Winner Of Auction Research Articles

Rent distribution in an ex-vessel auction market of fisheries

While the rent generation for harvesters in common property resource exploitation has been well studied, questions about the rent distribution between the resource users and the downstream sector remain. We study the effects of information asymmetry on the distribution of rent between harvesters and buyers in the ex-vessel fish market and discuss the implication on the outcomes of natural resource management. Under a first-price sealed-bid auction of the fish-by-fish firsthand market in Japan, the markdown gained by buyers is estimated using a structural auction model with a nonparametric method. The results suggest that auction winners enjoy considerably high markdown (48% on average) from market transactions in fish. In a market in which asymmetric information drives down the price, the markdown can work as a resource management tax and disincentivize harvesters from overfishing and overinvesting. This “unintended tax” should be recognized in the design of public policy because a policy that changes the equilibrium may affect the trade-off between marginalized low-income harvesters and the abundant resource stock.

Legal Protection Of Auction Winner On Minutes Of Auction Canceled By Court (Case Study Decision No.31/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Jmb)

Legal Protection Of Auction Winner On Minutes Of Auction Canceled By Court (Case Study Decision No.31/Pdt.G/2015/PN.Jmb)

Penyelesaian Sengketa Pelaksanaan Perjanjian Lelang Sungai di Bidang Perikanan di Kecamatan Tanjung Lago Kabupaten Banyuasin

In the Civil Code regulates agreement, one type of agreement is an auction, however the object of this auction agreement is not an object or animal, but a river. In areas that have natural resources in the form of rivers, these agreements are often carried out, in practice adapted to local local wisdom. The river auction tradition in Tanjung Lago District, Banyuasin Regency, South Sumatra Province has been going on for a long time and has become a tradition for the local population. However, in practice there are often defaults committed by the parties. The purpose of this study is to determine the settlement of disputes in case of default by the parties. The research method is to look at direct facts that happen in real terms but still by using legal materials in the form of existing regulations and other sources. From the research results it is known that if one of the parties (the village administration and the winner of the auction) defaults, a deliberation between both parties but if it cannot be resolved then legal action can be taken. Meanwhile, if there is a default between the auction winner and the fisherman, the settlement will only be in the form of a warning and loss of trust without any sanctions.

SISTEM PENDUKUNG KEPUTUSAN PEMENANG TENDER DALAM PROSES PELELANGAN BARANG DAN JASA DENGAN MENGGUNAKAN METODE PROMETHEE

Supporting factors for carrying out a production process is the existence of the auction selection process in the supply of goods that will go into the logistics plan. In the auction at the UPT Balai Yasa Manggarai PT. Indonesian Railways still have many human errors, so the qualification evaluation process is carried out by asking and checking all bid documents. Determine the winner of the participant auction so that it can assist the logistics plan in the selection bidders using Promethee. The alternatives used are 10 tenders and 5 criteria as valuation namely company registration criteria (C1), financial statement criteria (C2), trade mark permit criteria (C3), taxable criteria (C4), domicile criteria (C5). The method used in the study is the Promethe method. This developed system shows that the best auction participant at UPT BY MRI is PT BHINEKA KARTA PUTRA MANDIRI with a net flow value of 0.28889. Therefore, this study aims to develop a Decision Support System (DSS) to determine the winner of bidders in the objective auction of goods and services. This research is expected to help in determining tenders by minimizing human error.Keywords: Decision Support System, Promethee Method, Winning Bidder.

Sistem Opersionl Lelang BPPKD Kabupaten Purworejo Perspektif Hukum Islam dan Hukum Positif

At present many transactions are done by the community one of them is ba'i al-muzāyadah. BPPKAD (Finance and Regional Asset Management Agency) Purworejo Regency Practice the ba'i al-muzāyadah in selling inventory items that are not usable in equipment because they are damaged or for development, namely The sales auction with a single-cover closed bidding method, in the sense of a letter of bidding (a bid size) along with all requirement files inserted in one closed envelope. Therefore, among the bidders can not know each other's offerings from other participants. This is different from the auction system in the Fiqh rulings (Islamic law) is an auction with a method of bidding in the middle of the crowd or public and the price quote is done repeatedly to find the auction winner. Departing from the background, researchers interested in discussing the problems of the BPPKAD auction operational system (the financial and Regional Asset Management Board) of Purworejo Regency using the perspective of Islamic law. With the aim that researchers can research more in whether the auction system used by BPPKAD Purworejo District is already in accordance with Islamic law. This type of research is a type of field study, the method of collecting data by interview. There are two data sources that are primary data sources and secondary data sources while the analysis uses a qualitative approach.

Per-Hop Reversed Packet Auctions for Cooperative Routing in Mobile Wireless Networks

Many applications could benefit from multi-hop communications through users’ mobile devices. A key issue is how to incentivize users to cooperate in both routing and relay of messages by sharing their device’s precious resources. Previous works on the subject have either tackled cooperation in the relay of messages alone or in both routing and relay functionalities. In the latter case, path selection is usually carried out at the destination node, which renders significant delays because the selected path needs to be conveyed all the way back to the source node before any data packet can be transmitted. This is certainly unsuitable in mobile scenarios. This paper presents the performance of the “Tightness” strategy, which allows the routing and relaying of messages “on-the-go”, via per-hop reversed packet auctions. At each hop, the sender asks for bids from potential relays according to a “budget” attached to the data packet, through which the auction winner gets paid and can pay for others in subsequent auctions. The auction winner is chosen not only based on bid value, but also on the estimated relay’s likelihood to deliver the packet to destination. Likewise, each potential relay makes a bid considering its own chances to deliver the packet to destination. A fine is also announced in every auction, that must be paid by all relays if the packet is not delivered to destination within a “deadline” expressed in number of hops. The performance of the Tightness strategy is evaluated for both static and mobile scenarios and compared to two baseline strategies according to different performance metrics.

Preference Signaling and Worker-Firm Matching: Evidence from Interview Auctions

We study whether there are improvements in worker-firm matching when employers and applicants can credibly signal their interest in a match. Using a detailed resume dataset of more than 400 applicants from one university over five years, we analyze a matching process in which firms fill some of their inter- view slots by invitation and the remainder are filled by an auction. Consistent with the predictions of a signaling model, we find the auction is valuable for less desirable firms trying to hire high desirability applicants. Second, we find evidence that is consistent with the auction benefiting overlooked applicants. Candidates who are less likely to be invited for an interview (e.g., non-U.S. citizens) are hired after having the opportunity to interview through the auction. Among hires, these candidates are more represented among auction winners than invited interviewees, and this difference is more pronounced at more desirable firms. Finally, counterfactual analysis shows the auction increases the number and quality of hires for less desirable firms, and total hires in the market.

Auction Winner Legal Protection Execution of Liability for Land Rights in Absentee

The auction is a public sale by finding the highest price, the auction may be movable items or goods not moving. Determined the winning bidder after the auction officials published a treatise auction that has the strength of evidence is perfect as an authentic deed. In the auction of immovable goods, such as land, the minutes of the auction as proof of deed used for basic transition is done at the land department and spatial / National Land Agency. Related to agricultural land auction participants except there is no restriction in Article 77 point (1) of the Regulation of the Minister of Finance Regulation Number 27 / PMK.06 / 2016 the official auction, husband or wife of the auction officials, officials from the seller, auction guide, judges, prosecutors, clerks, Interpreters confiscation, lawyer / Advocate, Notary, official land deed, appraisers, inspectors DJKN, auction hall employees, and there are opportunities outside the auction winner who makes the land area of the object object absentee land. Ownership of absentee land is prohibited by law because it does not comply with land reform in Indonesia is feared the land is not worked actively, therefore, must be transferred not later than 6 months after the issuance of the certificate to others that one domicile to the object land or or move one subdistrict area with the land object. In Article 3d Government Regulation number 41 of 1964 that the prohibition of transfer of land into an object mengabitkan absentee land. Legal protection The auction winner is causing land object into absente stated in a circular letter of the Supreme Court in 2016 for number 4 in the realm of good faith purchaser.

Pelaksanaan Lelang Terhadap Jaminan Hak Tanggungan Pada Perbankan (Studi Di Kantor Pelayanan Kekayaan Negara Dan Lelang (KPKNL) Kisaran)

Marketing (auction) is meant in the discussion of this thesis is auction of mortgage rights to land, in practice it is called auction of mortgage rights over land. Based on the fact, the objects being auctioned are land rights and apartment units as stated in the mortgage rights law and government regulations. That the objective of the auction of land rights and apartment units is carried out so that consumers can use and control the land legally according to the applicable law shall be the right of the auction winner. The mortgage auction is the sale of movable and immovable property publicly with a written or direct bid price, whether it increases or decreases in the attainment of the highest price before the auction announcement, so that the committee can close and determine the auction winner with the highest bid system from the guarantor rights auction participants. Based on the provisions of the auction implementation instructions contained in PERMENKEU number 27 / PMK.06 / 2016, the meaning of Auction is the offering of movable and immovable objects open to the public and the bidding system from the lowest to the highest bid from the auction participants, the auction bid will be closed after the auction winner the one with the highest bid value

Revenue-Optimal Auction For Resource Allocation in Wireless Virtualization: A Deep Learning Approach

Wireless virtualization has become a key concept in future cellular networks which can provide multiple virtualized wireless networks for different mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) over the same physical infrastructure. Resource allocation is a main challenging issue in wireless virtualization for which auction approaches have been widely used. However, for most existing auction-based allocation schemes, the objective is to maximize the social welfare (i.e., the sum of all valuations of winning bidders) due to its simplicity. While in reality, MVNOs are more interested in maximizing their own revenues (i.e., received payments from auction winners). However, the revenue-optimal auction problem is much more complex since the payment price is unknown before calculation. In this paper, we aim to design a revenue-optimal auction mechanism for resource allocation in wireless virtualization. Considering the complexity, deep learning techniques are applied. Specifically, we construct a multi-layer feed-forward neural network based on the analysis of optimal auction design. The neural network adopts users’ bids as the input and the allocation rule and conditional payment rule for the users as the output. The proposed auction mechanism possesses several desirable properties, e.g., individual rationality, incentive compatibility and budget constraint. Finally, simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Comparing with second-price auction and optimization-based schemes, the proposed scheme can increase the revenue by 10 and 30 percent on average, for single MVNO and multi-MVNO cases, respectively.

Kekuatan Mengikat Surat Penunjukan Penyedia Barang dan Jasa Pemerintah dalam Kontrak Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah di Masa Pandemi Covid-19

The process of determining the auction winner for a goods / services procurement project ends with the issuance of SPPBJ by PPK. The purpose of this study is to analyze the legally binding force of the Goods / Services Provider Appointment Letter (SPPBJ) in government procurement contracts of goods / services, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic. The results showed that before the contract for the procurement of goods / services was signed by the PPK and the provision of goods / services, the SPPBJ that had been issued by the function of executing the auctioned work provided that there were no objections from other participants and the rebuttal period had ended. SPPBJ acts as a binding contract, where SPPBJ is very much needed because the contract may be canceled or transferred due to refocusing of activities and relocation of budgets due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as it is today. There needs to be a more stringent regulation in the SPPBJ issuance process to deal with irregularities that may still occur, which is carried out by PPK.

Should Auctions Be Transparent?

We investigate the role of market transparency in repeated first-price auctions. We consider a setting with private and independent values across bidders. The values are assumed to be perfectly persistent over time.We analyze the first-price auction under three distinct disclosure regimes regarding the bid and award history. Of particular interest is the minimal disclosure regime, in which each bidder only learns privately whether he won or lost the auction at the end of each round. In equilibrium, the winner of the initial auction lowers his bids over time, while losers keep their bids constant, in anticipation of the winner’s lower future bids. This equilibrium is efficient, and all information is eventually revealed. Importantly, this disclosure regime does not give rise to pooling equilibria.We contrast the minimal disclosure setting with the case in which all bids are public, and the case in which only the winner’s bids are public. In these settings, an inefficient pooling equilibrium with low revenues always exists with a sufficiently large number of bidders.

Opportunity cost, inattention and the bidder’s curse

Abstract Auction winners sometimes suffer a “bidder’s curse”, paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers. This seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avoid overpaying would appear to be readily available to bidders, yet they seem to ignore it. To understand this behavior, we consider the bidders’ decisions whether to acquire information about the fixed price before bidding, in the presence of opportunity costs. Our theory introduces costly information acquisition into an auction model, with a fixed price aftermarket selling an identical good. When information about the fixed price is costly, bidders sometimes remain rationally ignorant and overbid in the auction, generating the bidder’s curse. To assess the empirical validity of our proposed explanation, we study the model’s predictions in an experiment where subjects have an opportunity cost of looking up a fixed price and bid in an auction. We find that information acquisition decreases and overbidding increases with opportunity cost as predicted. Most observed lookup behavior is rationalizable and rational ignorance reliably generates the bidder’s curse.

Tata Cara Penyitaan Dan Pelelangan Serta Perlindungan Barang Milik Wajib Pajak

Development of taxation should be increased, if not fostered community members resulted inthe taxpayer less responsible and less participate in bearing the burden of the state and in maintainingthe continuity of the national development program. To further enhance the role of the taxpayer inreceipt of state sector of taxes necessary to have a law reform national tax, with the aim of furtherconfirm the independence of the nation to finance national development with the road more on the bestof our ability through increased state revenue through taxation, simplifying the tax system that includesthe type tax, tax calculation of tax payment and tax records, fix the taxation apparatus both concerningthe work procedures, work discipline and mental tax officials, tax burden more fair and reasonable, sothat on the one hand to encourage taxpayers consciousness paying taxes and on the other hand shallThe new tax increases. Law - Tax Law has encountered several improvements and is currently in useAct 16 of 2009 which is to amend Law No. 6 of 1983. Law No.36 of 2008 is an amendment to Law No.7 of 1983 on Income Tax, and Law 42 of 2009 is the change in the Act 8 of 1983 on Value Added Taxand the Goods and Services Sales Tax on luxury goods. In practice, if done auction, items auctionedprice could be lower than the normal price. This could result in losses for taxpayers because the nutrientobject sold at below market prices. Moreover, a thing that is impossible to do by the taxpayer is toreclaim the goods that have been auctioned off, because it belongs to the auction winner based on theminutes of the auction. For that we need a legal protection for the taxpayer / undertaking Taxes on theimplementation of the seizure and auction. Taxpayer / Tax Insurers have the right remedy for the implementation of seizure and auction in question.

PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP PEMENANG LELANG SEBAGAI PEMBELI BERITIKAD BAIK YANG DIGUGAT KEMBALI

When the bank debtors did not make the payment, the bank as the holder of the mortgage is bound in the credit agreement by obtaining fulfillment of the debtor's credit through an auction process as mandated by law. Problems will arise if the auction winner cannot own or control what he has won because the debtor uses the auction process on the collateral. Then the winner of the auction is a buyer with ‘good faith’ who must be protected by law, and legal protection for the buyer with ‘good faith’ as stated in article 584 of the Civil Code of ‘good faith’ exists if the property rights are obtained through one of the means to obtain property rights, where from that article It is known that some of the transfer of existing property rights cannot be separated from the existence of the agreement law in the Civil Code. Legal remedies that can be taken by the injured parties during the auction execution by the court if there is a rebuttal due to the lawsuit made by the original owner which is later won by the court's decision of the original owner, then the auction holder can submit legal remedies to the high court to resolve the problem by way of an appeal to the Supreme Court. This is because selling through an auction is a civil selling effort and legal remedies that can be taken within the scope of civil law.

Mechanism of Execution on Land and Building Auction Objects Proposed by the Auction Winner at the District Court

This study purpose to find out and analyze the mechanism of execution on land and building uction objects proposed by the auction winner at the District Court of Gorontalo and to find out and analyze the legal protection of the auction winner toward resistance to execution of mortgage rights at the District Court of Gorontalo. The study used normtive reserch method.The legal protection of the auction winner toward resistance to execution of mortgage rights at the District Court of Gorontalo has not appeared clearly in normative law however stated in several statutes such as the auction winner rights get aution minutes, uction winner as good buyer, the auction winner may get compensate if the auction being cancelled and the resistance ctully would not suspend the execution thus the auction winner get legal certainty. Key terms :Execution, Auction Objects DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/98-15 Publication date: June 30th 2020

Going Once, Going Twice: Using Willingness-to-Accept Auctions to Promote Smoking Cessation.

Incentive-based smoking cessation interventions increase quit rates. The optimal incentive, however, is unknown. We used a willingness-to-accept (WTA) auction where smokers submitted bids indicating the incentive they would need to receive for 1 week of smoking cessation. Smokers ready to quit (n = 35) participated in a WTA auction, naming the amount they needed to be paid to quit for 1 week. Auction winners received an incentive if they successfully quit. All smokers received nicotine replacement therapy and self-help cessation materials. Carbon monoxide concentrations were monitored remotely three times during the week and in person at the final session. Participants who smoked their first cigarette within 5 min of waking demanded a significantly larger incentive in exchange for quitting than those who waited (p < .05). About 45% of auction winners quit smoking compared to 20% of nonwinners (p < .05). The cost per quit was $466 among auction winners compared to $894 among nonwinners. WTA auctions may be an effective way to determine the amount smokers need to be paid to quit, which would allow researchers to estimate the most cost-effective payment to offer as part of incentive-based smoking cessation programs. Replication evaluating longer-term cessation outcomes with larger samples is warranted. Incentive-based smoking cessation interventions increase quit rates. However, the optimal incentive is unknown. We found that a WTA auction is a feasible technique for estimating the amount smokers need to be paid to quit. Incentives are a surprisingly cost-effective way to facilitate smoking cessation because they are only paid to those who successfully quit. WTA auctions are a promising tool for determining the incentive that strikes the optimal balance between being large enough to motivate cessation, but small enough that it can be offered to the largest possible population of smokers for a given program budget.

The Execution Rights Of Dependents Online

The study was motivated by the increasingly influential technology against the executions carried out by the Bank as an alternative to the completion of bad debt. Online auction based on article 6, UUHT is the executable can cause conflict parate norms, because the existence of regulations implementing the Government-level, as article 26 UUHT, associated with article 7 (1) of law No. 12 of 2011. Parate executions required by Court Fiat. The theory is a theory of hierarchi theory of norms, legal certainty and the theory of legal protection. This study aims to examine the dependent object execution rights in the settlement effort as the execution parate bad debt at The Rural of Banks and to describe the legal protection for the winner of the auction as a result of the implementation of the execution rights of dependents. This type of research and the approach is normative, legal research with approach of legislation and cases. The result of this study gave conclusion on the dependent right execution parate conducted an online lender as an alternative to the last settlement of bad debt, for quick and efficient. Auction winner gets legal protection internally, because the lender makes a deal with the auction winner that the auction is legal transactions such as selling in General. External legal protection, the State provides legal protection to all parties in the execution of rights to dependents.&#x0D;

PERLINDUNGAN HUKUM TERHADAP PEMENANG LELANG BARANG RAMPASAN NEGARA BERUPA KENDARAAN RODA DUA YANG DIEKSEKUSI DENGAN CARA LELANG OLEH KEJAKSAAN

Prosecutors as law enforcement institutions carry out execution of state loot in various ways, one of which is auctioned for the country. One of the loot state executed by the state attorney of Bandar Lampung by means of auction is a unit of vehicle twowheeled vehicles as contained in the quote treatise Number: 908/2016 issued by the State Wealth Service office and auction of Bandar Lampung. The results of this study showed: (1) The protection of the law against the auction winners of the state booty in the form of two-wheeled vehicles executed by way of auction by the attorney in quotation treatise number: 908/2016 can be realized by enforcing legislation or special policies in order to fulfill the right of auction winners to manage and possess vehicle ownership documents both STNK and BPKB. (2) The legal certainty of the winner of the state Booty auction in the form of a two-wheeled vehicle executed by way of auction by the Prosecutor has not materialized because the auction winner cannot take care of and have the vehicle ownership documents both in the form of STNK The winner of the auction in this case only accepts auction treatise quotes number: 908/2016 which serves as a buy and sell deed.

Imperfect Competition and Rents in Labor and Product Markets: The Case of the Construction Industry

The primary goal of our paper is to quantify the importance of imperfect competition in the U.S. construction industry by estimating the size of rents earned by American firms and workers. To obtain a comprehensive measure of the total rents and to understand its sources, we take into account that rents may arise both due to markdown of wages and markup of prices. Our analyses combine the universe of U.S. business and worker tax records with newly collected records from U.S. procurement auctions. We first examine how firms respond to a plausibly exogenous shift in product demand through a difference-in-differences design that compares first-time procurement auction winners to the firms that lose, both before and after the auction. Motivated and guided by these estimates, we next develop, identify, and estimate a model where construction firms compete with one another for projects in the product market and for workers in the labor market. The firms may participate both in the private market and in government projects, the latter of which are procured through first-price sealed-bid auctions. We find that American construction firms have significant wage- and price-setting power. This imperfect competition generates a considerable amount of rents, two-thirds of which is captured by the firms. Lastly, we use the estimated model to perform counterfactual analyses which reveal how increases in the market power of firms, in the product market or the labor market, would affect the outcomes and behavior of workers and firms in the construction industry. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.