Weapons Innovation Research Articles

North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs: Foreign absorption and domestic innovation

ABSTRACT North Korea’s strategic weapons innovation system is exemplary of an authoritarian mobilization model. The top leadership prioritizes the program and mobilizes the country’s science, technology, and heavy industrial resources around key programs. Key to success are investments in a defense industrial infrastructure that runs from basic research and development to applied R&D, product development, and linked production capability. Although foreign borrowing is important, the country’s nuclear and missile programs would not have gelled in the absence of complementary domestic investments.

The decline of South Africa’s defence industry

ABSTRACT The growth of South Africa’s apartheid era defence industry was propelled by international isolation following the 1984 UN arms embargo and revealed military technology deficiencies during the border war. Weapons innovation became an imperative, fostering development of frontier technologies and upgrades of legacy platforms that drove expansion in arms exports. However, this golden era was not to last. The 1994 election of the country’s first democratic government switched resources from military to human security. The resultant defence-industrial stagnation continues to this day, exacerbated by corruption, unethical sales, and government mismanagement. The industry’s survival into the 2020s cannot be assured.

Russia’s novel weapons systems: military innovation in the post-Soviet period

ABSTRACT This article identifies the principal drivers of Russian military innovation involving five novel nuclear, conventional, or dual-capable delivery systems—Avangard, Burevestnik, Poseidon, Kinzhal, and Tsirkon—and analyzes the interplay between these drivers over the course of the innovation process. It does so by means of a structured, focused comparison of the five systems and their progression to date, distinguishing “innovation” from concepts like “invention” and “diffusion,” and defining the stages of an innovation life cycle. The article also distills prior research on Soviet weapons innovation and investigates its continued validity. The analysis finds external factors to be central in driving innovation, specifically Russian threat perceptions around (1) US missile-defense development and (2) the development of Western conventional warfighting capabilities. It also discusses the roles of a range of internal factors, including industry and high-level political support for specific systems, the availability of Soviet-legacy research and engineering initiatives, and the appeal of anticipated industrial and ancillary benefits from the development of specific systems. Cooperation between design bureaus and other industry players is also examined, as is the role of status considerations in driving innovation. Finally, the relative importance of individual factors in explaining innovation is shown to differ across the systems. The structured comparison identifies the continued validity of certain aspects of past studies on Soviet military innovation, while also bringing to light new insights about contemporary Russian weapons innovation.

TRIPS Through A Military Looking Glass

The paper draws on an argument from Hanns Ullrich that the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) suffers for a legitimacy gap. This gap takes the form of an external conditioning of states’ sovereignty over innovation in markets. The paper argues there is a less-discussed and somewhat darker legitimacy gap of TRIPS. This gap relates to the US national security state (NSS) and its use of intellectual property to regulate globally innovation in weapons systems. The paper traces the links between the NSS, intellectual property and weapons innovation from World War II to the present day. TRIPS has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the NSS because it has failed to hold back China’s innovation in defense-sensitive areas such as 5G technology. Drawing on the work of Carl Schmitt, the paper offers a phenomenological reading of the NSS’ view of legitimacy. The paper finishes with an examination of the implications of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction for the future of intellectual property and the US-China relationship.

Death Dust: The Little-Known Story of U.S. and Soviet Pursuit of Radiological Weapons

Since September 11, 2001, most expert commentary on radiological weapons has focused on nonstate actors, to the neglect of state-level programs. In fact, numerous countries in the past have expressed interest in radiological weapons; a number have actively pursued them; and three tested them on multiple occasions before ultimately deciding not to deploy the weapons. Why is so little known about these false starts, especially outside the United States? Are such weapons more difficult to manufacture than depicted by science-fiction authors and military pundits? Are radiological weapons a thing of the past, or do they remain an attractive option for some countries? A comparative analysis of the previously underexplored cases of radiological weapons programs in the United States and the Soviet Union illuminates the drivers and limitations of weapons innovation in one specific nuclear sector. An examination of the rise and demise of radiological weapons programs in both countries also points to circumstances in the future that might prompt renewed interest on the part of some states in radiological weapons and proposes steps that might be undertaken to reduce the possibility of their production, deployment, and use.

Nuclear Superiority in the Age of Parity: US Planning, Intelligence Analysis, Weapons Innovation and the Search for a Qualitative Edge 1969–1976

ABSTRACTThis paper argues that between 1969 and 1976 US policy-makers actively sought to transcend nuclear parity. The Nixon and Ford administrations demonstrated increasing uneasiness toward nuclear parity and yet, proved unwilling to match the Soviet Union quantitatively. In the search for an answer to the question of what strategic superiority was in the age of parity, they came to understand it in distinctly qualitative terms, adopting a number of decisions related to nuclear planning, intelligence analysis of the nuclear balance, and nuclear weapons innovation and modernization, aimed at securing a qualitative edge over the USSR.

Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry (review)

Reviewed by: Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry Byron K. Callan Arms and Innovation: Entrepreneurship and Alliances in the Twenty-First Century Defense Industry. By James Hasik. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-226-31886-8. Tables. Notes. Index. Pp. 189. $35.00. Small business firms have played an important role in the development of contemporary weapons systems and technologies. This is particularly true of sectors where there has been rapid technological change, such as the aircraft industry in the first part of the last century and more recently in defense information technologies. But even in seemingly mature markets, small firms can play critical roles engendering major military innovation. For example, Higgins Industries of New Orleans developed the Eureka workboat in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The Eureka was ideally suited for the bayous and swamps of Louisiana where it was initially used in logging operations. In 1939, Higgins received a contract from the Navy for an experimental landing craft based on the Eureka and subsequent designs were critical to the conduct and execution of U.S amphibious operations in the Second World War. [End Page 1028] James Hasik's Arms and Innovationhas a contemporary focus, but provides a useful framework for historians to consider the structure and evolution of defense industries, and the role of small enterprises in developing weapons and supporting products. Hasik uses six case studies of current or recent U.S. defense procurements to discuss the role of small firms in the arms industry. These vignettes on weapons such as the Predator unmanned air vehicle, the Joint Direct Attack Munition, and the Space-Based Infrared Sensor are used to illustrate why small firms succeeded, or were unsuccessful, in developing and producing defense products. The case studies are well chosen as they include commercial products adopted for military use, and purpose-built weapons and software products Hasik identifies three circumstances where small firms could be "relatively advantaged" over larger enterprises. The first is "innovative" markets that don't require capital-intensive research and development and for which the vector of technological change is uncertain. Another is in circumstances where a high degree of skill is needed but where ensuing production runs could be low. The third is where there are already large players but where there is room for smaller firms to prosper. He also discusses circumstances where small companies should consider an alliance with larger enterprises. The audiences Hasik directs his recommendations to are aspiring and current defense contractors both large and small and government procurement and policy personnel. Hasik does not believe that small firms hold all the keys to weapons innovation and indeed the purpose of his study of the Joint Direct Attack Munition is to highlight instances where a small firm was not as well equipped as a large one (in this case Boeing) to undertake high level serial production of a weapon. However, he believes "small firms have an important role to play in the cycles of military-industrial development…" There were some areas that Hasik could have been explored in greater detail. Little was said about how small firms were able to make their skills and products initially known to potential military customers. In some instances, the U.S. Congress has played a critical role in shepherding and protecting smaller firms and this could have been discussed, particularly in the instance of the Predator program. And inter-service rivalries can also help a smaller firm find willing new customers. Little was said about the funding and policy initiatives that could provide entrance points for smaller innovative firms in defense markets. However, Arms and Innovationdeserves a place in the library of anyone interested in military procurement and weapons development. For the historian, the framework Hasik used may be helpful in identifying the circumstances in earlier time periods that allowed smaller firms and enterprises to bring forth new military tools. [End Page 1029] Byron K. Callan Darien, Connecticut Copyright © 2009 The Society for Military History

Scientists, Truth, and Power

There is little question that the interaction of government and science is one of the cardinal public issues of our time. Climate change, stem cell research, energy development, computer crime, nanotechnology, space exploration, weapons innovation, and other subjects attest to its importance and salience as subject. Many scholars have written about the critical and vexatious government-science relationship. Perhaps the man who first contributed to the serious discussion of it was Don K. Price. At the time he wrote the book discussed here, 1965, the interaction of science, technology, and public policy was much in the news, but academic writing about it was characterized as a literature in search of field

Proportionality, Just War Theory and Weapons Innovation

Just wars are supposed to be proportional responses to aggression: the costs of war must not greatly exceed the benefits. This proportionality principle raises a corresponding 'interpretation problem': what are the costs and benefits of war, how are they to be determined, and a 'measurement problem': how are costs and benefits to be balanced? And it raises a problem about scope: how far into the future do the states of affairs to be measured stretch? It is argued here that weapons innovation always introduces costs, and that these costs cannot be determined in advance of going to war. Three examples, the atomic bomb, the AK-47 and the ancient Greek catapult, are given as examples. It is therefore argued that the proportionality principle is inapplicable prospectively. Some replies to the argument are discussed and rejected. Some more general defences of the proportionality principle are considered and also rejected. Finally, the significance of the argument for Just War Theory as a whole is discussed.

The Qualitative Arms Race: Pluralism Gone Mad?

Large-scale weapons systems have increasingly become part of a patronage system justified by claims about national defense. American politics tends to proceed by distribution, redistribution, and compromise. The disjunction between the "virtually" autonomous processes of worldwide weapons innovation and American incrementalism lead to a potentially disastrous situation. This situation is characterized by potential chaos in the integration of complex, interdependent combat and communication systems as well as a mindless arms race that seems to defy political control. A modest proposal is made to suggest a potential bureaucratic change agent.

Issue-area and foreign policy revisited

In the study of comparative foreign policy, two schools of thought disagree over what accounts for variations in processes and outcomes of foreign policies within and between states. One holds that differences in the characteristics of the countries in question lead to differences in their foreign policies. The other argues that the important differences are not between countries but between issue-areas. A comparison of the Soviet Union and the United States in the issue-area of military policy (in particular, the process of weapons innovation) suggests that the policy processes differ substantially, contrary to what an issue-area approach would predict. On the other hand, the distinctions made by some students of political economy who focus on domestic structures appear to account well for differences between the U.S. and Soviet processes of innovation. The domestic structural approach should be applied to the study of comparative military policy as well as foreign economic policy.

Controlling the Qualitative Arms Race

"Controlling the Qualitative Arms Race." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 29(3), pp. 4–8 Additional informationNotes on contributorsHerbert F. York“The recent small successes in controlling the quantitative side of the arms race also call for renewed efforts to control its qualitative side, to slow down the rate of weapons innovation, and hence to reduce the frequency of introduction of ever more complex and threatening weapons. “Herbert York, former director of Defense Research and Engineering, and former member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, presents here seven different proposals for slowing the qualitative arms race. Dr. York is currently professor of physics, University of California at San Diego. This paper was presented last fall to the 22nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, Oxford, England.

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy, Defence in a New Setting, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's and Unless Peace Comes: A Scientific Forecast of New Weapons

Journal Article The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy, Defence in a New Setting, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's and Unless Peace Comes: A Scientific Forecast of New Weapons Get access The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy. By Michael H. Armacost. Foreword by William T. R. Fox. New York, London: Columbia University Press. 1970. 304 pp. (Institute of War and Peace Studies.) $10.90s.Defence in a New Setting. By Neville Browneet al. London: Fabian Society. 1968. 27 pp. (Fabian Tract, 386.) 3s. 6d.The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's. By George W. Rathjens. Preface by Joseph E. Johnson. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Distributors: Taplinger.) 1969. 53 pp. $.60.Unless Peace Comes: A Scientific Forecast of New Weapons. Ed. by Nigel Calder. 2nd ed. Introduction by Abdus Salam. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 1970. 253 pp. (A Pelican Book 14 021158 6.) 7s. A$1.20. NZ$1. S. Africa RO.85. C$1.50. John Simpson John Simpson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 47, Issue 1, January 1971, Pages 134–135, https://doi.org/10.2307/2614707 Published: 01 January 1971

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy.

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy.

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy

The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy