588 seer, 87, 3, July 2009 Mexico,Korea orIsrael,reinforces theroleofexternal openness, thestrategic importance of internationally competitive manufacturing sectors, as well as the necessity of Western-type institutional endowments such as security of ownership rights and theruleoflaw. A key part of such a developmental strategy is a statecharacterized bystrong administrative and legalcapacities, and exhibiting majorregulatory functions as emphasizedby theliterature on policyreforms. Such a stateis able toresist attempts at capturing itbyprivate actorsorvestedinterests, yet keepsitself out of mostmarkettransactions. This is labelleda core state by Csaba (p. 112), following theconcepts ofJamesBuchananand MancurOlson. Only sucha statecan effectively establish, operateand monitor markets of goodsand services, and maintain internal security, theruleoflawand market competition. This is a relatively small(interms ofGDP-proportionate redistribution ) butadministratively strong stateconstrained byconstitutional checks and balances. This is,ofcourse,nothing elsebutthedominant Western developmental trajectory ofthepost-war era.In thissense,catching-up implies theadoption ofa Western-type institutional framework, whether in Centraland Eastern Europe, East Asia or Latin America. Consequently, thereis not much sensetalking about post-Communist transition as such any longer:Central and EasternEurope develops(or not)just like any otherdeveloping(or stagnating) partoftheglobaleconomy. Development pathsseemtoconverge within limited institutional variety andthemosteffective institutional solutions seem to be essentially uniform. Well,it mightsounda bit boring,but the good newsis that- withmoreor lessadjustment efforts, depending on the structure ofphysical andhumanendowments ofthenationaleconomy - any country can follow suit. The new,extended version ofthevolumeaddstwochapters totheoriginal 2005edition. Bothofthemdeal withthemechanisms and future perspectives oftheEU: chapterninereinterprets 'rules-based behaviourin Europe' with particular emphasison rules-based fiscalpolicies;whereaschaptertenprovides 'post-crisis perspectives on thefuture oftheEU', focusing on, among otherquestions,issuesof enlargement. The two new chaptersservewell theoriginal purposeof thebook: providing a theoretically well-established, institutionally focusedpoliticaleconomyapproachto the transformation of Centraland EasternEurope,and reinterpreting itin a Europeanand global context. Budapest Zoltán Ádám Procaccia, Uriel. RussianCulture, Property Rights, and theMarketEconomy. CambridgeUniversity Press,Cambridgeand New York,2007.xi + 297 pp. Illustrations. Notes.Appendix.Bibliography. Index.£45.00: $75.00. Uriel Procaccia, who teacheslaw in Israel and New York,led ca short courseinMoscowon whatwaslooselytermed "capitalist law'" in 1995(p. 1). He statesthathis students revealedthat'No one evertookthetroubleto REVIEWS 589 familiarize themwiththefountainhead ofall privatelaw - contract' (p. 1). He concludedthatthis'fountainhead' did notexistin Russiaat all. Instead, hediscovered 'theRussianantipathy tocontracts.' (p.5).Thisvolumeexplains thesourcesofthatantipathy. ProcacciaarguesthatRussia did notbenefit fromone of the important products oftheRenaissanceand Reformation - the'doctrine ofthelaw of contract (p. 170).He traceshow sixcultural wellsprings in theWestnurtured contractlaw: 'humanism, individualism, crumbling authority, the driveto accumulate worldly riches, epistemic beliefs based on scienceand rationality, and thetriumphant riseoftheword'(p. 280). He devotesa chapterto each. He delineates theemergence ofeach principle in theWestand thenexplains its failureto take root in Russia. 'When at long last theseculturalideas started to movealongthearduousmigration pathintoRussianterritory, the move may have been too tardy,too lily-livered, and altogether futileand wane' (p. 280). Procacciathreadshisthesisthrough metaphysical, legal,economic,scientificand artistic trends.He uses fiftytwo illustrations (regrettably dark)to categorize Russiaas an 'iconsociety' devoidofhumanism, perspective based on theinsights oftheScientific Revolution, orthetriumph ofcompeting texts overstaticimages.He maintains that'an "icon society"cannotbe [.. .] a "contract society'"(p.6). He comparesRussianicons to Westernpaintings from theRenaissancethrough theDutchMasterstodemonstrate thatRussian Orthodoxy precludedtheendorsement of severalconceptsunderlying contract lawintheWest.He stresses Russians'aversion towealthand happiness, and preference forpoverty and suffering. He opines,'Certainly, [.. .] most Russianshavealwaysbeen,and still aretoday, deeplyimmersed ina hopeless quagmireofsuffering and self-denial' (p. 169). Ificonsin MoscowgaveProcacciaa sinking feeling, St Petersburg evoked outrageat this'cityofdespots','thewretched siteofPeter'scapital'(p. 131). As a member oftheRationality Centerat HebrewUniversity, Procacciafinds Peter's geographically irrationalchoice appalling. BartolomeoRastrelli's WinterPalace embodies,in Procaccia's rendering, the bastardization of Western concepts andtheRussianpreference forauthority through hypertrophieprocedure attheexpenseofsubstantive rights, thesine quanon ofcontract law. 'Rastrelli's architecture [.. .] is a self-aggrandizing style ofornament that departsnotonlyfrom thearchitectural paradigmoftheRenaissance[.. .] It is likecodifying procedure without substance[.. .] likeenshrining thefaçade ofpowertotheneglect ofitsjustifying cause' (p. 141).He explains, 'In purely procedural systems, individual subjects aretreated as iftheir rights dependon thegoodwilland discretion oftheirsecularor religious pastors'(p. 117).He admits there weremultiple lawcodesinRussia,butinsists they alwaysfocused onprocedures. Meanwhile, theRenaissancepermitted 'substance topermeate thelaw and thusto erodetheprocedural conceptofunmitigated authority' (p.us). The fate of Westernoil companies' contractssince 2000 and the lavish renovationof the Senate buildingin St Petersburg to house the 590 SEER, 87, 3, JULY 2OO9 Constitutional Court validateProcacciai characterization of Russia as a stubbornly 'concessionist state5 allergicto sovereign, privatecontracts and addictedtoornateprocedure oversubstantive justice.Russianspecialists may findProcacciai richsurvey ofthedevelopment...