions will lead us to analyze the concepts of identity from a philosophical point of view and relate it to the existing conceptions of creolization. Relying on Wittgenstein's (1988) notion of ‘family resemblance’, we shall suggest that there might not be one essential fixed feature or quality which captures Caribbean identity, rather we shall see identity as a hybridized, relational and dynamic notion and this view in turn squares well with the view of creolization which sees the term as a process rather than a finished product.As applied to Caribbean Philosophy as an academic discipline, we shall make use of our conception of creolization as a dynamic and dialectical process to suggest that both Western and African Philosophies constitute reliable data for the creation of a distinctive Caribbean Philosophy.