572 SEER, 79, 3, 200I advicefromRussiacan allhelp 'createincentivesin favourof Europe'(p. I87). If such a policy bringsresults,in the long run 'Europe'sreluctantparticipant' (P. I73) may not be so reluctant. Overall, even given Lukashenka's apparent deafness to influence, the argument is a good one and the authors make it well. This is an excellent study, one that breaksnew ground in explaining Belarus'simportance in the new wider Europe. School ofSlavonic andEastEuropean Studies ANDREW WILSON University College London Watanabe, Koji (ed.). EngagingRussia in Asia Pacfic. Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo and New York, I999. I90 pp. Notes. Bibliographies.Appendices. $25.00 (paperback). SPECIFICALLY Asian perspectives on major issues of international politics could be a useful adjunct to the predominantlyWesternliteraturewhich has traditionallyoccupied the lion's share of discursive space in this field. This book is the work of seven scholars from China, Japan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea involved in a research project on the 'desirability'of enlistingpost-Soviet Russia's 'positiveengagement' in the economic and politicaldevelopment ofwhat they referto as 'AsiaPacific'.The project covers the period from mid-1997 to mid-iggg, although few of the contributorstake adequate account of the Russian economic crisisof August I998 and subsequentevents. Consequently, the study is based on a snapshot of economic and political reality in a relatively uneventful period in the evolution of Russian domestic and foreign policy. Fortunately,in a special appendix, two prominent Russian specialists, along with some others from Australiaand the USA, are given the opportunity to comment on the issues raisedby the main contributors.This additionhelpsto roundout the coverage in the main body of the work. On the whole, the two Chinese contributors,Yang Mingjie and LiJingjie, seem to have the most sympathetic and realisticallycritical perspective on Russia'srole inAsia Pacific.The formerarguesthatRussiamustceaseviewing the East as merely instrumentalto her primarypolicy orientation toward the West. Russia should be, as a matter of course, included in economic and security issues, such as North Korea, while KEDO and the whole matter of nucleardevelopment shouldhave been expanded to include Russia, aswell as Japan. On Japan, he maintains that domestic political considerations in Russiapreclude the sortof concessions on the so-called 'NorthernTerritories' (thefour SouthernKuril Islands)thatJapan demands in returnfor economic assistance. LiJingjie, focusing on Sino-Russian securityrelations, notes that unlikethe WestandJapan, China has not soughtto takeadvantageof present Russian internal weaknesses to exclude Moscow from strategic institutionbuilding in the region. He also envisages Chinese participation in the development of the resourceand productionpotentialof the RussianFarEast. FortheJapanese contributorsthe NorthernTerritoryissuebulksverylarge. They view it as much more of an injusticeto Japan than her exclusion from REVIEWS 573 the parts of China, Korea and Southeast Asia which Japan occupied during her imperial expansionary trajectory.There is some merit in this distinction, since Stalin'sactions in occupying the Kurils at the very end (and even after) the war were clearly a violation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty of 13 April I94I. This position, however, ignoresthe importantsecurityvalue of the islands as a gateway to the Sea of Okhotsk, where the ballistic missile submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet are deployed. Japan's sudden economic vulnerability,her enhanced securitylinkages to the USA and her participation in Washington's national and theatre missile defence schemes have undoubtedly diminished her capacity for successful dialogue with the Russians.This facthas surelyincreasedthe desirabilityof Russiaas a 'strategic partner'for China in the evolving securitymechanismsin Asia Pacific.Fewof these vital considerations are given adequate attention by the contributors. Most of them look upon Russia's inclusion in the economic and security machinery of the region as useful, but they don't seem to take Russia very seriously, arguing somewhat short-sightedly,that Moscow has little to offer economically or strategicallytoward the creation of such machinery for the foreseeablefuture. The essayswere writtenbefore the riseof V. V. Putinasfirst,RussianPrime Minister,and subsequentlyPresident.Indeed, most of the commentaryon the Russian economy ends in I997, when prospects seemed fairly good; that is, before the collapse of August I998 and the subsequent turnaroundin 2000. Much of the detailed analysis is, thus, at best dated, and at worst naively fixatedon unreliableofficialstatistics.Fortunately,the two Russiancommentatorsare able to set the recordstraighton a numberof these issuesand to give an alternativeperspective:for example, that...
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