This study explores the extent to which the executive arm of government in Ghana exercises excessive power, undermining the principle of separation of powers and its implications for democratic governance. The objective is to evaluate the discretionary powers of the President in appointing key officials and to understand its impact on the autonomy of the legislative and judicial branches, political patronage, institutional effectiveness, and public trust. The methodology involved a comprehensive review of Ghana’s Fourth Republic Constitution (1992) and relevant literature to assess the legal framework and practical manifestations of executive dominance. The study critically analyzed the appointment powers vested in the President, including the roles of the Council of State, Parliament, and other advisory bodies. The results indicate that the President’s extensive appointment powers, as enshrined in the Constitution, significantly compromise the independence of other branches of government. Key appointments, such as those of the judiciary, ministers, and heads of public institutions, are heavily influenced by the executive, leading to a politicized public service and weakened institutional checks and balances. The practice of Winner-Takes-All (WTA) politics exacerbates this issue, fostering political exclusion and undermining democratic inclusivity. The conclusion highlights the need for constitutional reforms to decentralize appointment powers and enhance the role of independent bodies in the selection process. Strengthening parliamentary oversight and promoting merit-based appointments are recommended to ensure transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. Addressing these challenges is crucial for restoring public confidence in Ghana’s democratic institutions and promoting good governance.
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