Wired Equivalent Privacy Research Articles

DRKH: A Power Efficient Encryption Protocol for Wireless Devices

In this paper, we present Dynamic Re‐keying with Key Hopping (DRKH) encryption protocol that uses RC4 encryption technique to ensure a strong security level with the advantage of low execution cost compared to other IEEE 802.11 security schemes. Low computational complexity makes DRKH suitable for solar‐ and battery‐powered handheld devices such as nodes in Solar ESS (Extended Service Set) and wireless sensor networks. Our design goal is to eventually integrate DRKH with different emerging wireless technologies. However, in this paper, we will focus on the integration of DRKH with 802.11 standard since it is the most widely deployed wireless technology. The results and analysis show that DRKH overcomes all the security threats with Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol while consuming a much lower power than WEP, Wi‐Fi Protected Access (WPA) 1.0 and WPA 2.0.

On the Impact of Security on the Performance of WLANs

This paper investigates the impact of security on the performance of WLAN. More specifically, it analyzes the impact of different implementations of encryption techniques used by two security protocols, namely Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) on the throughput over WLAN IEEE 802.11g. This paper also addresses the different issues related to the security protocols currently used in WLAN IEEE 802.11g and demonstrates how these issues affect the final results of the experiments conducted. The results show that within the same access point range the security adds moderate degradation on the throughput that may affect some applications over both infrastructure and ad hoc WLANs.

Analysis of the effect of security on data and voice traffic in WLAN

This paper investigates the impact of security on the performance of WLAN. More specifically, it analyzes the impact of different encryption techniques used by two security protocols, namely Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) on the throughput and delay over WLAN IEEE 802.11g. Moreover, in this paper, we investigate the effect of encryption on the performance of wireless transmission during the handover process when a mobile device disassociates from one access point and re-associates with another one. In addition, this paper addresses the impact of the use of security in WLAN specifically on voice traffic namely the incurred transmission delay and jitter.

A hybrid cryptosystem based on WEP for 802.11 networks

Wireless is the next generation networking technology. The security of such technology is very critical because its physical layer is the electro-magnetic waves that can be easily intercepted by anyone. The original security protocol for 802.11 wireless networks is called WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy). It is a protocol that is based on symmetric-key encryption algorithm RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4). Unfortunately, this protocol had many flaws that made it exposed to many attacks. This paper presents a set of improvements for WEP, which include key management and distribution, and authentication. These improvements convert WEP to a hybrid cryptosystem, a system that is based on both a symmetric-key algorithm and an asymmetric-key algorithm.

Profiles in Cyber Courage #2: Tom and Justin Peltier

Father and son consultants Tom and Justin Peltier are quizzed by War & Peace in Cyberspace columnists Dario Forte and Richard Power on certification, laptop security and wireless. Justin describes certification as a “flawed process” but admits it can be useful in applying for jobs. He believes technical certifications are difficult to create so they have practical application. He calls for an IT security review board equivalent to the law exam for lawyers. On laptop security he believes easy to use encryption is best for end-users. He recommends PGP as it is user friendly and transparent. He says one of the most basic laptop security controls is a cable lock, which he uses everywhere. Justin says wireless networking is still part of the “golden age of hacking.” He says “fantastic” security controls are available for securing wireless access points and wireless clients. He has encountered organizations with no awareness of rogue access points or any means of detecting rogue devices. He says old attacks are still mostly used today where common tools such as airsnort and kismet are used against Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP). He describes client side exploits as the newest wave of attacks saying they leave him “scared about security controls.” He admits the attacks are difficult to prevent and says deep pack inspection is the only measure that works somewhat. He is also fearful of: TOR - Packets travelling across the TOR are impossible to trace back. Anti-forensics (AF) - AF makes hiding an attack easier. Steganography - Combining steg with anti-forensics makes finding an attacker impossible. SSL- SSL is a popular attack vector. This year, every other month, War & Peace in Cyberspace will feature “Profiles in Cyber Courage.” In this ongoing series, we will focus on colleagues who have made significant contributions to the field of cybersecurity, and conduct in-depth interviews on timely and vital issues. Our second “Profile in Cyber Courage” highlights Tom and Justin Peltier ( http://www.peltierassociates.com ), who along with many individual accomplishments share the distinction of being the first father and son to win the CISSP and CISM certifications. The Peltiers consult, train, write and speak both as a team and individually. Tom Peltier's expertise is in the arena of cybersecurity management; Justin's is in the technical dimensions of cybersecurity.

A Survey of Wireless Security

Constant increase in use of wireless infrastructure networks for business purposes created a need for strong safety mechanisms. This paper describes WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol for the protection of wireless networks, its security deficiencies, as well as the various kinds of attacks that can jeopardize security goals of WEP protocol: authentication, confidentiality and integrity. The paper, also, gives a summary of security improvements of WEP protocol that can lead to the higher level of wireless network infrastructure protection. Comparative analysis shows the advantages of the new 802.11i standard in comparison to the previous security solutions.

Demonstrating the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) Weaknesses Inherent in Wi-Fi Networks

On the surface, wireless networks act the same as their wired counterparts, transporting data between network devices. However, there is one fundamental, and quite significant, difference: WLANs are based on radio communications technology, as an alternative to structured wiring and cables. Data is transmitted between devices through the air via the radio waves. Devices that participate in a WLAN must have a network interface card (NIC) with wireless capabilities. This essentially means that the card contains a small radio device that allows it to communicate with other wireless devices within the defined range for that card; for example, the 2.4—2.4853 GHz range. For a device to participate in a wireless network it must, first, be permitted to communicate with the devices in that network and, second, be within the transmission range of the devices in that network.

Key-Dependent Weak IVs and Weak Keys in WEP -- How to Trace Conditions Back to Their Patterns --

The WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) is a part of IEEE 802.11 standard designed for protecting over the air communication. While almost all of the WLAN (Wireless LAN) cards and the APs (Access Points) support WEP, a serious key recovery attack (aka FMS attack) was identified by Fluhrer et al. The attack was then extended and implemented as WEP cracking tools. The key recovery attacks can basically be prevented by skipping certain IVs (Initial Values) called weak IVs, but the problem is that there exist huge amount of key-dependent weak IVs and the patterns of them have not been fully identified yet. The difficult part is that a naive approach to identify the key-dependent weak IVs requires the exhaustive search of IVs and WEP keys, and hence is infeasible. On the other hand, it might be feasible to skip the key-dependent weak IVs for the currently set WEP key but this reveals information on the WEP key from the skipped patterns. To skip them safely, the patterns of the key-dependent weak IVs must be identified in the first place. In this paper, we analyze the famous condition for IVs and WEP keys to be weak in the FMS attack, i.e. 0 ≤ S[1] ≤ t' <t and S[1] + S[S[1]] = t (cf. Sect. 2.3 for more details), and then trace it back to the patterns of IVs and WEP keys theoretically. Once such patterns are obtained, their safe skip patterns can be obtained by using them.

Security mechanisms, attacks and security enhancements for the IEEE 802.11 WLANs

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol was adopted to protect authorised users from unauthorised access and eavesdropping in the IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs. It has been proven that the WEP protocol fails to provide data confidentiality and authentication. This paper first introduces the WEP as well as all kinds of attacks. Then, two approaches to enhance the WEP are proposed to overcome some known vulnerabilities and thus to provide better data confidentiality and authentication. Finally, simulation methodology is presented and simulation results are provided. Our studies show that the proposed enhancements provide better data confidentiality with some degree of computing cost as the trade-off.

Holistic approach to Wep protocol in securing wireless network infrastructure

Constant increase in use of wireless infrastructure networks for business purposes created a need for strong safety mechanisms. This paper describes WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol for the protection of wireless networks, its security deficiencies, as well as the various kinds of attacks that can jeopardize security goals of WEP protocol: authentication confidentiality and integrity. The paper, also, gives a summary of security improvements of WEP protocol that can lead to the higher level of wireless network infrastructure protection. Comparative analysis shows the advantages of the new 802.11i standard in comparison to the previous security solutions. A proposal of possible security improvements of RSNA (Robust Security Network Association) is presented.

Exposing the Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol Weaknesses in Wireless Networks

This article highlights a number of security issues within wireless networks. Signal leakage for instance, means that network communications can be picked up outside the physical boundaries of the building in which they are being operated, meaning that a hacker can operate from the street outside or discretely from blocks away. In addition to signal leakage, the Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol is inherently weak. There are also various other attacks that can be initiated against WLANs, all with detrimental effects. During our investigation, a war-driving expedition was conducted to ascertain the number of unprotected WLAN devices in use locally. We concluded that there was an apparent and serious lack of security on WLAN devices. Even those users that have implemented WEP do not seem to realize just how weak this protocol is or how their networks could be affected.

FPGA implementation cost and performance evaluation of IEEE 802.11 protocol encryption security schemes

The explosive growth of internet and consumer demand for mobility has fuelled the exponential growth of wireless communications and networks. Mobile users want access to services and information, from both internet and personal devices, from a range of locations without the use of a cable medium. IEEE 802.11 is one of the most widely used wireless standards of our days. The amount of access and mobility into wireless networks requires a security infrastructure that protects communication within that network. The security of this protocol is based on the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) scheme. Currently, all the IEEE 802.11 market products support WEP. But recently, the 802.11i working group introduced the advanced encryption standard (AES), as the security scheme for the future IEEE 802.11 applications. In this paper, the hardware integrations of WEP and AES are studied. A field programmable gate array (FPGA) device has been used as the hardware implementation platform, for a fair comparison between the two security schemes. Measurements for the FPGA implementation cost, operating frequency, power consumption and performance are given.

New approach to WLAN security with synchronized pseudo random

Wireless transmission is becoming increasing ubiquitous, but there is a big black hole in the security of this kind of network. Although IEEE 802.11 provides an optional Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) to implement the authentication and confidentiality, it leaves a lot of vulnerabilities and threats. This paper proposes a protocol called SPRNG for wireless data-link layer security. SPRNG is based on the sender and receiver who generate in a synchronized way a pseudo-random number sequence. In each transmission, the sender and receiver use a pair of random numbers, one for data frame authentication, and the other for encryption key. The random numbers are used as "one-time passwords" for sender authentication and as fresh encryption keys for each frame. SPRNG is designed to be compatible with the existing 802.11 products. Like WEP, the current 802.11 security protocol, SPRNG uses a symmetric key as its seed. SPRNG has already been simulated and tested in experiment, it shows that SPRNG has stronger security than WEP because it reveals little information for attackers. The key problem of SPRNG, synchronization loss problem, is also presented. Though motivated by wireless security, SPRNG is generic for many other applications, especially in the point to point communication.

A Note on the Fragility of the “Michael” Message Integrity Code

The IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network standard did not incorporate a cryptographic message integrity code into its wired equivalent privacy (WEP) protocol, and relied upon CRC-32 for message integrity. This was shown to be completely insecure since WEP uses a stream cipher (RC4) for encryption. The latest IEEE 802.11i draft addresses this, and other, weaknesses discovered in WEP. IEEE 802.11i suggests three new modes of operation: two based on the Advanced Encryption Standard cipher and one [temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP)] still based on RC4. The TKIP mode is intended for use on legacy hardware, which is computationally weak. TKIP uses a new, keyed, 64-b, message integrity code called Michael. In this letter, we highlight a weakness in Michael and suggest a simple fix.

Wireless LAN security and laboratory designs

For the past couple of years, increasing number of wireless local area networks (WLANs), based on the IEEE 802.11 protocols, have been deployed in various types of locations, including homes, schools, airports, business offices, government buildings, military facilities, coffee shops, book stores, as well as many other venues. One of the primary advantages offered by WLAN is its ability to provide untethered connectivity to portable devices, such as wireless laptops and PDAs. In some remote communities, WLANs are implemented as a viable last-mile technology [4], which link homes and offices in isolated locations to the global Internet. The further widespread deployment of WLANs, however, depends on whether secure networking can be achieved. In order for critical data and services to be delivered over WLANs, reasonable level of security must be guaranteed. The WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) protocol, originally proposed as the security mechanism of 802.11b WLANs, is known to be easily cracked by commonly available hacking software. Alternative security mechanisms, such as SSL, VPN, Cisco's LEAP, 802.1x, and the being-developed 802.11i protocols, provide mechanisms to enhance security in WLANs. In this paper we study the security aspects of WLANs, by starting with an overview of the WLAN technology and the respective vulnerabilities of various protocols, followed by a discussion of alternative security mechanisms that may be used to protect WLANs. At the end we present a sequence of laboratory designs, which are used as platforms on which attacks at WLANs can be simulated and studied, and alternative security solutions can be implemented and tested.