Wholesale Price Research Articles

Vertical price transmission in agricultural markets in Ghana

The purpose of this study was to investigate the extent of price transmission along the agri-food supply chain in selected regions in Ghana. The extent of transmission was used to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the agricultural marketing systems in the area. Efficient marketing systems are expected to reduce the issue of regional price fluctuations, encourage fair income distribution throughout the supply chain, and improve food security. The preliminary time series stationarity/unit root and seasonality tests were performed using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF)/Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) and Canova-Hansen seasonal stability tests respectively. Following the detection of statistically significant threshold effects by the Supremum Likelihood Ratio (Sup-LR) tests, the extent of price transmission was investigated using two-region threshold vector error correction models. The initial tests found that the monthly wholesale, retail, and producer price series for maize, cowpea, and yam used in the study were first difference stationary rather than seasonally integrated. The findings revealed that price signals in the agri-food markets were not fully transmitted across the supply chain. Thus, the extent of price transmission was generally low, creating unexploited arbitrage opportunities along the chain. The study identified high transfer costs (proxied by the threshold parameter) and actor-specific market power (as revealed by the Granger causality test) as the primary obstacles to effective market functioning in the area. Minimizing transfer costs through infrastructural development such as improvements in road networks linking farming communities and markets, access to price information, and regular stakeholder engagements could help improve the functioning of the agri-food markets.

Level Analysıs of the Relatıonshıp Between Inflatıon, Exchange Rate, Cbrt and Fed Interest Rates of Turkısh Foreıgn Trade

Foreign trade has become one of the important elements of the financial structure of countries. Money transfer mechanisms have the power to determine the direction of trade in the world. In the study; Türkiye's exports acording to the country groups were used. In the period 2013:1-2023:11; Panel cointegration, Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) and Granger causality analyses were used to determine the relationship levels between the Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye (CBRT), Federal Reserve System (FED) interest rates, Wholesale Price Index (WPI), Consumer Price Index (CPI) and Türkiye's foreign trade. has been used. As a result of the study; Findings have been obtained that Turkish exports are not affected by the CBRT interest rate decisions and WPI in the short or long term. While the increase in FED interest rates causes a decrease in all of Türkiye's exports in the long term, it reduces exports to the Turkic Republics, OECD, EFTA, BSEC, CIS, OIC and D8G in the short term. It has been concluded that while there is a unidirectional causality relationship between the CBRT and FED interest rates, WPI and CPI and Türkiye's exports, there is a bidirectional causality relationship between the exchange rate and Türkiye's exports.

Price transmission relationships in Taiwan seafood supply chain: Tilapia (Oreochromis niloticus) and milkfish (Chanos chanos)

Tilapia and milkfish are aquaculture species associated with the highest production volume in Taiwan. With both fish species as the research focus, this study explored their price transmission relationships along the seafood supply chain. Our study results revealed that tilapia and milkfish prices had a long-run equilibrium relationship at different stages of the seafood supply chain and presented inconsistent price transmissions in the short run. There are domestic and foreign market channels for tilapia, enabling producers and wholesalers to transmit prices to retailers. By contrast, milkfish are mostly supplied to domestic markets, there is not perfect price transmission in the milkfish supply chain besides between farmers and wholesalers. An accurate price forecasting model can effectively indicate future price volatility and predict seafood prices, especially following government policy changes or in the face of external impacts. Such model can also serve as a crucial reference for future research of tilapia and milkfish industry, producers, and aquaculture farmers. Finally, seafood prices are a key determinant of fisheries and supply chain sustainability. Therefore, the stability of seafood prices, fish market wholesale pricing, and retail pricing are issues meriting continuous attention for a sustainable seafood supply chain.

Platform Information Sharing Decisions Considering Supplier Delivery Services and Encroachment Strategies

The platform often has private information about uncertain demand and determines whether to share the information with the supplier. And the supplier’s choice of delivery services and encroachment may depend on the platform’s information sharing policy. This paper examines the two-dimensional information sharing strategies in a supply chain where the supplier provides delivery services. Based on the game theory model, we find that when the platform shares unfavorable information, the motivation for the supplier’s encroachment decreases firstly. Encroachment does not reduce the level of delivery service from the supplier. Second, delivery services levels of supplier increase with channel substitution rate. Although platform sharing information lowers profits in a supply chain where the supplier provides delivery services, the platform can share information on behalf of delivery services improvement under certain conditions interestingly. Previous papers that ignore a supplier’s decision on delivery services may have underestimated the scope for platform profitable information sharing. Third, the equilibrium profits of supply chain entities present non-monotonous with respect to encroachment cost. The platform often faces a tradeoff. Sharing information, on the one hand, enables the supplier to gain a better understanding of the impact on demand and encourages enhancements to delivery services, which is advantageous to the platform. However, sharing information allows the supplier to absorb the impact of demand information by making modifications to the wholesale price and delivery services, which benefits the supplier but hurts the platform. This makes the negative effects of double marginalization worse.

Full Quantity or Full Credit? Choosing the Right Buyback Policy for a Behavioral Retailer

Problem definition: Despite extensive research on buyback contracts in supply chain management, little attention has been given to a direct comparison between a traditional full-quantity, partial-credit (FQ) buyback contract and an alternative full-credit, partial-quantity (FC) contract, especially when considering the behavioral biases of the retailer. This study aims to fill this research gap by exploring how these biases influence contract performance and offer practical guidelines for suppliers. Methodology/results: Through controlled laboratory experiments and structural model estimation, we show that the ordering decisions made by human retailers are jointly affected by three behavioral biases—loss aversion, prospective accounting, and psychological cost of inventory error—and these biases differ in magnitude between the two contracts. Incorporating these biases into a behavioral retailer’s utility function, we then analytically examine which buyback policy the supplier should choose. When the wholesale price is exogenously given, the supplier should adopt the FC contract for high-margin (low-cost) products. Conversely, when the supplier has the power to set both the wholesale and buyback prices, the FC contract is generally more beneficial for low-margin products. Finally, when the product cost is sufficiently high, a wholesale price contract may be advantageous over buyback policies. Managerial implications: The managerial implication of this paper is significant for suppliers who have to choose between different buyback policies. The paper suggests that the supplier should carefully consider not just the economic, but also the behavioral dimensions when making contract decisions, particularly when dealing with a retailer influenced by behavioral biases. Specifically, the choice between FQ and FC contracts is influenced by two key environmental factors: the production cost of the product and the nature of wholesale pricing. Understanding these elements allows suppliers to be flexible in contract choices and design appropriate return policies for their downstream supply chain partners. Funding: P. Yu was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72371038 and 72033003] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [Grant 2024CDJSKPT16]. T. Feng was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 72131004]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.0574 .

Coordination of a socially responsible two-stage supply chain under random yield and demand

This study integrates corporate social responsibility (CSR) and channel coordination in a supply chain (SC) under random yield and random demand. In the SC, a supplier with random yield determines wholesale price and production input, and a producer with CSR decides order quantity and CSR investment facing CSR-related random demand. For centralized SCs with and without CSR, we prove the unimodality of the expected profits of the SCs for generic random yield and demand, and show the uniqueness of optimal ratio of order quantity to production input quantity. We disclose that the optimal expected profit of the SC with CSR is larger than that of the SC without CSR, and the profit difference increases with CSR effort and expected yield. We also find that the optimal CSR investment increases with the expected yield. Subsequently, the Nash equilibrium solutions of decentralized SCs under wholesale price and revenue-sharing contracts are analyzed. Next, we present a revenue and CSR sharing contract to realize channel coordination and win-win of SC members and related stakeholders. Lastly, we verify theoretical statements of centralized and decentralized SCs versus three numerical examples, and present managerial insights for the effect of yield uncertainty and CSR effort.

The evolution of two‐stage production and order equilibrium in a random yield supply chain with demand information updating

AbstractThe mismatch between production, order, and demand seriously affects supply chain performance. However, most research focus on the mismatch between the retailer's order and customer's demand, which ignores the influence of the supplier's random yield on supply chain members' decision‐making. This paper investigates a two‐stage optimization problem within a two‐echelon supply chain, featuring a supplier with random yield and a retailer updating demand information in real‐time. Faced with a long production lead time, the retailer can either place advance orders at the production season's onset (first‐stage advance order) or opt for instant orders at the beginning of the sales season (second‐stage instant order). To ensure timely order fulfillment, the supplier initially employs a cost‐effective regular production mode with random yield during the production season. If yields are insufficient during sales, a pricier emergency production mode with guaranteed output becomes available. Utilizing a dynamic programming approach, we formulate the two‐stage optimization problem to derive optimal production and order decisions. Our analysis uncovers how realized random yield and stochastic market signals influence emergency production and instant order quantities in the second stage. We compare expected profits in scenarios with perfect and imperfect market signals, probing the members' preferences regarding order strategies. An intriguing finding emerges: as instant wholesale prices rising, the supplier's preferred order strategy diverges from the retailer. By strategic adjustments to the instant wholesale price, we demonstrate the potential for unanimous agreement on preferred order strategies among supply chain members — a quality enhancing the chain's flexibility and performance. Moreover, we extend the model to hybrid order strategies and identify conditions for unanimous preference among the three strategies. To bolster our theoretical findings, we provide numerical examples, lending practical support to our study.

Decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint under government subsidies

Motivated by the challenge of meeting carbon-conscious consumers and carbon regulations, this paper expounded on the decisions and coordination in low-carbon supply chains with a wholesale price constraint (WPC). The WPC is the behavior of large retailers (e.g., Walmart, Amazon, and E.Leclerc) that pursue a profit margin that does not fall below a certain level, which can affect supply chain operations. First, we develop a competition model, revealing that the WPC can result in a loss of total supply chain profit and a shortage in carbon emission reduction and then pose systematic challenges. Following this, we design a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model, showing that it can coordinate the supply chain and achieve a continuous allocation of optimal profits according to the bargaining power of firms. Lastly, our extended analysis incorporates the external influence of government subsidies for low-carbon technologies and designs the optimal subsidy mechanism. We demonstrate that, while government subsidies can reduce cost pressures on the supplier and provide incentives to reduce carbon emission, they can also induce the retailer to set a higher WPC for greater profitability, so the performance loss remains prominent. In this circumstance, we construct a Nash bargaining-based cooperation model that can coordinate the supply chain. Overall, our insights can help firms achieve scientific carbon emission reduction and formulate a reasonable WPC, as well as provide a quantitative basis for government carbon regulations.

Selling mode selection and AI service strategy in an E-commerce platform supply chain

With the advancement and wide adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology, various industries have recognized its immense potential and significance, especially in the e-commerce sector. This study considers an E-commerce Platform Supply Chain (EPSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a platform that may provide AI service. The primary purpose of this research is to explore the strategic interaction between different customer service strategies (i.e., Manual or AI service) and different selling modes (i.e., Agency or reselling mode). The research results show that if the manual service sensitivity is relatively high, the manufacturer is more willing to set a higher wholesale price. When the service efficiency attenuation effect of the manual customer towards demand is stronger, AI service would bring about more demand. Additionally, when the service efficiency attenuation effect is stronger, or it is weaker but the AI service efficiency is higher, the EPSC could utilize AI service to obtain more profit under reselling mode. Under agency mode, AI service can benefit the EPSC more when the service effect attenuation coefficient is relatively larger. Last but not least, we find that when the AI service cost coefficient is relatively small, the reselling mode can benefit the EPSC more. Most importantly, compared with manual service, AI service provides the EPSC with a new opportunity to embrace the reselling mode more.

Dual-Channel Supply Chain of Agricultural Products under Centralised and Decentralised Decision-Making

The rise of rural e-commerce, accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic, has driven agricultural development, resulting in a dual-channel model that combines offline supermarket docking with online e-commerce direct sales. Furthermore, given the perishable nature of most agricultural products, consumers exhibit a preference for high-quality logistics services. This paper analyses the dynamics of the agricultural supply chain, beginning with the “leading enterprises + farmers” production mode, and establishes two optimal decision-making models for online and offline dual-channel agricultural supply chains, incorporating logistics service levels. The first model considers centralised decision-making, where leading agricultural producers and community superstores make decisions simultaneously, aiming to maximise the overall profit of the supply chain. The second model addresses decentralised decision-making in which the producer, as the dominant player in a Stackelberg game, anticipates the reactions of retailers and sets the wholesale price, online sales price, and online logistics service level accordingly. Retailers, as followers, then determine the offline sales price and offline logistics service level based on the producer’s decisions. Finally, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the proposed models. Our findings reveal that as consumer focus on logistics service levels increases, the overall profit of the supply chain improves, and as the unit logistics cost corresponding to the level of logistics service increases, the marginal benefits of decreasing profit brought about by the increase in unit logistics cost also decrease.

Smart food‐sharing platforms for social sustainability: a heuristic algorithm approach

AbstractThis study examines how smart food‐sharing platforms (SFSP) can help reduce food waste and suggests a method for using smart contracts to share extra food among different partners effectively. For smart contracts to work automatically and prevent food wastage, artificial intelligence systems can recognize how smart clauses should be executed. This will involve analyzing several factors like the selling price, expiration dates, offers from other partners, transport costs, wholesale price, shelf life, donation rates, and demand rates. The findings indicate that adopting an SFSP is an efficient solution for preemptively adopting redistribution strategies and improving social outcomes through donations as well as achieving positive environmental outcomes through reduced waste. However, we also identify cases in which reducing food waste to achieve social sustainability may negatively impact economic performance.

Should the pricing or advertising decision come first in a supply chain with a network externality?

PurposeThis paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents.Design/methodology/approachThis paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer’s advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost.FindingsThis paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer’s share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete.Practical implicationsWhen the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers’ motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest.Originality/valueThe impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions.

Battery recycling and coordination in information leakage prevention under blockchain technology in a new energy vehicles supply chain

Retired battery recycling and information leakage prevention under blockchain introduction intertwine in the new energy vehicle (NEVs) supply chain, but rare literature has jointly investigated them. Therefore, we characterize the vehicle goodwill under recycling and marketing efforts as well as the automobile demand function with and without blockchain introduction, identify the long-run discounted profits of the manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain, and investigate the Stackelberg differential game equilibrium under four scenarios: no blockchain introduction, manufacturer introduction, manufacturer-retailer cooperative introduction, and cooperative introduction plus wholesale price discounts for preventing information leakage. The results show that the manufacturer can introduce blockchain when costs are below a certain threshold, which increases the recycling rate of decommissioned batteries and improves goodwill, consumer demand, and marginal profits for the manufacturer and retailer; the retailer participation in the introduction of blockchain solves the free-rider problem and reduces the thresholds introduced, but does not affect battery recycling, goodwill, consumer demand, and wholesale and retail prices; wholesale price discounts effectively discourage the retailer from leaking information about the manufacturer and lead to improved profits for the retailer, but results in higher earnings for the manufacturer only when discounts are below a certain threshold.

Budget Impact Analysis of Olaparib for the Management of Patients with Homologous Recombination Repair (HRR)-Mutated Castration-Resistant Metastatic Prostate Cancer in Argentina.

The aim of this study was to perform a budget impact analysis (BIA) of introducing olaparib treatment for adult patients with metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer in Argentina. A BIA model was used to estimate the cost difference between the current scenario (without olaparib) and the new scenario (incorporation of olaparib) for a third-party payer over a 5-year time horizon. The budgetary impact is estimated at the national health system level and by healthcare sectors in Argentina. Input parameters were obtained from the literature and validated by local expert opinion. Direct medical costs were obtained from both the Institute for Clinical Effectiveness and Health Policy (IECS) unit cost database and public data in Argentina. The microcosting estimation was used for key variables of the analysis. All costs are reported in US dollars (US$) as for October 2022 (1 US$ = 152.59 Argentine pesos). One-way sensitivity analyses and scenario analyses were conducted to evaluate the model robustness. The incorporation of olaparib, with a wholesale price per pack of US$3176, was associated with a weighted average of the budget impact per member per month (PMPM) of US$0.0191 for the national health system, being slightly higher than the estimated budgeted high impact threshold (US$0.0153). The PMPM budget impact for a 5-year average ranged between US$0.007 (public sector) and US$0.033 (private sector). The duration of treatment with olaparib was the most influential parameter in the budget impact results. The introduction of olaparib for the treatment of metastatic castration-resistant prostate cancer has a high budget impact for Argentina's health system. These findings are informative to support policy decisions aimed to expand the current treatment landscape for prostate cancer.

Existence of equilibrium in a dynamic supply chain game with vertical coordination, horizontal competition, and complementary goods

We consider supply chain competition and vertical coordination in a linear–quadratic differential game setting. In this setting, supply chains produce complementary goods and each of them includes a single manufacturer and a single retailer who coordinate their decisions through a revenue-sharing contract with a wholesale price and a fixed sales revenue share. We study a multiple leader-follower Stackelberg game where the manufacturers are the leaders and the retailers are the followers. Competition occurs at both levels of the supply chains. Retailers play Nash and compete in price; manufacturers also play Nash but they compete in choosing their production capacities by exploiting the equilibrium price decisions made by the retailers. We show that open-loop Nash equilibria exist when the manufacturers only receive a wholesale price (there are no longer exploiting the equilibrium price decision made by the retailers, however). When the manufacturers receive both a wholesale-price and a share of the retailers’ sales revenues, equilibria generally no longer exist. The non-existence of an equilibrium stems from the fact that the manufacturers’ instant profits are discontinuous functions of their production capacities. This discontinuity leads to a major technical difficulty in that one cannot apply standard optimal control approaches to study the equilibria of the dynamic game. Our results illustrate the possibility that competition between supply chains might not be sustainable when they sell complementary products and rely on a revenue-sharing agreement.

Heterogeneous products operation decisions of online dual-channel supply chain considering online reviews under different financing modes

This research examines the operation decisions of the online supply chain for heterogeneous products under different financing modes: e-commerce platform financing or bank financing, when manufacturers face funding constraints. Considering the manufacturer’s adoption of differentiated channel strategies when providing heterogeneous products is also considered, and combined with the impact of online reviews on consumer utility, an e-commerce platform online dual-channel financing model is constructed. The research findings are as follows: (i) when the effectiveness of online reviews differs within a certain range, the equilibrium solution exists. If the relative interest rates of the e-commerce platforms and bank change within a certain range, the same financing mode can bring mutual benefits to both the manufacturer and e-commerce platform, resulting in a “win–win” situation. (ii) If the interest rates under both financing modes are the same, the e-commerce platform financing mode has a higher wholesale price, but the difference in retail prices of distribution products depends on the costs difference between the two products, and at this point, the manufacturer will select e-commerce platform financing mode. (iii) At the optimal interest rate, when the cost of heterogeneous products is the same, the e-commerce platform consistently offers a more favorable interest rate compared to the bank’s optimal rate. when the e-commerce platform’s commission and the positive difference in product reviews is large, the manufacturer will choose e-commerce platform financing mode. Under the e-commerce platform financing mode, both the manufacturer and e-commerce platform are willing to provide lower retail prices to attract more consumers.

Retailer anticipated regret under carbon tax policy

Environmental policies such as carbon tax implementation significantly impact the technology choice and cost structure of the upstream manufacturer, affecting the downstream retailer’s the procurement decision and risk management in a sustainable supply chain. This study constructs a single-manufacturer-single-retailer supply chain model constrained by carbon tax policies to analyze the influence of retailer’s anticipated regret on the supply chain operation and environmental performance. Utilizing game theory, the research finds that the retailer’s anticipated regret behavior suppresses manufacturer’s willingness to invest in the green initiative, resulting in a non-monotonic effect on profits. When the retailer’s regret level is low and her demand for eco-friendly products is also low, the manufacturer tends to reduce the green investment and increase the wholesale price to maximize the marginal return. Although such the anticipated regret behavior by the retailer may stimulate the manufacturer’s profit growth, it reduces retailer’s profit. Conversely, as the retailer’s regret level increases, the manufacturer increases the green investment and reduces the wholesale price to induce higher procurement by the retailer, leading to a decline in the manufacturer’s profit but an upward trend in the retailer’s profit. This discovery suggests that the upstream supply chain manager, should closely the monitor retailer’s potential anticipated regret and adjust the corresponding strategy accordingly. Furthermore, the study finds that the lower level of retailer’s anticipated regret positively impact environmental behavior, offering the policymaker a new perspective on promoting the green supply chain practice.

Optimizing traceability scheme in a fresh product supply chain considering product competition in blockchain era

Fresh product traceability plays an integral role in ensuring food safety. Recently, many firms have introduced blockchain technology (BCT) for product traceability to guarantee product authenticity and consumer rights. However, introduction of the new technology has also intensified the competition among fresh products. Meanwhile, previous studies on traceability strategies only considered the impact of traceability cost and ignored the issue of increased product competition in blockchain era. Driven by these problems, we build a game-theoretical model to analyze the optimization of traceability schemes for both low-end fresh products (LEFP) and high-end fresh products (HEFP) in a fresh product supply chain (FPSC) in a competitive environment. Moreover, this paper investigates the impact of power structure on traceability schemes and identifies the conditions under which one scheme outperforms the others. We find that the cost per unit of product input has no effect on the traceability decision of the FPSC. Nonetheless, the introduction of BCT increases the number of consumers who choose LEFP and raises the selling price and wholesale price of corresponding products. Finally, from the supply chain perspective, it is best to adopt the same traceability scheme for both products. This study sheds light on the use of BCT in traceability can provide enhanced product authenticity and consumer rights while increasing product competition and demonstrates the significance of traceability schemes in the FPSC.

Competitive pricing and seed node selection in a two-echelon supply chain

This paper presents a bi-level game model for pricing in a supply chain where the manufacturer (He) is the leader, and the retailer (She) is the follower. The leader decides on the wholesale price, and the follower decides on the selling price and selects seed nodes. The main idea of the model is that the marketing strategy used for promoting the product is focused on giving free samples to potential customers. Hence, the importance of analyzing a social network becomes evident. To maximize her profit, the retailer decides based on three factors: first, the leader's decision about wholesale price; second, the social network structure, which is critical for selecting the seed nodes; and third, people's valuation of the product. Therefore, a bi-level Mixed-Integer Nonlinear Programming model is developed to consider the social binds between potential customers. To solve this model, we employ a meta-heuristic algorithm. Finally, the effect of the model's parameters on decision variables and the objective functions is discussed. Based on the analysis and discussions, the production cost has a prominent impact on the players’ decisions and profits. Furthermore, instead of spending all the marketing budget on increasing seed nodes, it is suggested that they be spent on market research and improving good publicity. Moreover, deciding whether the players want to maximize the profit or market penetration is required before diving into decision-making.

Manufacturer Encroachment on a Sustainable Supply Chain under Asymmetric Green Information

This paper investigates manufacturer encroachment on a sustainable supply chain, where the manufacturer holds exclusive information on product greenness and is responsible for both corporate social responsibility (CSR) and greening. The manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game whereby CSR effort and wholesale price serve as joint green signals. Findings reveal that, firstly, encroachment induces higher CSR efforts from manufacturers. When customers exhibit a strong CSR preference, the resulting CSR increment leads to increased offline demand and drives up both wholesale and retail prices in a mutually beneficial manner. This phenomenon is referred to as the CSR effect, yielding a win-win encroachment. Secondly, when signaling product greenness to highly CSR-sensitive customers, the high-greenness manufacturer principally distorts her CSR effort downward to an extent unprofitable for the low-greenness manufacturer to mimic and subordinately distorts the wholesale price downward to counter CSR-induced demand decrement and mitigate CSR cost pass-through downstream. Finally, the win-win encroachment pattern is characterized by encroachment profit and signal expense sharing, with encroachment strengthening downward-distorted signaling while signaling weakens the CSR effect. These insights contribute valuable guidance for green manufacturers in CSR decision-making, which functions as a component of green signaling and facilitates transitioning to dual-channel sustainable supply chains.