Since the appointment of Karel Van Miert as Commissioner for Competition in 1994, the EU’s Directorate General for Competition (DG-Comp) has gained a reputation as having more vigorous competition enforcement than most other regulatory authorities around the world, including the US Department of Justice (DOJ). This perception is even stronger when it comes to cartel enforcement under Article 101 of the European Commission Treaty. For example, one of the current authors’ previous analysis comparing DOJ fines to EU fines showed that the EU had imposed more than twice as many fines on cartels than the DOJ over the 1994–2014 period. Our data also showed that, over the same period, the EU had issued more than five times as many zero-amount fines than the DOJ (for companies that cooperate with investigations), likely due in part to the strong whistleblower policy adopted in the EU in 2004.1 In this paper, we apply a quantitative approach to assess the EU’s cartel enforcement activity over the terms of its last five Commissioners for Competition, drawing on data publicly available from the EC website starting in 1994.
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