White Voters Research Articles

POSTRACIAL POLITICS?

AbstractThis paper examines the claim that the historical election of Barack Obama demonstrated a new era of postracial politics in America (Ceaser et al., 2009). Drawing on arguments in the recent American political development literature (King and Smith, 2005; Novkov 2008), this research proposes a racial tension theory to link Obama’s White voter support to the deep-seated racial tension at the state level. In doing so, a theoretic and empirical solution is offered to solve the problem of high correlations between the major contextual variables measuring Black density (Key 1949), racial diversity (Hero 1998), state political culture (Elazar 1984), and social capital (Putnam 2000). The converged findings based on multiple methods clearly show that the state-level White support for Obama in both 2008 and 2012 was directly related to the racial tension of a state. In contrast, racial tension did not affect the White vote for John Kerry, the Democratic nominee in the 2004 Presidential election.

Racial Imagery and Support for Voter ID Laws

The limited research on public support for voter identification (ID) laws suggests that informational cues can shape opinions about the topic. We test whether two forms of cues — framing and racial imagery — affect support for voter ID laws, both individually and in conjunction with one another. Our data come from a 2x3 survey experiment embedded in the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) (N=1,436) randomizing question wording (balanced framing versus “stripped” wording) and racial imagery (African American voter, White voter, or no image). We find that both framing and imagery influence opinion. Imagery also influences the extent to which racial resentment predicts opinion among White respondents. The effects of imagery on opinion emerge under stripped wording but not balanced framing.

Quantifying the Effect of Age Structure on Voter Registration

ObjectiveWhere population subgroups have distinctly “young” or “old” adult age distributions, their observed overall rates of political participation may differ for this demographic reason. Age standardization can quantify the proportion of an observed difference in registration rates attributable to age structural differences between two populations, thereby facilitating comparison of political participation across subgroups.MethodsI illustrate the derivation and interpretation of an age‐standardized registration rate. This rate weights a set of observed age‐specific registration rates with a standard age distribution to create a hypothetical total (all‐ages) registration rate, to afford an undistorted comparison of Hispanic and non‐Hispanic white voter registration.ResultsFor seven communities studied here, differences in adult age structure account for as much as one‐third of the observed difference in the voter registration rates of adult Hispanics and non‐Hispanic whites in a community. The effect of age structure is most apparent in those communities registering substantial influxes of young‐adult Hispanics.ConclusionAge standardization is a useful technique to control for differences in population structure that may obscure a comparison of political participation across subgroups.

Racial stereotypes, racial context, and the 2008 presidential election

As the first African-American nominee for president of a major political party, Barack Obama's campaign and ultimate victory reminded voters, scholars, pundits, and the press of the centrality of race in American political life. Speculation by observers of all types centered around the potential impact of race as an individual psychological prejudice and/or as a geographic/contextual factor. These two themes parallel different leading scholarly treatments of race and racism in the USA. Rather than choose one theme or the other, in this paper, we bring both traditions together in a unified analysis of white voter response to Obama. We find strong evidence that the level of prejudice toward African-Americans held by whites affected their evaluations of Obama as well as their probability of voting for him. In contrast, we find little evidence that whites responded to the racial context of their immediate geographic environment.

Race, Class, and Values in Post-New Deal Presidential Politics: Inverted Class Loyalties as a Trend in Presidential Elections, 2000–2012

This article analyzes the role of race, class, and values as a determinant of voting behavior in recent presidential elections. Over the past decade the What's the Matter with Kansas? thesis has been cited to argue that the culture wars over social issues (civil rights, homosexual rights, feminism, gun control) have inverted the class determinant of partisan choice to the point where lower-income white voters favor the Republican Party while professionals have shifted toward the Democratic Party. The article concludes that there is significant evidence that the class loyalties as determinants of partisan identity established by the New Deal have been superseded by values-driven imperatives, which are themselves trumped by racial identities. As a result, traditionally Democratic pre-materialist white blue-collar constituencies have moved toward the Republican Party, while the opposite has occurred in traditionally Republican post-materialist suburban constituencies.

Substance and Symbolism: Race, Ethnicity, and Campaign Appeals in the United States

Using data from the 2002 Wisconsin Advertising Project and a Democratic direct mailing firm, we ask if candidates publicly court African American and Hispanic voters through the inclusion of these groups in their campaign advertisements or through appeals to their substantive policy interests. We find evidence that Democratic and Republican candidates make symbolic and substantive appeals only when these appeals are very unlikely to be viewed by White voters. These findings lend credence to studies that conclude that candidates are hesitant to publicly court minority voters due to concerns that such activities may harm their existing electoral coalitions, particularly their standing with White voters.

The Jewish Vote 2012

In november 2012, Jews voted overwhelmingly for Barack Obama and for Democrats at the state and local levels once again. Exit polls indicated that between 69 percent and 70 percent of Jews voted to reelect President Obama. Jewish Republicans predicted that Obama’s disagreements with Israeli policies would cost him heavily, but in fact most Jews did not cast their vote primarily on Israel-related issues: most Jews identified the economy and health care as their primary concerns in exit polls.The majority of voters in most of Obama’s other core constituent groups, such as the African American and Latino voting blocs, would directly benefit from Democratic Party economic policies. In contrast, Jewish voters’ loyalty to the Democratic Party is unusual because the majority of Jews are prosperous enough such that voting for candidates who support higher taxes to care for the poor and the powerless constitutes a consistent vote against their own narrowly construed economic interests. The election left many Jews wondering why so few relatively prosperous, white voters are willing to vote like we do.Yet we should also add a cautionary note: the percentage of Jews voting for Obama was down about 5 percent from 2008. Although Tikkun does not endorse candidates or political parties, the struggle we’ve been waging for the heart of the Jewish community will almost certainly have a political impact in the future. There are two major forces pulling younger Jews to the Right. In the Orthodox world, an uncriti cal support for the government of Israel is reinforced weekly in synagogues that pray not only for Israel as “the beginning of the flourishing of our redemption” but also for “the defense forces of Israel” on whom God’s blessing is invoked. Non-religious younger Jews — for whom the countervailing influence of Torah (with its command to love the stranger) and the knowledge of Jewish oppression in the past have largely disappeared — may increasingly be drawn to the dominant individualism, exhortation to “look out for number one,” materialism, and lack of interest in the well-being of others that is the central message of capitalist society. As a result they may then begin to vote more in accord with a narrow vision of their economic interests, and hence become a less reliable constituency for liberal politics. This is just one of many reasons why liberals and progressives should support our efforts (through Tikkun and the Network of Spiritual Progressives) to revive a spiritual progressive worldview, not only for Jews, but for everyone.

The Criminal Caste

The Criminal Caste

New Deal Liberalism and Racial Liberalism in the Mass Public, 1937–1968

Few transformations have been as important in American politics as the incorporation of African Americans into the Democratic Party over the course of the 1930s–60s and the Republican Party's growing association with more conservative positions on race-related policies. This paper traces the relationship between New Deal economic liberalism and racial liberalism in the mass public. A key finding is that by about 1940, economically-liberal northern white Democratic voters were substantially more pro-civil rights than were economically-conservative northern Republican voters. While partisanship and civil rights views were unrelated among southern whites, economic conservatives were more racially conservative than their economically liberal counterparts, even in the south. These findings suggest that there was a connection between attitudes towards the economic programs of the New Deal and racial liberalism early on, well before national party elites took distinct positions on civil rights. Along with grassroots pressure from African American voters who increasingly voted Democratic in the 1930s–40s, this change among white voters likely contributed to northern Democratic politicians' gradual embrace of civil rights liberalism and Republican politicians' interest in forging a coalition with conservative white southerners. In attempting to explain these linkages, I argue that the ideological meaning of New Deal liberalism sharpened in the late 1930s due to changes in the groups identified with Roosevelt's program and due to the controversies embroiling New Dealers in 1937–38.

Racial Context and the 2008 and 2012 US Presidential Elections

White voter support was a key to Barack Obama’s historical win of the Presidency in 2008, which begs the question of whether America had entered into an era of post-racial politics. Obama’s white support, however, declined in his 2012 reelection. To account for the variation in Obama’s white voter support in states, this article examines the previous contextual explanations of white voting behavior. Drawing on arguments in the recent American political development literature (King and Smith 2005, Novkov 2008), this research proposes a new racial tension theory to link Obama’s white voter support to the deep-seated racial tension at the state level. In doing so, a theoretic and empirical solution is offered to solve the problem of high correlations between the major contextual variables measuring black density (Key 1949), racial diversity (Hero 1998), state political culture (Elazar 1984) and social capital (Putnam 2000). The converged findings based on multiple methods clearly show that the state-level white support for Obama in both 2008 and 2012 was directly related to the racial context of a state. Overall this study reveals the enduring, rather than vanishing, effect of race.

Catholic Partisanship and the Presidential Vote in 2012: Testing Alternative Theories

AbstractCatholics have long been an important force in American electoral politics. Once a vital and loyal component of the New Deal Democratic coalition, Catholics in recent decades have shifted their political loyalties away from the Democratic Party to more of a partisan equilibrium. Indeed, by 2012, the White Catholic vote had become predominantly Republican, even in a year in which a Democrat was re-elected to the White House, and on balance party identification among these voters showed a slight Republican edge. Only the growing contingent of Latino Catholics kept the national vote of the entire religious community closely balanced. Despite widespread agreement among scholars that the partisan behavior of Catholics has changed, there is much less consensus on the nature of that change, its permanence, and its causes. We review the historic patterns of Catholic partisanship and voting behavior, discuss three major perspectives on electoral change among Catholics, and test these perspectives with data drawn from the 2012 National Survey of Religion and Politics, with a rich battery of religious measures. We find that socioeconomic factors, religious perspectives, and issue preferences among Catholics all influence partisanship and vote choice, reducing any true “distinctiveness” of the “Catholic vote.”

Taking Minorities for Granted? Ethnic Density, Party Campaigning and Targeting Minority Voters in 2010 British General Elections

There are many reasons why political parties can take the racial and ethnic minority voters for granted in Britain. They vote overwhelmingly and loyally for the left-wing parties, have fewer resources than white voters and they mostly live in geographical clusters giving them electoral leverage in a limited number of seats. Yet, minorities participate as much as the white population and seem to do more so in areas of ethnic concentration. Using the British Election Study, Ethnic Minorities British Election Study, British campaign spending data and the electoral agent's survey from 2010 election, we explore the relationship between party campaigning, individual mobilisation and ethnic population density. We find that although minorities perceive less contact, parties campaign just as hard (or harder) in areas of minority concentration and they target minority voters in these areas, However, minority voters living outside of local concentrations of population may experience less contact from parties.

Issue Voting and Immigration: Do Restrictionist Policies Cost Congressional Republicans Votes?

ObjectiveI test the hypothesis that Latino voters were less likely to support Republican incumbents with strong anti‐immigration records in the 2006 congressional elections in comparison to Republicans with less restrictive records. I also test whether non‐Hispanic white voters were similarly sensitive to incumbent immigration records when determining vote choice.MethodTo examine these questions, I created hierarchical models in which incumbent immigration records, individual views on immigration, and an interaction between the two were used to predict vote choice in the 2006 midterm elections. Individual‐level data were provided by the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study and incumbent immigration records were provided by NumbersUSA.ResultsThis analysis found little or no evidence suggesting that Latino voters are less likely to support Republican incumbents with anti‐immigration records. There was evidence suggesting that vote choice among non‐Hispanic whites was influenced by incumbent records on immigration, but the effect varied according to the respondent's own views on immigration.ConclusionThis study found no evidence that incumbent Republicans could increase their share of the Latino vote by embracing less restrictive immigration policies. In fact, doing so may cost them votes among non‐Hispanic whites.

White Voters' Choice in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

White Voters' Choice in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election

Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites

This study inquires as to the nature of racial regularities in residual voting that exist under post–Help America Vote Act conditions. Even with modern, optical scan voting machines, there were significant differences among black, Hispanic, and white residual vote rates in the city of Chicago during the Municipal Election of 2011 and the Illinois General Election of 2010. Moreover, these residual vote rates varied with the availability of, respectively, black, Hispanic, and white candidates for office. Hispanics often had the highest residual vote rates among the three major race groups in Chicago, and there were instances in the aforementioned 2011 and 2010 Chicago elections in which a group of voters chose not to vote for anyone rather than vote for a dominant candidate of a different race than the voters themselves. Thus, even holding constant electoral administration and voting technology, the role of race in residual voting remains prominent.

Blood donations motivators and barriers: A descriptive study of African American and white voters

African American adults are half as likely to donate blood than whites. In order to understand this difference, African American and white participants completed a survey regarding demographics, medical and donation history, and motivators and barriers. The most agreed upon motivators to blood donation were more convenient place and times, being asked and taking less than hour. Motivator responses which differed by race included donating for infectious disease test and reward, and assurance donating is safe. The most agreed upon barriers were not having a convenient place, not knowing where (response differed by race) and fear of needles, pain and feeling faint.

Helping Hispanic-America vote? Ballot technology, voter fatigue and HAVA 2002

Lott (2009) finds that nonvoted ballot rates for down-ballot races are greater than those for presidential races, and newer technologies that reduce nonvoted presidential ballots create even greater rates of nonvoting down-ballot than the same older voting technologies. The conclusion is momentous: adopting voting technologies that minimize under-voting in presidential races actually increases under-voting across all races on the same ballot. This study extends Lott's by examining the Congressional vote on the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA 2002), which established a program to provide funds to states in order to replace punch card voting systems with newer technologies. We focus on the racial component of Lott's finding, specifically that Hispanic-American voters exhibit greater rates of voter fatigue than do white voters. This study posits that, given the large Hispanic-American populations in California and Texas and their propensity to support Democrats in these states, House Democrats from these states would not view the HAVA 2002 as favourably as House Democrats from other parts of the US. Among other results presented here, the data show that support for HAVA 2002 among California and Texas House Democrats was 11.6 percentage points below that of House Democrats from the other 48 states.

Disenfranchisement Through Divorce? Estimating the Effect of Parental Absence on Voter Turnout

Does growing up without both parents decrease voter turnout? I extend and improve upon earlier answers to this question. First, I estimate the long-term effects on voter turnout via analysis of a nationally representative sample of adults. Second, I exploit the quasi-natural experiment of parental death to correct for non-random selection into parental absence. Contrary to previous research, I find no evidence that growing up in an absent-parent household effects white voter turnout. I also present evidence suggesting the negative effects are limited to black voters.

Racial Salience and the Obama Vote

Barack Obama's successful campaign for president renewed both scholarly and popular interest in understanding the extent to which race remains a barrier for African American candidates in American elections. Despite a substantial body of work that indicates that African Americans do face significant barriers to winning White votes, initial interpretations of the 2008 election results suggest that the Obama vote was not depressed because of his race. In this paper, I introduce a relatively unobtrusive measure of racial salience to examine whether these initial interpretations are correct. I find that when race was a more salient factor for White voters, they were substantially less likely to vote for Obama and were more likely to think that Obama was focusing attention on African Americans during the campaign. I estimate that the salience of race for some Whites may have cost Obama as much as 3% of the White vote. Thus, this paper indicates that even in Obama's historic 2008 campaign, African American candidates continue to face barriers to winning White support.

Who loses in direct democracy?

We examine the success of California’s black, Latino, and Asian voters in ballot proposition elections, showing that minority voters lose more often than whites across all ballot propositions, and that this disadvantage is not limited to a small subset of racially-targeted propositions. Minority voters are 2–5 percentage points less likely than otherwise-similar white voters to be on the winning side of ballot propositions. These differences persist after excluding racially-targeted propositions because minority voters are more likely to lose on several issues including elections, the environment, health, housing, taxes, and transportation. We demonstrate that race is more important than class in describing which voters lose.